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Foreword
The plain packaging story has attracted public attention in a way even
its most ardent supporters would have found hard to credit at the out-
set.
At its simplest, the story is one of the public good against commer-
cial evil – governments and health authorities introducing an evidence-
based measure in the face of ferocious opposition from a lethal and
discredited, but still powerful industry. But the story has much more
than this. It has heroes and villains, political chicanery, legal cases in
the High Court and international tribunals, global companies promot-
ing their claims through front groups, research versus junk science,
attempts to distract and disrupt the processes of government, smear
campaigns, shadowy lobbyists, battles for media hearts and headlines,
and dire warnings about Chinese criminal gangs.
While most of the tobacco industry’s claims and predictions have
been duly discredited, its greatest concern – the domino effect – has
been justified. Once even one country with a population of 23 million
showed that plain packaging could be implemented, others would see it
as something feasible. It is clearly now only a matter of time before, like
tobacco advertising bans and measures to protect non-smokers from
passive smoking, plain packaging is introduced in other countries – al-
ways of course opposed by the tobacco industry with ever-increasing
desperation.
vii
Nobody is better placed to tell the story than Simon Chapman and
his colleague and co-author Becky Freeman, and they do so with a
splendidly readable mix of information, anecdote, science, passion and
humour. They take us from the origins of plain packaging through to
all the processes and political activity that led to its introduction, while
also providing thorough analyses of both the science around packaging
and the tobacco industry’s own internal and external positions, machi-
nations and skullduggery.
As they emphasise, plain packaging was not intended as a single
magic bullet to end all smoking overnight; rather it is the next and most
logical step in a comprehensive approach to end tobacco promotion
and to reduce smoking over time, with a special focus on children and
young people. But as they also note, the international tobacco industry’s
frenetic and aggressive response – more ferocious than any of us can
remember over any issue in several decades – provides ample confirma-
tion of the importance the tobacco companies attach to their capacity
to promote through packaging to adults and children alike.
So what have we learned from the plain packaging story?
First and foremost, we have learned that this powerful and ruthless
industry can be defeated, even on an issue that it clearly sees as being of
fundamental importance for its long-term survival.
Second, political leadership and integrity can trump cynical com-
mercial interest. The authors rightly laud Nicola Roxon, Australia’s pi-
oneering health minister and attorney general, to whom they dedicate
their book. She saw prevention as a priority, recognised the importance
of further action on tobacco, implemented comprehensive approaches,
backed plain packaging – and drove it through, despite immense and
often vicious industry opposition. Legislation cannot happen without
legislators: for me, as for Chapman and Freeman, Nicola Roxon is sim-
ply the best and most courageous minister for prevention Australia has
seen. As they further point out, the legislation went through with cross-
party backing, since confirmed by the incoming Coalition government:
credit is properly paid to the then Opposition for treating this as a
health issue rather than a political football, and to some of its MPs, no-
tably Dr Mal Washer, for their staunch support.
Third, tobacco companies are increasingly, in the Australian ver-
nacular, ‘on the nose’. Their lies and deceptions over decades have cre-
ated an environment in which media, politicians and the community
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simply do not believe what they say. Their lack of credibility is com-
pounded by increasing difficulty in finding anyone willing to be associ-
ated with them, or even people of high calibre who want to work for an
industry whose products kill one in two regular users. One must won-
der if some of the industry’s remarkable own goals (such as blatantly
ridiculous assertions about illicit sales, or expecting that ‘astroturfing’
would not be exposed) would have occurred in earlier decades when
they had smarter, classier leaders and executives.
Fourth, public health coalitions can work well and cohesively to-
wards a common goal. The coalition in support of plain packaging was
both organised and instinctive, with wonderful support not only from
core tobacco control groups, but also a wide range of health and com-
munity organisations. It is not surprising that those working in other
areas of public health look to tobacco control as an advocacy model.
Fifth, sound research and a strong evidence base underpin both
good public health policy and effective advocacy. Australia has been
blessed with outstanding tobacco researchers for many years; the au-
thors rightly identify Melanie Wakefield and Michelle Scollo as stellar
researchers who live in the real world and understand its needs, while
maintaining a constant focus on academic rigour and integrity.
As an author, Simon Chapman is inevitably constrained in describ-
ing to the full his own massive contributions. Simon has, of course,
created a unique niche – he is not only an outstanding and creative
advocate, teacher, editor, prolific author and media commentator, but
also a leading researcher who has made many important contributions
to tobacco control literature over many years. It was Simon who pro-
posed plain packaging as a major recommendation for the Australian
National Preventative Health Taskforce after work he and others had
done in this area; he was a crucial figure in the activity that led to its
implementation; he has tirelessly pursued and exposed the industry’s
deceitful counter-arguments; and he deserves even further credit for
following up with this book, as well as so much other invaluable work
in tobacco control. His example should inspire other public health aca-
demics to understand that the roles of researcher and campaigner can
be combined to exceptional effect.
Sixth, while this battle has been won, it is a battle in a war that be-
gan 64 years ago with the BMJ (1) and JAMA (2) reports by Doll and
Hill and Wynder and Graham demonstrating the lethal consequences
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of smoking beyond any doubt. The global battle will continue as long
as there is a commercial tobacco industry, and as long as its leaders –
board members and chief executives – remain personally untouched by
the literally millions of deaths that their actions have caused. In Aus-
tralia, the battle must continue, to avoid complacency and to ensure
that governments support the continuing action that is needed to com-
plement plain packaging.
So while this book tells a great story, it is also an important text
for any who are interested in how good public health policy is devel-
oped and implemented, or whoe are interested in the art and science
of public health advocacy. There should be no illusions about the ob-
stacles entailed in taking on massive global industries. Chapman and
Freeman offer encouragement that, given persistence, good science,
research-based recommendations, skilled advocacy and perhaps above
all, politicians with integrity, the public good can indeed prevail.
Mike Daube AO
Professor of Health Policy
Curtin University
President, Australian Council on Smoking and Health (ACOSH)
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Introduction
Since 1 December 2012 all tobacco products sold in Australia – ciga-
rettes, hand-rolling tobacco, cigars and pipe tobacco – have been re-
quired to be sold in standard ‘plain’ packs. The only features of the pack
that now differentiate one brand from another are the mandatory brand
and ‘variant’ names (for example Dunhill – the brand name – and Pre-
mier Red – a variant of the Dunhill brand). The tobacco manufacturing
and importing companies are required to comply with graphic health
warning legislation, put their name and address on the side of the pack,
and have a unique bar code, which means nothing to any smoker. Other
than these differences, all packs look the same, aside from the variations
induced by having one of 14 graphic health warnings.
But there is nothing plain about Australia’s plain packs. They are
anything but plain white or drab boxes. The plain packaging legislation
was accompanied by new regulations about cigarette pack warnings re-
quiring that the graphic (picture) warnings that had appeared on all
Australian packs since 2006 be increased to 75% of the front of the
pack. The size of the combined text and graphic warning must take up
90% of the back of the pack.
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World first
Australia’s plain packaging legislation was the first time anywhere in the
world that a government had mandated what the entire appearance of
packaging for any product must look like. There are many categories
of consumer goods where governments require mandatory inclusions
on packaging or apply standards to the products themselves. Ingredient
labelling on foods, warning labels on dangerous household or garden
products like cleaning agents, pesticides or flammable goods, and phar-
maceutical product information about dosage and contra-indications,
are all examples where such requirements are common. Many gov-
ernments also require that certain consumer goods must meet safety
standards and that advertising claims for them should not be mislead-
ing.
But nowhere has there been any example of the entire packaging
of a product been prescribed. The Australian legislation was therefore
globally historic, unique and made the statement that tobacco products
were, in every respect, exceptional items of commerce.
Australia joined the front line of global tobacco control 30 years
ago when it became one of the first nations to start banning tobacco
advertising (direct advertising of cigarettes was banned on radio and
television from September 1976). Since that time, successive Australian
governments at state and federal levels have incrementally progressed
their commitment toward a comprehensive approach to tobacco con-
trol. Components of Australia’s approaches to tobacco control include
the following:1
• Taxing tobacco to increase its cost to smokers or potential smokers,
thereby putting a brake on consumption and stimulating cessation.
After Norway, Australia has the most expensive cigarettes in the
world. (3)
• Mass reach anti-smoking media campaigns, well-funded in Aus-
tralia by most global standards. (4)
• Smokefree workplace and public spaces legislation which prevents
smoking inside all public places including all forms of public trans-
1 The best single reference for very detailed information on all aspects of tobacco
control in Australia is www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.
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port, restaurants, cafes, bars and pubs, theatres, cinemas, public halls
and, increasingly, sports stadiums and some outdoor dining areas.
• Large, graphic pack warnings.
• Bans on the retail display and point-of-sale promotion of tobacco
products.
• A prohibition on the use of the deceptive cigarette descriptors ‘light’
and ‘mild’ (5)
• Limits on duty-free imports (only 50 cigarettes) per adult.
• Government subsidy of evidence-based smoking cessation medica-
tions and Quitline funding.
• Specific focus programs such as the Tackling Indigenous smoking ini-
tiative.
Plain packaging is the latest change in a long series of encroachments
onto the pack that commenced with the first tiny warning at the base
of packs that appeared from 1973. The tobacco industry strongly re-
sisted all of these in Australia, as elsewhere around the world. A British
American Tobacco (BAT) official wrote to its German branch office in
1978: ‘Obviously the group policy should be to avoid health warnings
on all tobacco products for just as long as we can.’ Over the next decades
Big Tobacco sought to defeat, dilute and delay even the most modest
changes to pack warnings (see a history of this in Australia here (6)).
The industry threw everything it could at the effort to stop plain
packaging: millions of dollars in hysterical TV and other advertising,
a forlorn High Court challenge that was rejected by all but one of the
seven judges, intense public relations activity, a conga-line of melodra-
matic political threats and bluster from industry allies, including often
obscure US trade and commerce groups. The slippery slope metaphor
was given its biggest ever workout: life as we know it would surely soon
collapse entirely into dreary North Korean conformity when anything
posing even the smallest risk to health was treated in the same way as
tobacco.
Between us, we have worked in tobacco control for a combined to-
tal of 50 years, as researchers and advocates for policy change in several
different countries. Neither of us ever experienced anything remotely as
intense and as sustained as the tobacco industry’s push back against the
impending introduction of plain packaging. As we discuss in the final
chapter, plain packaging has already begun to spread to other nations.
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Because the stakes are so large and the potential impacts so devastat-
ing to the tobacco industry, we would expect similar resistance there to
such developments. This is already happening in Great Britain, Ireland
and New Zealand, using a template that was tried and failed miserably
in Australia.
There is probably no more telling illustration of how much the
tobacco industry fears plain packaging than a comment made to a
parliamentary committee in August 2011 by the chief executive of
British American Tobacco Australia (BATA), David Crow. Crow almost
begged the politicians to keep on raising tobacco tax instead of intro-
ducing plain packs. He said:
What I do believe is that . . . if the objective is to reduce consumption
then you would move towards areas which have been evidence-
based not only in this country but in others around the world –
things like education, which have been proven to work and have been
the focus of many studies across the world. They have been proven to
work very, very well. We have great examples in this country not only
on tobacco but on things like skin cancer and drink driving laws,
where they have changed consumer behaviour. We have seen that be-
ing effective not only here but elsewhere. There should be more, more
and more on that. We need uniformity on pricing; we need to get
pricing right and excise regimes right. We understand that the price
going up when the excise goes up reduces consumption. We saw that
last year very effectively with the increase in excise. There was a 25
per cent increase in the excise and we saw the volumes go down by
about 10.2 per cent; there was about a 10.2 per cent reduction in the
industry last year in Australia. So there are ways of achieving the ob-
jectives that do not infringe on the property rights, do not breach the
laws and the international commitments and do not mean that the
Australian government would have to compensate people. (7) [our
emphases]
Paul Grogan, head of advocacy for Cancer Council Australia, was in-
credulous at Crow’s candour here, in underscoring the sheer despera-
tion of the industry to offer up even another significant tax rise in lieu
of plain packs:
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I was at a hearing where he was fronting the industry presentation
and he effectively said ‘we need to increase tobacco excise’. And I was
thinking, really great! Because we know that really works. That re-
ally struck a chord with a few members of the committee who were
informed enough to know that [tax] really does work. So they were
saying ‘how desperate is this guy, if he’s putting up as an alternative
something that has been proven to work over 30 years of evidence?
Maybe this thing [plain packaging] will work even better.’ It was a
very strange kind of desperation.
Why plain packs?
Why is tobacco so ‘like no other product’ that it warrants this treat-
ment? Globally, tobacco claims more than five million deaths a year.
Many smokers suffer for years from wretched diseases like emphysema
which eventually makes taking a few steps a major effort. Thousands of
previously private internal tobacco industry documents read like recipe
books from crack cocaine labs, detailing how the cigarette can be better
engineered as a nicotine delivery device to ‘make it harder for existing
smokers to leave the product.’ (8)
Lung cancer is a disease that was rarely seen before the mid-1930s.
(9) Thanks to cheap cigarettes that flowed from the mechanisation of
cigarette manufacture, today lung cancer is the world’s leading cause of
cancer death, way ahead of breast, prostate and all other cancers which
often attract massive community and political support. Lung cancer
in males has been falling every year in Australia since 1982, and fe-
male lung cancer rates will probably never reach even half the heights
experienced by men (Figure 1), thanks to successive governments tak-
ing incremental action to curtail the industry since 1973 when health
warnings first appeared. By 2004, the male lung cancer rate had fallen
to that last seen in 1963. In 50 years from now, lung cancer may once
again be ‘history’.
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Figure 1 Male lung cancer rates per 100,000 as low as they were in
1963. Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare National
Mortality Database
The Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin famously said that ‘a single death is a
tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic’. And in tobacco control, there are
statistics to die for. Tobacco caused about 100 million deaths last cen-
tury. But a projected one billion people will die from tobacco-caused
disease this century if present trends continue. (10)
The average smoker takes 12.7 puffs per cigarette. (11) A person
who starts smoking at age 15, and smokes 20 cigarettes a day for 40
years, will baste the delicate pink linings of their mouth, throat and
lungs with a cocktail of 69 carcinogens (12) some 3,710,940 times by
the time they reach just 55 years of age.
Half of long-term smokers die early from a tobacco-caused disease,
taking an average of 10 years off the normal life expectancy. (13) Con-
sider the case of former Beatle George Harrison, who died of lung
cancer at just 58. At the time of his death, British life expectancy for
men was 75 years. So he lost 17 years that we can assume he might oth-
erwise have lived. If we assume Harrison started smoking late – at 18
years – he smoked for 40 years. A cigarette takes about six minutes to
smoke. So for every cigarette that Harrison smoked, he lost more than
five times the time it took to smoke them all, off his normal life ex-
pectancy (14).
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On and on it goes. But even stratospheric statistics on tobacco
deaths have become banal for many. (10) People rationalise that life’s a
jungle of risks, and that feeling fine or seeing longevity in a relative who
smokes means that they are bulletproof. People cling to self-exempting
beliefs (15, 16) such as that air pollution causes most lung cancer, or
that putting on some weight if you quit is more dangerous than smok-
ing.
What is so often missing from these reflections about smoking is
any real appreciation of the suffering and greatly diminished quality of
life in the years that people can spend living with smoking caused dis-
ease.
On many occasions across our careers we have received unsolicited
letters, calls and email from people living with tobacco-caused disease.
Two in particular stand out.
An articulate 52-year-old woman called me a few years ago. Give
the ‘smoking kills’ line a rest, she urged:
I’ve smoked for 30 years. I have emphysema. I am virtually house-
bound. I get exhausted walking more than a few metres. I have
urinary incontinence, and because I can’t move quickly to the toilet,
I wet myself and smell. I can’t bear the embarrassment, so I stay iso-
lated at home. Smoking has ruined my life. You should start telling
people about the living hell smoking causes while you’re still alive,
not just that it kills you.
Then early this year, amid publicity on the 50th anniversary of the first
historic United States Surgeon General’s report on smoking, an amaz-
ingly brave woman, Karen, wrote to me about her experiences with
cancer of the mouth. Smoking tobacco causes around 70% of oral can-
cer in men, and around 55% in women. (17) In 2009, 3031 Australian
were diagnosed with various head and neck cancers, and in 2010, 1045
died. (18)
Here are Karen’s words, used with her permission.
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Karen’s story
This cancer is brutal! Treatments are cruel! Daily for six to eight
weeks during radiotherapy treatments our head and face is covered
with a tight mask and bolted to a slab while radiotherapy is blasted at
our mouth, teeth, jaw, face and neck. Damage during and after this
treatment is horrendous. Many of us will never speak clearly, swal-
low or function normally again.
Patients endure tracheotomies inserted in their wind pipe be-
cause we cannot breathe naturally through our mouth and nose due
to swelling and other side effects.
Many people are left with PEG [percutaneous endoscopic gas-
trostomy] feeding tubes shoved in their stomach for the rest of their
lives because they will never swallow normal food via their mouth
again. I had a PEG tube for three and a half years. A tube hanging
from our stomach is sickening and depressing. Think about never
eating another meal or swallowing again! You can’t imagine the
never ending physical and emotional hell this particular disease
causes.
I was diagnosed in 2007 at 46 years of age. Yes, I smoked for sev-
eral years. I have endured 12 surgeries since 2007 trying to improve
my quality of life.
Almost all my entire tongue, lower jaw, gums and beautiful teeth
have been removed and reconstructed because of treatments to re-
move cancer. Bone was taken from my hip to reconstruct my jaw.
Normal function is gone. Permanently. My perfect face is now disfig-
ured.
I have not sat down to a normal meal with friends or family in
almost seven years. Those pleasures of socialising, eating at restau-
rants and dinner parties that everyone regularly attends are history
for us. I struggle to control saliva because of oral cavity nerve dam-
age and facial trauma. Sometimes I dribble when I try to speak. I will
never kiss again.
My life has been destroyed by this cancer, as has many other
wonderful people around Australia. We lose our careers. Relation-
ships fall apart.
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We can’t make appointments over the telephone or ask for
something over a counter. No one can understand us! We write down
questions during appointments because we can’t speak and doctors
don’t understand what we’re saying. That doesn’t work! This is frus-
trating, humiliating and extremely upsetting.
The aftermath from this disease is debilitating and permanent.
Dental issues are painful and relentless, yet the previous federal
government abolished the Enhanced Care Dental Scheme. This is
shameful!
We can’t just pick up from where we left off. We can’t ‘do coffee’
with friends and chat about our issues like most other cancer patients
because we can’t speak or drink as normal. We can’t cover our mouth
with a piece of clothing and get on with it. Our face is our identity!
Many smokers say things like ‘oh well, I’m going to die anyway’
or ‘I could get hit by a bus tomorrow’. Well, from my experience I
can honestly say dying immediately would be much easier than the
long slow suffering this disease puts patients through. In 2007 while
in hospital I had a cardiac arrest because the tracheotomy blocked.
Once resuscitated, little did I know I had years and years of pain,
ongoing treatments and loss of normal function ahead of me! It’s
devastating!
My lower face and mouth has been cut and shut many times. My
neck/throat has been dissected twice ear to ear. It’s been a long diffi-
cult road! I’ve undergone six surgeries in the past three years trying
to improve mouth function and facial appearance. More than likely
there’s a few more down the track. I have a wonderful plastic surgeon
who genuinely cares!
Karen’s hopes are for more resources to be given to care and support for
people in her situation. We hope her story stimulates far greater atten-
tion to the impact of cancer on people’s lives.
But with so much potential for head and neck cancers to be pre-
vented, we hope too that her unforgettable words will be passed along
to anyone still smoking. It is stories like Karen’s which explain why to-
bacco control is so important.
Plain packaging is the latest strategy in a suite of policies and
awareness campaigns that have been driving smoking down in nations
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like Australia over the past three to four decades. It is difficult to over-
state the global importance of Australia’s leadership: the new tobacco
packaging law makes an exceptional statement about tobacco, lifting it
into a league above all other health risks.
There is one parallel: prescribed drugs, which are designed to save
lives and enhance health, but are heavily restricted because of misuse
concerns. Unlike cigarettes, antibiotics, oral contraceptives and
cholesterol-controlling drugs are not sold in pretty, highly market-re-
searched boxes, but in plain packs with the name and dosage instruc-
tions.
The tobacco industry has been stripped of its ability to call its car-
cinogenic products ‘mild’ or ‘light’; banished from all above-the-line
advertising and all sponsorship; told by all major political parties in
Australia, except the Nationals and Liberal Democrats, that its polit-
ical donations are unwanted; uniquely excluded from giving research
money to universities; rejected as an investment option by an increas-
ing number of superannuation funds; (19) and ensconced in the pub-
lic’s mind as the index case example of corporate mendacity.
The new Australian pack law sets a catastrophic precedent for the
global tobacco industry because it rips the very heart out of its ability
to dress the pack to make a killing. Tobacco packaging is now devoid
of any graphic feature – including colours and special scripts on the
cigarette itself – that conveys any associations other than harm. Just as
no Australian aged 22 or under has today ever seen a football match
sponsored by tobacco or a cigarette advertisement in any Australian
publication or on television, the next generation of kids will grow up
having no sense of what the totally image-driven difference is between
Brand X or Brand Y, and how they might select a brand to distract
from some aspect of a fragile personality. The new law has effectively
put an end to this lethal corporate pied piper’s promotional tune that
has led many millions to early deaths. The emperor of cancer now has
no clothes in Australia.
In public health and medicine, we venerate milestones like public
sanitation, the discovery of anaesthesia, the introduction of vaccina-
tion, and the development of antibiotics and contraception. With
chronic diseases like cancer, heart and respiratory disease dominating
global disease profiles, governments with the courage to tackle corpo-
rations whose goals are antithetical to public health deserve a similar
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place in history. This law, combined with the significant tax rises, is as
big as it gets.
We have written this book principally for those in other countries
wanting to make the best case for plain packaging and to defend it
from the inevitable attacks that will follow. We also wanted to produce
a history of how such a major step in the history of tobacco control oc-
curred, how it was resisted and how it prevailed. So often, such histories
in public health exist as oral histories only, so we wanted to capture as
much of it as we could.
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1
Early advocacy for plain packs
The idea that governments might require all tobacco products to be
sold in so-called plain, standardised or generic packs, devoid of any el-
ement or feature that might contribute to their attractiveness or allure
to smokers or future smokers, can be traced back to Canada in the
mid-1980s. Dr Gerry Karr appears to be the first person to have for-
mally proposed the idea in a motion presented at a Canadian Medical
Association annual general meeting in June 1986, (20) and David
Sweanor, a Canadian tobacco control activist, was recommending it to
politicians in 1988. (21) Over the next decade, the proposal received
some attention from researchers and advocates in Australia (David Hill
and Ron Borland and colleagues) (22), New Zealand (Park Beede, Rob
Lawson, Mike Shepherd and Michael Carr-Gregg, (23–26) and a con-
siderable amount of attention in Canada (27, 28).
Carr-Gregg, who headed up a coalition of tobacco control groups
in New Zealand, told us he had been told about plain packaging by
David Sweanor. The coalition soon promoted the idea to a parliamen-
tary committee sitting and Carr-Gregg says: ‘I remember the expression
on the industry’s face when we outlined this at a select committee – they
looked apoplectic! One of them rushed out of the room (presumably
to phone head office of BAT [British American Tobacco]). I don’t think
they saw that coming!’
The vanguard New Zealand government’s Toxic Substances Board
1989 report (29) endorsed a proposal by Murray Laugesen, represent-
1
ing the Coalition Against Tobacco Advertising and Promotion, that
cigarettes be sold only in white packs with black text and no colours or
logos. This recommendation was not taken up by the government, but
the momentum had begun.
In 1990 the conference resolutions at the Seventh World Confer-
ence on Tobacco or Health in Perth included one submitted by Cana-
dian advocate Gar Mahood stating:
Generic packaging: given the importance of package designs in pro-
moting tobacco products, this Conference endorses the concept of
mandatory generic packaging of all tobacco products, and urges all
countries to include generic packaging in their tobacco control legis-
lation. (30)
A similar resolution was passed at the 1994 world conference in Buenos
Aires.
A BATCO fax from 1994 summed up these early beginnings, con-
cluding prophetically with ‘the rest is history’ (Figure 1.1).
Early Australian interest
In 1992, the Australian Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy (MCDS)
comprising health, police and justice ministers from all eight states and
territories, considered a report commissioned by the MCDS Tobacco
Taskforce, chaired by Mike Daube. (22) This report recommended that
‘regulations be extended to cover the colours, design and wording of the
entire exterior of the pack’. The MCDS report proposed large new warn-
ings and asked for a report on plain packaging. While new, stronger
warnings were mandated on all packs from January 1995, the idea of
plain packaging did not progress. At that stage the ministers were only
prepared to move in a staged process to larger, stronger warnings.
A memo from WD & HO Wills (the BAT company then trading in
Australia) noted:
Mike Daube’s influence as chairman of the Tobacco Taskforce re-
viewing pack labelling in 1991 was a crucial first step in a wider
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Figure 1.1 BATCO summary of plain packaging developments, 1993. A 70
page dossier of these various early papers was prepared for a BATCO
meeting held in September 1993 (31) where those attending considered
how they might derail this early momentum.
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agenda, which, of course, culminated in the CBRC [Centre for Be-
havioural Research in Cancer] Report in 1992. (32)
Daube returned to the plain packaging agenda 17 years later, when he
chaired the National Preventative Health Taskforce Tobacco Commit-
tee (see pp 18).
In 1993, Cancer Council Australia’s national cancer prevention
policy included a recommendation for plain packs. This recommenda-
tion was maintained in all six subsequent updates of the policy.
In December 1994, Western Australia’s health minister, Peter Foss,
called for the introduction of plain packaging (33) and the Australian
Medical Association lobbied for it in 1995. (34)
In September 1997, the Australian government responded to a Sen-
ate committee’s recommendation that plain packaging be considered.
While not committing in any way to the policy, its careful wording did
not close the door on the possibility:
In response to the mounting interest in generic packaging, the Com-
monwealth obtained advice from the attorney general’s department
on the legal and constitutional barriers to generic packaging. This ad-
vice indicates that the Commonwealth does possess powers under
the constitution to introduce such packaging but that any attempt
to use these powers to introduce further tobacco control legislation
needs to be considered in the context of the increasingly critical at-
tention being focused on the necessity, appropriateness, justification
and basis for regulation by such bodies as the Office of Regulatory
Review, the High Court and Senate standing committees. In addi-
tion, further regulation needs to be considered in the context of
Australia’s international obligations regarding free trade under the
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), and our obligations
under international covenants such as the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, and the agreement on Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). (35)
As we will see in Chapter 6, the High Court of Australia roundly re-
jected tobacco companies’ constitutional arguments in 2012 and much
legal scholarship has challenged expressed concerns about Australia’s
international treaty obligations. (36) However tobacco industry com-
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mentary in other countries, and a subsequent withdrawal from an early
attempt to introduce such legislation by the Canadian government,
may have influenced Australian political thinking at the time. Respond-
ing to the Australian Medical Association’s calls for plain packaging,
a spokesperson for the then Labor health minister Carmen Lawrence
is reported to have said plain packs ‘would breach constitutional re-
quirement for free trade. We would have to buy the tobacco companies’
trademarks, and that would cost us hundreds of millions of dollars.’ (34)
Canadian campaign
In the mid-1990s, Canada went further than any nation and considered
introducing plain packaging legislation, with Health Canada commis-
sioning a thumping 427 page expert review. (27) The then Canadian
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien had announced in February 1994 a sig-
nificant rollback of tobacco taxes, after increased tobacco smuggling
into Canada occurred via Native American reservations on the US-
Canada border. (37) To counter concerns about the impact this would
have on the health of Canadians, he promised several compensatory
measures, including consideration of plain packaging of cigarettes.
Within weeks of this announcement, the Canadian House of Commons
Standing Committee on Health launched public hearings into the pos-
sible impact and effects of plain packaging.
The tobacco industry responded by launching a coordinated cam-
paign that focused on framing plain packaging as an intellectual prop-
erty issue; countering health agency research with industry-sponsored
expertise (an edited book was produced by the long-time tobacco in-
dustry consultant, the late John Luik; (38)) and creating a public debate
designed to weaken public support. The tobacco companies Philip
Morris and RJ Reynolds worked with former US trade representative
Carla Hills and former deputy trade representative Julius Katz to tell
the Canadian government that plain packaging would be an ‘unlawful
expropriation’ of their trademark rights and that ‘the compensation
claims of affected foreign trademark holders would be staggering,
amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.’ (39)
The tobacco industry decided to fight plain packaging on trade
grounds. Arguments focused on intellectual property agreements gov-
1 Early advocacy for plain packs
5
erned by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and
the investment protection contained in the North American Free Trade
Agreement. Despite being told repeatedly by WIPO that its analysis was
flawed, (40) the industry persisted in telling the government and the
media that plain packaging would be contrary to intellectual property
protections. Following the industry’s misrepresentation of international
trade law, a newly appointed Canadian health minister dropped plain
packaging. By 1995, plain packaging was no longer on the policy radar
in Canada due to the success of the tobacco industry's campaign, cou-
pled with a Canadian Supreme Court ruling against provisions of the
Tobacco Products Control Act on advertising and promotion.
However, as two slides from an internal industry presentation show
(Figure 1.2), from at least 1994 the tobacco industry was well aware that
international trade treaties and conventions provided it with ‘little pro-
tection’, ‘little support’ and ‘little joy’ in defeating plain packaging. Its
success in framing plain packaging as being incompatible with these
treaties and conventions was a triumph of public relations spin over
sophisticated legal understanding of what those treaties would have al-
lowed. The spin had succeeded.
Removing the emperor’s clothes
6
Figure 1.2 Tobacco industry knowledge of legal impediments in
opposing plain packaging, 1990s. Source:
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hpp34a99
Canadians Rob Cunningham and Ken Kyle published a summary of
the case for plain packaging in 1995. (41) Physicians for a Smoke-free
Canada have written a detailed account of why Canada did not adopt
plain packaging in the 1990s, some 20 years ago. (39) Their report re-
views internal tobacco industry documents from the period that have
since come as a result of settlements of legal actions in the United
States, and traces the tobacco industry campaign to ensure that plain
packaging reforms would not succeed.
The new millennium
The failure of New Zealand, Canada and Australia to progress in the
1990s may have temporarily taken the wind out of the sails of advocacy
for plain packs. But the concept had taken firm root and was never far
from the surface of future possibilities in global tobacco control circles.
Two papers on the importance of packaging in the tobacco advertising
and promotional mix (42, 43) were published early in the new millen-
nium by Australian researcher Melanie Wakefield’s group, and a case
study of tobacco packaging was published in the legal literature in 2004
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by Melbourne lawyer Benn McGrady. It explored whether the TRIPS
agreement ‘creates a positive right to use a trademark,’ concluding that
it did not. (44)
In May 2003, the World Health Assembly, the parliament of the
World Health Association, adopted the world’s first global health treaty,
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). As of April
2014, 178 nations (as well the European Union) have ratified the treaty
and have thereby become ‘Parties’ to it.
Recommendations on plain packaging were included in guidelines
on packaging and labelling and on advertising and promotion that were
adopted at the 3rd Conference of the Parties, held in Durban, South
Africa, in November 2008. (45)
Clause 46 of the guidelines for implementation of article 11, Guide-
lines on packaging and labelling of tobacco products, states:
Plain packaging
Parties should consider adopting measures to restrict or prohibit the
use of logos, colours, brand images or promotional information on
packaging other than brand names and product names displayed in
a standard colour and font style (plain packaging). This may increase
the noticeability and effectiveness of health warnings and messages,
prevent the package from detracting attention from them, and ad-
dress industry package design techniques that may suggest that some
products are less harmful than others. (46)
And article 13, Guidelines on tobacco advertising, promotion and spon-
sorship (47) states:
16. The effect of advertising or promotion on packaging can be elim-
inated by requiring plain packaging: black and white or two other
contrasting colours, as prescribed by national authorities; nothing
other than a brand name, a product name and/or manufacturer’s
name, contact details and the quantity of product in the packaging,
without any logos or other features apart from health warnings, tax
stamps and other government-mandated information or markings;
prescribed font style and size; and standardized shape, size and mate-
rials. There should be no advertising or promotion inside or attached
to the package or on individual cigarettes or other tobacco products.
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17. If plain packaging is not yet mandated, the restriction should
cover as many as possible of the design features that make tobacco
products more attractive to consumers such as animal or other fig-
ures, ‘fun’ phrases, coloured cigarette papers, attractive smells, nov-
elty or seasonal packs.
Recommendation
Packaging and product design are important elements of advertising
and promotion. Parties should consider adopting plain packaging re-
quirements to eliminate the effects of advertising or promotion on
packaging. Packaging, individual cigarettes or other tobacco prod-
ucts should carry no advertising or promotion, including design
features that make products attractive.
In 2005, Cancer Research UK called for the implementation of plain
packaging for tobacco products, allowing for only the brand name,
the health warning and any other mandatory consumer information
to appear on such packs. After studying tobacco company documents,
Cancer Research UK concluded plain packaging was ‘the next step in
breaking the links between the tobacco industry and its consumers’.
(48)
In 2006, Canadian lawyer Eric Le Gresley presented on the legal
considerations relevant to plain packaging to a global audience at the
13th World Conference on Tobacco or Health in Washington DC.
Timely review
In August 2007, we were part of a research team working on a three-
year National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) grant
examining various options for ‘the future of tobacco control’. (49) Being
a very advanced nation in global tobacco control, Australia had fully
implemented almost all of the planks of a comprehensive tobacco con-
trol policy platform. But smoking prevalence remained at just under
one in five adults, and our project sought to focus on some of the
less developed or more contentious issues where Australia (and indeed
most nations) had not advanced very far. Our group published papers
on issues as diverse as regulating the retail environment, (50) genetic
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testing for susceptibility to smoking, (51) harm reduction (52) and,
later, smoker licensing. (53)
Plain packaging was one such issue, and along with Matthew Rim-
mer, a legal scholar in intellectual property from the Australian Na-
tional University, we published an online review, (54) later peer-re-
viewed, (10) on the concept of plain packaging and the evidence and
arguments for it.
Researchers are often asked to nominate papers they have pro-
duced which they believe have been influential in ‘real world’ settings.
This was one such paper. Our review was cited by numerous other
researchers who went on to conduct experiments that clearly demon-
strated that removing the design elements of packaging sharply reduced
product appeal and increased consumer attention to health warn-
ings—see Chapter 2. Our review has been steadily cited by other re-
searchers (Google Scholar shows 111 citations by October 2014, easily
the most for any paper yet published on plain packaging) but by far
the most important outcome was the timing of its publication and the
role it played in shaping the wording of the background and recom-
mendation on plain packaging in the reports of Australia’s National
Preventative Health Taskforce (see pp 18).
In May 2008 Scotland’s Smoking Prevention Action Plan (55) com-
mitted its government to consider moving towards plain packaging
of tobacco products, in conjunction with the British government and
other devolved administrations.
The British government followed suit, releasing a Consultation on
the future of tobacco control, (56) where it sought reactions from stake-
holders and the public on measures that included plain packaging.
In June 2008, the Cancer Council of Western Australia included a
question about plain packaging among 21 other tobacco control policy
related questions as part of a post-campaign evaluation survey of 408
smokers and non-smokers in metropolitan and non-metropolitan ar-
eas. They asked: ‘To what extent are you in favour or against each of the
following measures?’ The statement given was: ‘Selling tobacco prod-
ucts in plain packaging, with only the brand name and health warnings.’
Combining those who were in favour or strongly in favour, 87%
of non-smokers, 67% of recent quitters and 45% of smokers were in
favour. Among smokers, only 13% were against, with the remainder
having no opinion.
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In 2011, the Australian public continued to be supportive of the
proposal, with 72% of the community supporting the idea in an April
2011 Victorian survey, notwithstanding heavy industry spending on
advertising and public relations. (57)
Industry awareness of the approaching storm
From at least 2007, there were signs that the tobacco industry was well
aware that the plain packaging issue was about to awaken from its short
siesta. Morgan Stanley advised investors:
In our opinion, [after taxation] the other two regulatory environment
changes that concern the industry the most are homogenous pack-
aging and below-the-counter sales. Both would significantly restrict
the industry’s ability to promote their products. (58)
In September 2008, Adam Spielman, a tobacco analyst at Citigroup, was
interviewed by the trade magazine Tobacco Journal International. (59)
Spielman was in no doubt as to how important it would be to the in-
dustry to stop plain packaging, saying:
If the proposal is carried out, it would reduce the brand equity of cig-
arettes massively. In my opinion, more than half the brand impact
is in the design of the cigarette packet, as opposed to the name of
the particular brand. As the industry’s profits depend on some con-
sumers paying a premium of as much as GBP 1.50 (EUR 1.90) for
certain brands, anything that weakens this will dramatically reduce
profitability. In terms of market shares, you would expect an even
more rapid trend of downtrading. Over time, I think the proposal
would result in a very severe reduction in the industry’s profit.
Spielman noted with some prescience that plain packaging in the UK
was ‘unlikely in the next year or two. On a five- or ten-year view, then I
think it is certainly possible.’ He continued:
It is important to remember that every anti-tobacco proposal that
has been consulted on by the UK government in the last 10 years has
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been implemented. In addition, the industry has little hope in ap-
pealing to natural justice – no politician has any incentive to support
it.
Spielman returned to the issue in 2010, writing:
The most important issue is plain packaging, but there is no advance
here. We have always said that, for investors, the no 1 regulatory
issue is plain (or generic) packaging: we believe greying out all packs
would lead to rapid downtrading. (60)
In a video review, Euromonitor’s tobacco analyst Don Hedley described
plain packaging as the mother of all battles that would be faced by the
tobacco industry. (61) Two tobacco industry trade magazines, Tobacco
Journal International (April 2008) and Tobacco Reporter (November
2012) ran cover stories on plain packaging (see Figures 1.3 and 1.4). The
Tobacco Journal International cover warned ‘plain packaging can kill
your business’. Actually, this was the whole point, or as Homer Simpson
might have put it: ‘D’oh!’ Effective tobacco control unavoidably means
reduced sales of tobacco.
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Figure 1.3 Cover of trade journal Tobacco Journal International,
April 2008
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Figure 1.4 Cover of trade journal Tobacco Reporter, November
2012
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Prevention on a new
government’s agenda
It is commonly said that conservative governments have ideological
antibodies to preventive health policy, particularly when it comes to
anything regulatory. The conventional wisdom is that they are comfort-
able with funding education and information campaigns, but almost
congenitally leery of anything regulatory. However, this characterisa-
tion is difficult to sustain when it comes to tobacco control.
From the early 1980s on, various state governments from both
sides of politics had run sporadic mass reach campaigns commencing
in New South Wales (62) and Western Australia (63) and implemented
state and territory-level legislative measures.
But the conservative Coalition government under prime minister
John Howard (1996–2007) changed that, introducing at least three very
important, sustained initiatives that were anything but signs of a
tobacco-friendly party.
As health minister Michael Wooldridge (1996–2001) ensured un-
precedented levels of funding for Australia’s first national tobacco con-
trol campaign, which commenced in June 1997. Australian government
funding was in excess of $7m over two years, with another $2m being
spent by state governments. Funding for the national campaign was
maintained and increased throughout the Howard era and continued
during the Labor government years. Funding for tobacco control pro-
grams in Australia increased from 26 cents per adult in 1996 to 55 cents
per adult in 1998 and continued at 49 cents per adult from 2001.1
15
Table 2.1: Recent health ministers and prime ministers, Australia
Health minister Prime minister Party Duration
Tony Abbott John Howard Coalition Oct’03 – Dec‘07
Nicola Roxon Kevin Rudd Labor Dec’07 – Jun’10
Julia Gillard Jun’10 – Dec’11
Tanya Plibersek Julia Gillard Dec’11 – Jul’13
Kevin Rudd Jul’13 – Sept’13
Peter Dutton Tony Abbott Coalition Sept’13 on
In 1999, after several years of extensive lobbying by health groups using
magnificent, detailed reports prepared by Michelle Scollo for the Can-
cer Council Australia, the Coalition government switched from levying
excise and customs duty on cigarettes on a weight basis to a per stick
basis. Over the ensuing years, this had a dramatic effect on increasing
the retail price of tobacco, while also increasing government revenue.
With price being the single most important determinant of consump-
tion, this decision could never be construed as the act of a government
or party which was soft on tobacco contro.
Also during this time, the Coalition government followed Canada
to be one of the first nations to require graphic health warnings on all
tobacco packs (announced in 2003, with regulations adopted in July
2004 and fully implemented from March 2006). This was in the face of
strident tobacco industry opposition, and so again an action incompat-
ible with the idea of a government soft on tobacco control. Tony Abbott,
later prime minister, was health minister in the Coalition government
at that time.
The newly elected Labor government brimmed with enthusiasm
about health policy reform. While in Opposition, Kevin Rudd had
made a point of emphasising that prevention would be promoted as a
1 See http://tiny.cc/1seqox
Removing the emperor’s clothes
16
major platform of health policy reform (see http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=PwON8dc9zw4).
Rudd’s health minister was lawyer Nicola Roxon, who held a Labor
seat in Melbourne’s socially disadvantaged inner west. Roxon had been
in parliament since 1998 and Rudd had appointed her as shadow health
minister in December 2006. She rapidly developed a reputation within
health and medical circles as a highly intelligent, population-focused,
big picture politician. ABC-TV’s Australian Story, broadcast a 30
minute portrait of Roxon, including her reflections on her decision to
support plain packaging (see http://www.abc.net.au/austory/specials/
kickingthehabit/default.htm) and The Age (64) and the Australian Fi-
nancial Review (65) newspapers ran lengthy portraits.
Her chief of staff from mid-2008 was Dr Angela Pratt, who had
done her doctoral research on political debates surrounding Indigenous
rights since the 1970s, before spending several years as a researcher
specialising in health policy in the Canberra Parliamentary Library.
The two formed a formidable team, complemented by staffers Chris
Picton (later to be Nicola Roxon’s chief of staff when she became Attor-
ney General), Chris Altis and, later, Angela Koutoulas. These staff were
frequently in contact with key individuals in the public health and re-
search communities seeking advice and information, and at different
times urging that we might ramp up public discussion of particular as-
pects of the plain packs proposal.
Angela Pratt recalled the last year of Labor being in Opposition:
It was the year before an election so we wanted to carve out an
agenda in health that distinguished us from the Government. . . . I
see that year of Opposition as laying the groundwork for all of the
things in this area that came after. In particular in that year of Op-
position, the Labor Party released a policy paper which was all about
putting prevention at the centre of the health debate. In that paper
we proposed establishing the Prevention Taskforce as well as doing
a few other things to put preventive health on the political agenda
and very much on Labor’s health agenda. We also thought of it as
a Labor agenda in that the people who are most predominantly af-
fected by preventable illness, including preventable illness caused by
tobacco smoke, are people in lower socioeconomic groups. So it was
in a sense a new take on an old-fashioned Labor issue, in that it was
2 Prevention on a new government’s agenda
17
trying to look after the people who are most disadvantaged by the
problem. We saw that as an area that the previous government had
neglected.
Within two months of taking government, Rudd convened the Aus-
tralia 2020 Summit, which saw 1000 Australian leaders in 10 policy
areas converge on Canberra in April to engage in a two day ‘future vi-
sion’ exercise for the country. Prevention is a word that featured often in
the Summit’s report across a number of fields. It was a theme in health
policy that would continue throughout the life of the two terms Labor
was in power.
In 2008, with 50 or so others from the health sector around Aus-
tralia, I was invited to a briefing in Canberra by Roxon. Just as Rudd
had emphasised in his public speeches, her presentation started with,
and dwelt on prevention, not in its usual role as a Cinderella-like policy
confection to be sprinkled on the ‘real’ meat and potatoes of health pol-
icy like hospital crises and expensive drug subsidies, destined to turn
into a neglected pumpkin after any midnight of fiscal restraint, but as
a primary consideration. Here was a rare government health minister
sending direct and forceful signals that chronic disease prevention was
to be taken seriously. To most in the room, Roxon seemed to ‘get it’, to
understand the enormous potential for a population-focused approach
to public health to achieve major and lasting reductions in mortality
and social costs, and wide-scale improvements in health and quality of
life. There was palpable excitement in the room that prevention might
at last be elevated in health policy reform.
The National Preventative Health Taskforce
In April 2009, the new government lost no time in getting prevention
further on to the policy agenda by announcing the establishment of
a National Preventative Health Taskforce to develop a framework and
recommendations for national action on prevention, focusing in the
first instance on three leading areas – obesity, tobacco and alcohol.
While a few were mildly irritated by it being called ‘preventative’ in-
stead of the more felicitous ‘preventive’, the establishment of a peak
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national committee focused entirely on prevention was seen as the
opening of a massive door of opportunity.
Mike Daube, who after the now-retired Nigel Gray and David Hill
(both former directors of the Cancer Council Victoria) has a longer
track record in tobacco control than anyone in Australia, was appointed
to the Taskforce as both deputy chair, and as chair of its tobacco com-
mittee. The Taskforce was chaired by the widely respected Professor
Rob Moodie. The members of the committee advising the taskforce
on tobacco control were Viki Briggs (an Indigenous specialist in to-
bacco control), Dr Christine Connors (a public health doctor from the
Northern Territory), Mike Daube, Dr Shaun Larkin (managing director
of the health insurance company HCF), Kate Purcell (a highly experi-
enced tobacco control specialist from NSW), Dr Lyn Roberts (CEO of
the National Heart Foundation), Denise Sullivan (another highly ex-
perienced public health specialist from Western Australia), Professor
Melanie Wakefield (arguably the world’s leading researcher on mass
reach campaign evaluation in tobacco control) and me. Michelle Scollo,
former director of Quit Victoria and to many, the most encyclopaedic
and astute person in Australian tobacco control, was appointed as the
official writer for the committee.
Daube said that the invitations to sit on the taskforce came directly
from the minister’s office:
Absolutely from the minister’s office. I’m sure with some advice from
the department and I think particularly having people like Rob
[Moodie, the chair], myself and Lyn Roberts on there sent out a very
strong signal about what this was to be about – this wasn’t just to be
about ‘popular’ prevention. This was to be about coming up with sig-
nificant recommendations that would make a difference.
My view was that this was a chance of a lifetime, the one chance
you get in a lifetime. You’ve got a terrific minister. You’ve got a pow-
erful commission taskforce. You have the best committee you could
find. So let’s go for it.
So that’s the message I tried to send out to the committee and
the superb secretariat. It was our chance to produce the best report
that you could do.
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On the first day the tobacco committee met, Daube emphasised to us
that his brief had been to convene a committee who should be in no
doubt that the government wanted recommendations that would really
make a difference. Roxon backed this in an interview, saying:
The only real riding instructions that I can recall having to reiterate
quite often was to not give us one all-or-nothing recommendation,
but to give us a cascading range of options, but not to be scared about
what was included in those options.
We all agreed that we should prepare a report and give recommen-
dations that reflected world’s best practice in tobacco control. In one
meeting after a lengthy discussion about where Australia was at the
time and where it might go, we took turns to propose sometimes bold,
but always evidence-based recommendations. One of these was a sub-
stantial increased tobacco tax: two lots of 25%. A 25% increase was
introduced within 24 hours of its announcement in April 2010. A 2013
Treasury paper shows that this increase reduced apparent consumption
of dutied tobacco products by 11%, nearly twice the 6% that had been
predicted. (66) In 2013, a further four annual 12.5% increases were
announced and later adopted by the incoming Coalition government.
Tobacco taxes were to rise 75% over seven years, on top of the routine
rises reflecting changes in the consumer price index. Labor had intro-
duced this, and the Coalition supported it.
Having been closely involved with plain packaging in the months
before the committee’s formation through our review of industry docu-
ments and tobacco trade literature, (67) when it came to my turn in the
committee, I recommended plain packaging, which was unanimously
supported.
Three National Preventative Health Taskforce committees each
produced an initial paper in December 2008. (68) The tobacco discus-
sion paper included consideration of a wide range of policy initiatives,
including plain packaging. Following its release there was an extensive
period, until April 2009, for consultation and public submissions. Some
400 submissions were received. (69)
It was noteworthy that notwithstanding a very broad range of is-
sues and options considered in the discussion paper, 43 of the 142
pages of responses from the major tobacco companies active in Aus-
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tralia (BAT, Philip Morris, Imperial Tobacco) were devoted to opposing
plain packaging.
Mike Daube’s instincts saw this as extremely telling:
Nearly a third of their responses were on plain packaging. So we
thought wow, we’re onto something here. We thought it was going to
be good. We didn’t realise it could be that important and I don’t think
they could have been more helpful in showing us where the main
game was for them.
Early media interest
In April, ABC TV’s program Lateline ran a lengthy item on the possibil-
ity that Australia would pick up the plain packaging baton dropped by
Canada in the mid-1990s. I had recommended to Lateline’s reporter Pe-
ter Lloyd that Canadian researcher Cynthia Callard would be the ideal
person to interview.
Callard emphasised that the earlier decisions byCanada and Aus-
tralia to not pursue plain packing had nothing to do with the strength
of the legal case made against the move, but said everything about the
success of the tobacco industry’s bluff at the time. (70) She said:
Well, they did that because the whole legal and trade world is a bit
behind a black curtain. It is not like the scientific world, where things
are published and data are shared. They could come in and tell gov-
ernments that they had a good case, that they had legal opinions that
told them they had a good case, that their trademarks could be pro-
tected.
Now we knew that this was unlikely to be the case because the
key issue is that you can own a trademark, but it doesn’t give you the
right to use it. The only thing that ownership gives you is the right to
stop other people from using it, and what we now know as a result
of . . . documents that were released as a result of US court actions,
is that the tobacco companies had gone to their own lawyers, they
had gone to the international agencies like WIPO that govern trade-
marks, they had surveyed all of the trade agreements they could find
and they came to an internal conclusion that they had no case.
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But instead of telling governments, well, we were wrong, they
paid people to publish books that provided contrary evidence and
they just played a good game of chicken.
Sadly, governments blinked and they caved. The Canadian gov-
ernment first and then the Australian government. What we hope
now is that with this stronger evidence of exactly the nature of the
industry bluffing, that the trade departments will be more supportive
of the health ministries to bring in plain packaging.
The taskforce’s final report, delivered to the health minister on 30 June
and released in September 2009, contained a recommendation on plain
packaging as part of a comprehensive approach: ‘Mandate plain pack-
aging of cigarettes and increase the required size of graphic health
warnings to take up at least 90% of the front and 100% of the back of
the pack.’ (68)
The report elaborated:
Plain packaging would prohibit brand imagery, colours, corporate
logos and trademarks, permitting manufacturers only to print the
brand name in a mandated size, font and place, in addition to re-
quired health warnings and other legally mandated product infor-
mation such as toxic constituents, tax paid seals or package contents.
A standard cardboard texture would be mandatory, and the size
and shape of the package and cellophane wrapper would also be
prescribed. (67) A detailed analysis of current marketing practices
suggests that plain packaging would also need to encompass pack
interiors and the cigarette itself, given the potential for manufactur-
ers to use colours, bandings and markings, and different length and
gauges to make cigarettes more ‘interesting’ and appealing. Any use
of perfuming, incorporation of audio chips or affixing of ‘onserts’
would also need to be banned.
The legislative announcement
Nearly eight months passed until 29 April 2010, when prime minister
Kevin Rudd and health minister Nicola Roxon made the historic an-
nouncement that Australia would mandate plain packaging from July
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2012, (71) along with a 25% tax increase and a range of further initia-
tives on tobacco.
Over those eight months, some committee members had written
opinion page articles and otherwise commented on the importance of
plain packaging, but none of us had received any feedback or indication
from the government or the bureaucracy as to which recommenda-
tions might be selected for adoption. The proposed legislation was first
announced at a press conference held by the two, although late night
television broke the news the night before.
Several of us had been called by Roxon’s office about 6pm that
night, because a television station had got wind of the imminent an-
nouncement. For those closely involved, that phone call was one of
those occasions like always remembering where you were when a big
news incident occurs. I picked up the phone at home and Angela Pratt,
Roxon’s chief of staff said deadpan: ‘I thought you might like to know
that we’ll be announcing in the morning that we’ll be introducing plain
packaging.’
Daube, as chair, had been briefed a few days earlier.
I was going into a lecture and the mobile rang and I looked at it and
thought do I take this call? Oh, who knows? So I took it and there
was a voice on the other end saying ‘Nicola Roxon here.’ So I thought
well, maybe it was good idea to take the call and she says ‘Mike, you
can’t tell anyone but we’re going with the tax and we’re going with
plain packaging’. It was so hard to keep the widest grin you’ve ever
seen off my face when I walked in to do that lecture.
From that moment, some of us working in population-focused tobacco
control in Australia did little else for the next four years. We concen-
trated our efforts to ensure the announced bill would be passed, then
defended it from industry-motivated attempts to discredit its impact.
I asked Pratt about how the plain packaging proposal was received
by Rudd. She said:
He was very supportive. I clearly remember being in the meeting
when the idea was first put to him when we were discussing how to
respond to all of the tobacco recommendations from the prevention
taskforce – taxation, packaging, social marketing and other things.
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The idea was put to him and he said, ‘yes, let’s go for it. I like it, let’s
go for it.’ It’s a simple idea at its heart with a compelling logic which
the PM [prime minister] got right away.
Rohan Greenland, lobbyist at the Heart Foundation, recalls that his
then CEO, Lyn Roberts, and the CEO of the Cancer Council Australia,
Ian Olver, had met with Rudd well before the announcement. Plain
packaging was not discussed, but the two presented Rudd with data
on the widespread support for tobacco control in the community, and
assured him that any policy advances on tobacco would be very well re-
ceived. They sensed he was very receptive.
So what is plain packaging and what aspects of packaging are ad-
dressed in the Australian law?
‘Plain’ packaging (sometimes called ‘generic’ or ‘standardised’
packaging) is the term given to Australia’s pioneering national legisla-
tion (72) which requires all tobacco products (cigarettes, roll-your-own
tobacco, pipe tobacco and cigars) to be sold in prescribed packaging.
All packaging for every brand is identical, except for the brand and
variant names and the name of each brand’s manufacturer, which still
enable each brand to be clearly identified. Here are the essential features
of plain cigarette packaging.
• The brand name must appear on the front of the box in a standard
size and font.
• The name of any brand variant must also appear immediately below
the brand name, also in a standard font.
• All remaining surfaces must be in the colour ‘drab dark brown’.
• 75% of the front of the pack must show one of 14 prescribed graphic
(pictorial) health warnings. (73) These 14 warnings are required to
be rotated according to a particular pattern across the years, so that
each 24 months after the 1 December implementation date, each of
the 14 different warnings will have been evenly distributed across all
tobacco stock. The same graphic warning must also appear on the
back of the pack in smaller size, along with the relevant accompa-
nying textual warning. The size of the combined graphic and text
warning on the back of the pack is 90% of the surface area.
• On the top of the pack (both back and front), the matching textual
warning must appear.
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• The number of cigarettes in the pack must be shown in the bottom
right-hand front corner.
• The Quitline phone number must appear on the back of the pack.
• All writing in all the above matters must conform to standard, spec-
ified fonts which is the same for all brands.
• The left hand side of the box must show another textual warning.
• The box shape, wrap, and colour of all cigarettes must conform to
prescribed standards, the same for all brands.
Figure 2.1 Australia's plain cigarette pack specifications. Source:
http://tiny.cc/3xeqox
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Figure 2.2 Australia's plain cigarette pack specifications. Source:
http://tiny.cc/3xeqox
Australia’s plain packs are therefore far from being just ‘plain’ boxes.
They are fully coloured because the boxes must all carry a large graphic
health warning, front and rear. In moving to require the health warn-
ings to cover 75% of the front of the pack and 90% of the rear, Aus-
tralian warnings had set the standard then for the largest in the world,
ahead of Uruguay (80% front and back) and Canada (75% front and
back).
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The goals of plain packaging
The Australian government implemented plain packaging as part of
its long-standing policy commitment to end all forms of tobacco ad-
vertising and promotion within its control. The path toward ending
tobacco advertising had commenced in September 1976 when the then
Fraser-led Liberal government enacted legislation, first proposed by the
previous Whitlam Labor government, and banned directadvertising on
cigarettes on television and radio. Over the next 16 years, successive
Labor and Coalition governments both federally and at state level had
incrementally enacted further extensions of tobacco advertising bans
in different media (cinema, outdoor, point-of-sale), culminating in the
Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act of 1992 (74) which ended all to-
bacco sponsorship in sport and in cultural settings. The WHO’s FCTC,
ratified by Australia in December 2003, locked Australia into a list of
nations today numbering 178 (75) which are legally obligated to ban all
forms of tobacco advertising and promotion.
This background is central to an appreciation of why the Australian
government enacted plain packaging legislation: packaging is indis-
putably a form of product promotion (see Chapter 3). Indeed, the
2014 Chantler Report (76) noted that ‘Japan Tobacco International
responded to the decision to introduce tobacco plain packaging in
Australia by attempting to sue the Australian government for taking
possession of its mobile ‘billboard’.
Plain packaging was also designed to maximise the impact of the
graphic health warnings on future and current smokers and to reduce
the ability of the pack to mislead consumers.
Australia’s plain packaging Act describes the objectives of the legis-
lation as:
(1) (a) to improve public health by:
(i) discouraging people from taking up smoking, or using
tobacco products; and
(ii) encouraging people to give up smoking, and to stop us-
ing tobacco products; and
(iii) discouraging people who have given up smoking, or
who have stopped using tobacco products, from relapsing;
and
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(iv) reducing people’s exposure to smoke from tobacco
products; and
(b) to give effect to certain obligations that Australia has as
a party to the Convention on Tobacco Control.
(2) It is the intention of the Parliament to contribute to achieving the
objects in subsection (1) by regulating the retail packaging and ap-
pearance of tobacco products in order to:
(a) reduce the appeal of tobacco products to consumers; and
(b) increase the effectiveness of health warnings on the re-
tail packaging of tobacco products; and
(c) reduce the ability of the retail packaging of tobacco
products to mislead consumers about the harmful effects of
smoking or using tobacco products.
As we will discuss in Chapter 7, the precise wording of these objectives
is of utmost importance to questions on evaluation of the impact of the
policy.
Prevention as the primary goal
In announcing the government’s intention to introduce plain packag-
ing, Nicola Roxon emphasised from the outset that the leading goal of
the legislation was one of prevention of uptake among young people.
She said:
And of course we’re targeting people who have not yet started, and
that’s the key to this plain packaging announcement – to make sure
we make it less attractive for people to experiment with tobacco in
the first place. (77)
Paul Grogan from the Cancer Council Australia saw this emphasis as
critical to the success in getting multi-party support during the many
months ahead of the passing of the legislation:
In years of government relations work, I’ve never met a parliamen-
tarian or advisor of any political persuasion who opposed the idea
of protecting young people from tobacco addiction. The fact that the
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rationale and much of the evidence for plain packaging was about
preventing take-up and benefiting children and young adults made it
easier to promote to parliamentarians from a range of backgrounds.
The final ‘look’ of plain packaging
The way Australia’s plain packs appear was not the whim of some in-
fluential bureaucrat or committee. No one simply declared: ‘let’s have
them look this way!’ Instead, almost every facet of their appearance
was subject to extensive market research testing. The Department of
Health and Ageing established an expert advisory group of Australian
and international tobacco control researchers and stakeholders to ad-
vise on plain packaging design. They oversaw comprehensive consumer
research which would inform the way that plain packaging would actu-
ally look. (78)
Six studies were conducted to optimise the plain packaging design
and the impact of revised graphic health warnings, which would change
at the same time the packs were introduced. The studies are detailed in
Table 2.2 below. The results of this work, together with an existing body
of experimental evidence on the effects of plain packaging on consumer
purchase preferences, led to the final plain packaging design. The full
results of the consumer research can be found in a highly detailed re-
port on the health department website (79): http://tiny.cc/2vfqox. Key
findings and recommendations of the market research combined with
the experimental research include: (78, 79)
Plain packaging colour: A dark olive brown colour emerged as the
best candidate for plain packaging. Consumers found cigarette pack-
ages in this colour to be less appealing, to contain cigarettes that were
perceived to be more harmful to health, of lower quality, and to make
it harder to quit smoking. Additionally, this colour was not at all sim-
ilar to any existing cigarette brand and failed to generate any positive
associations for consumers. While a dark brown coloured pack also
tested well on these elements, it elicited unintended positive associa-
tions such as reminding consumers of chocolate and creating feelings
of luxury and warmth.
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The official name of the colour chosen for surfaces of the pack not oc-
cupied by health warnings is Pantone 448G. Initially people, including
Roxon, referred to it as ‘olive green’. The Australian Olive Association
was not happy, with its chief executive saying Roxon:
. . . referred to it as ‘disgusting’ olive green, so it hasn’t been very
favourable. To associate any food with cigarettes is a thoughtless
thing to do, especially one that’s had a very good reputation as being
a healthy product. You could have called it ‘drab green’ or ‘khaki
green’ or, better still, not used green at all. (80)
It was a fair cop: the colour can much more accurately be described as
‘dark drab brown.’
Pack size and shape
Innovative packaging shape, size and opening can create strong associa-
tions which contribute to appeal and brand personality. Cigarette packs
are therefore required to be a standard rectangular shape with a stan-
dard flip-top opening. The size is also limited, ranging from a minimum
based on standard packs of 20 cigarettes to a maximum based on a stan-
dard pack of 50 cigarettes.
Font and font size for brand name
Testing revealed that a 14 point font size was the smallest size that
maintained legibility of the brand name, when read at a distance of one
metre. The Lucida Sans font type was found in testing to be easier to
read than Arial. Ensuring brand name legibility addressed a key con-
cern raised by retailers that plain packs would lead to retailer confusion
and slowed or incorrect purchases by consumers.
Design of graphic health warnings (size and layout)
Larger front-of-pack graphic health warnings were more noticeable,
easier to understand, prompted a stronger reaction to ‘stop and think’
and conveyed the seriousness of health risks. Additionally, larger warn-
ings reduced the overall appeal and perception of the quality of the
Removing the emperor’s clothes
30
packaging. A graphic health warning covering 75% of the front of the
pack elicited the highest noticeability, message comprehension and dis-
suasive effect on appeal.
Table 2.2: Summary of studies on pack appearance
Study Description Objectives Methodology
Study 1 Consumer per-
ceptions of
branding ap-
peal,
attractiveness
and smoking
harm
To understand the impact
of current brand and
packaging design (brand,
colour, finish, pack size)
on appeal, attractiveness
and perceived harm
amongst current smokers
Eighteen face-to-face
group clinics including a
self-completion ques-
tionnaire and group
discussion among
(n=122) at least weekly
smokers aged 18–64
years old
Study 2 Consumer per-
ceptions of
plain pack
colour
To identify a shortlist of
potential plain packaging
colours
Online survey among
(n=409) at least weekly
smokers aged 18–65
years old
Study 3 Legibility of
brand names on
plain packs for
retailers
To identify the optimal
combination of design el-
ements (font size, font
colour) for legibility and
ease of identification
amongst potential retail-
ers
Face-to-face interviews
with (n=10) respondents
aged 40 years old and
older
Study 4 Consumer per-
ceptions of
plain pack
colour with
brand elements
To shortlist plain packag-
ing colours that
minimised brand impact
Online survey among
(n=455) at least weekly
smokers aged 18–64
years old
Study 5
(Face-
to-face)
Consumer ap-
praisal of plain
packs with new
health warnings
using prototype
packs
To identify the optimal
plain packaging designs
in combination with the
new front-of-pack
graphic health warnings
Twenty face-to-face
group clinics including a
self-completion ques-
tionnaire and short
group discussion among
(n=193) at least weekly
smokers aged 16–64
years old
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Study Description Objectives Methodology
Study 5
(Online)
Consumer ap-
praisal of
different
graphic health
warning sizes
and layouts on
pack
To identify the optimal
plain packaging designs
in combination with the
new front-of-pack
graphic health warnings
Online survey among
(n=409) at least weekly
smokers aged 18–64
years old
Study 6
(Online)
Consumer ap-
praisal of
different
graphic health
warning sizes
and layouts on
pack – Testing
75% GHW lay-
out
To identify the optimal
plain packaging designs
in combination with the
new front-of-pack
graphic health warnings
Online survey among
(n=205) at least weekly
smokers aged 18–64
years old
Cigarettes, too
The inclusion of brand names and other design embellishments on the
cigarettes themselves is associated with level of appeal and perceived
brand personalities. It is less appreciated that Australia’s legislation also
standardised the look of cigarettes, not just the packs in which they are
sold. In the past, tobacco companies have introduced different colours
and bandings on cigarette wrappers (the paper in a cigarette) to make
them look more appealing and interesting (See Figures 2.3 and 2.4).
Like packs, cigarettes are used in branding and marketing. Accordingly,
the regulations accompanying Australia’s new law contain very impor-
tant provisions which specify that the appearance of cigarettes is also
governed by the Act (see Table 2.2). Cigarette stick appearance is lim-
ited to either plain white, or plain white with an ‘imitation cork’ filter
tip. No branding, other colours or design features are permitted.
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Figure 2.3 Pink Dream cigarettes. Source: http://tiny.cc/
v0fqox
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Figure 2.4 Sobranie cigarettes. Source:
http://cigarettezoom.com/cigarettes-manufac-
turers/
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Why the industry cares so much
about packaging – the silent
salesman
Packaging design is a major way of differentiating and promoting
brands, being particularly important in homogenous consumer prod-
ucts such as cigarettes where, like bottled water, few objective differ-
ences exist. (81) Marketing literature routinely highlights the critical
role played by pack design in the overall marketing mix, emphasising
that the ‘product package is the communication life-blood of the firm’,
the ‘silent salesman’ that reaches out to customers, (82) and that pack-
aging ‘act[s] as a promotional tool in its own right.’ (83)
Colours and typeface have long been known to elicit particular
responses in consumers, often shaped by strong social and cultural
forces.1 Imagery and symbols also exert powerful effects, linking desir-
able attributes with particular brands. Cigarette packaging conveys this
crucial sense of brand identity through logos, colours, fonts, pictures,
packaging materials and shapes. For example, the world’s most pop-
ular cigarette brand, Marlboro, (84) can readily be identified through
its iconic red chevron (see Figure 3.1). The powerful association of
the bold colour red with Marlboro is embodied in Philip Morris In-
ternational’s continued multi-million dollar sponsorship of the Ferrari
1 Portions of Chapter 2 are drawn from: Freeman B, Chapman S and Rimmer M.
Review: the case for the plain packaging of tobacco products. Addiction
2008;103:580–90. and Scollo, M and Freeman B. Packaging as Promotion. Tobacco
in Australia. 2012. Available from: http://tinyurl.com/nf44zrv
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Formula 1 racing team, despite the fact that neither the official logo
nor brand name appears on the red race car (see Figure 3.2). In 2013,
the Marlboro brand was estimated to be worth $US69 billion, making it
the eighth most valuable brand in the world, just behind Microsoft and
Coca-Cola. (85)
Figure 3.1 The Marlboro brand as it appeared in Australia
prior to the plain packaging reforms. Source: Becky Free-
man private collection
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Figure 3.2 The 2014 Scuderia Ferrari Formula 1 car. Source: Offi-
cial Scuderia Ferrari Formula 1 team website http://tiny.cc/n7fqox
The importance of packaging in promoting tobacco use
The tobacco industry has always claimed that it has no interest in at-
tracting new, non-smoking customers but is interested only in stimulat-
ing brand-switching among current smokers and in maintaining brand
loyalty in current customers. Notwithstanding the commercial absur-
dity of any industry professing disinterest in attracting new recruits
to its products, this position has been comprehensively undermined
by a multitude of revelations from internal industry documents that
candidly acknowledge the vital importance of attracting new smokers
(predominantly youth). (86–93)
These internal documents confirm that companies have invested
heavily in pack design in order to communicate specific messages to
specific demographic groups including young people. (43, 91) In the
early 1990s a presenter addressing marketing staff at Philip Morris
remarked that smokers: ‘are ready for change’ and ‘once exposed to
innovative [packaging] especially young adults see their current pack-
aging as dated and boring’. (94) The presenter said packs aimed at
younger women should be ‘slick, sleek, flashy, glittery, shiny, silky, bold’.
(94) In designing tobacco packs, the tobacco industry counts among
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potential purchasers those already smoking the brand, those smoking
other brands and those not yet smoking but who might be persuaded
to take it up.
If, as the tobacco industry contends, cigarette pack design is pri-
marily intended to convey important consumer information, then very
few facts are being shared with smokers. Tobacco packaging has histor-
ically carried very little ‘information’. Internationally, apart from show-
ing the brand and variant names, the manufacturer’s name, the number
of cigarettes in the pack (all required components under plain pack-
aging laws) and, in some countries, nicotine and tar levels, cigarette
packs rarely contain any other information. Furthermore, misleading
on-pack descriptors like ‘light’ or ‘mild’ are now restricted in several
jurisdictions. Cigarette packaging then plays an essential role in dif-
ferentiating one product from another. The industry has long known
that different brands of similar cigarettes are often indistinguishable to
smokers. As an industry document from 1979 explained, ‘one of every
two smokers is not able to distinguish in blind (masked) tests between
similar cigarettes.’ (95)
In 1975, the government of Norway introduced what was then the
world’s most comprehensive ban on tobacco advertising. Yet a 2003
study conducted with young adult Norwegian smokers aged 18–23
(born five to 10 years after the ban) highlights how the tobacco industry
continued to market to this demographic through persuasive cigarette
pack design. This study showed that cigarette brands and cigarette
package designs gave meaning to personal characteristics, to social
identity and to positions in status hierarchies. In the young smokers’ ac-
counts, brands appeared to add ‘an extra dimension to the social mean-
ing of smoking in their daily life.’ (96) With the increasing prevalence
of tobacco advertising and sponsorship bans throughout the world,
the pack has fast become the most important promotional vehicle for
reaching potential and current smokers. (43, 97–102)
Several nations have now banned the open display of tobacco prod-
ucts in retail locations. Point-of-sale displays have been found to be
highly visible and persuasive forms of promotion.
Power walls and counter top displays are highly visible and eye-
catching. They present an unavoidable and unfortunate spill of pro-
motional imagery and product reminders to vulnerable consumers
Removing the emperor’s clothes
38
including young people, former smokers . . . and smokers of all ages
who are trying to quit. (103)
With removal of point-of-sale as an opportunity for promotion, BAT
and Philip Morris (104) have predicted that, in the future, pack design
alone will drive brand imagery. Unless governments impose complete
restrictions on packaging design, bans on the retail display of tobacco
will encourage a further shift in industry investment towards inno-
vative pack design, with the pack functioning as the only remaining
vehicle for product promotion. The industry trade journal Tobacco
Journal International states it best:
When most media advertising is illegal and even promotion at point
of sale is under threat, the pack itself is the last chance saloon for to-
bacco company brand managers to sell their products to the smoking
public. (105)
Pack design can not only communicate the ‘personality’ of a cigarette
brand to the smoker, but smokers can project these characteristics by
handling and displaying the package throughout their daily routines.
(43) Once again the tobacco sector provides the most succinct sum-
mary as to why this is so essential:
Today, with restrictions in advertising, when the pack is seen in the
hands of the right person, it is surely the best product placement that
a cigarette company can get for free. This personal appeal is a ma-
jor aspect driving cigarette packaging design. An attractive pack is
something smokers want to be seen with. (106)
Just as designer clothing, accessories and cars serve as social cues to
style, status, values and character, so too can cigarette packs signify
a range of attributes about users. As ‘badge products’ cigarettes can
reinforce the characteristics conjured by brand image. (43, 107–110)
This behaviour not only affects the single consumer, but also exerts a
powerful effect on their friends, associates and even casual contacts.
Consumer theory and research has demonstrated that incidental brand
encounters (ICBEs) powerfully affect buying patterns in ways in which
the consumer is not fully aware. A series of four studies by Ferraro,
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Bettmand and Chartrand published in the Journal for Consumer Re-
search in 2008 found that repeated exposure to simulated ICBEs:
. . . increases choice of the focal brand among people not aware of the
brand exposure, that perceptual fluency underlies these effects and
these effects are moderated by perceivers’ automatic responses to the
type of user observed with the brand. (111)
Minimising the effect of health warnings
The other important goal of packaging design that is unique to tobacco
products is to use the pack to obscure, downplay and minimise
government-mandated health warnings. Again, the industry is refresh-
ingly candid about this challenge.
Tobacco product packaging is a paradox in paper and cardboard.
Like any [fast moving consumer good], a cigarette pack aims to at-
tract the eye, display the brand to advantage, and generally look cool.
However, the difference between tobacco and other industries is that,
in looking at the packaging, the consumer is also looking at a health
warning. One might forgive a pack designer coming to the conclu-
sion that the less a consumer looks at a cigarette pack, the better.
But packaging developments demonstrate a different mindset, with
tobacco product manufacturers competing with their rivals just as
fiercely as confectionery and soap manufacturers. (105)
This effect is reflected in the results of plain pack research that shows
consistently that pack brand imagery distracts from and reduces the
impact of health warnings. Students have been found to have an en-
hanced ability to recall tobacco health warnings on plain packs than
on branded packs. (23, 28) Health warnings printed on plain packs are
seen as being more serious than the exact same warnings printed on
branded packs. These findings suggest that positive brand imagery dif-
fuses the overall impact of health warnings. (112) For example, in 2010
a Benson and Hedges superslims cigarette pack from Canada incorpo-
rated the required graphic health warning so that the pack appeared to
be reminiscent of a digital music player (see Figure 3.3). The small size
of the superslims pack also significantly reduced the size of the graphic
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health warning (as warnings were then required to be 50% of the sur-
face area of the front of the pack, not a specific size) potentially further
reducing its impact.
Figure 3.3 Comparison of Benson and Hedges superslims ciga-
rette packaging to a digital music player. Source: Becky Freeman
private collection
Other packaging designers have confirmed that branding elements on
packs are essential for differentiating brands, even in the face of graphic
health warnings:
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Although the warnings, graphic or otherwise, cannot be said to en-
hance the aesthetics of the pack, they function separately from the
branding in communication terms. Because they are on all packs,
they do not differentiate one brand from another, whereas the brand-
ing device, colours and other elements of the identity enable con-
sumers to readily recognise their chosen brands. (106)
Subverting bans on light and mild descriptors
The industry has also found that packaging design is a useful way to
work around legislation meant to protect consumers from misleading
product descriptors. In nations where the deceptive descriptors ‘light’
and ‘mild’ have been banned, manufacturers have used packaging inno-
vations to subvert the intent of those bans (113) where different colour
gradations and intensities are used to perpetuate smokers’ understand-
ing that a brand is allegedly lower or higher yielding.[14] For example,
Derby cigarettes in Brazil substituted red for full strength cigarettes,
blue for mild, and silver for light (see Figure 3.4). (114)
Cigarette packaging as a key aspect of marketing
Several insightful and illustrative statements have been made by in-
dustry insiders about how influential brand and package design is in
the repetitive, daily ritual of carrying, opening and displaying cigarette
packs. The recurring and ingrained use of cigarettes is reflected in the
physical properties of the packages themselves.
If you smoke, a cigarette pack is one of the few things you use regu-
larly that makes a statement about you. A cigarette pack is the only
thing you take out of your pocket 20 times a day and lay out for
everyone to see. That’s a lot different than buying your soap powder
in generic packaging. (115)
Packaging styles convey an essential advertising image: Pack-
aging design, structure, and graphics play an integral part in brand
image, which, along with tradition, plays a heavy role in tobacco
sales. Handled an average of 20 or more times a day, cigarettes are
carried in pockets and purses, and displayed on counters, bars, desks,
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Figure 3.4 Brazil: cigarette manufacturers substituted red for full
strength cigarettes, blue for mild, and silver for light. Source:
http://www.smoke-free.ca/pdf_1/Endingthedeception-2005.pdf
and coffee tables. Brands display an image in the same way as cloth-
ing, car, and restaurant choices. (116)
When we offered them Marlboros at half price – in generic
brown boxes – only 21% were interested, even though we assured
them that each package was fresh, had been sealed at the factory and
was identical (except for the different packaging) to what they nor-
mally bought at their local, tobacconist or cigarette machine. How
to account for the difference? Simple. Smokers put their cigarettes in
and out of their pockets 20 to 25 times a day. The package makes a
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statement. The consumer is expressing how he wants to be seen by
others. (117)
The tobacco industry, and its service providers such as printing and
packaging companies and advertising agencies, offer unique and telling
insights into the myriad of opportunities that packaging presents to
reinvigorate flagging brands and sell everything ‘old as new again’. Any
naivety in assuming a package is primarily to serve as a safe container
for goods is swiftly refuted by this quote from a packaging industry
consultant, who said that: ‘Packaging is the embodiment of all the time,
money and resources invested in building a consumer packaged good.’
(118) It should be no surprise that the tobacco industry is fiercely pro-
tective of this investment, and is constantly seeking to improve pack
design.
The tobacco industry trade magazine, World Tobacco, contains nu-
merous examples of appeals to manufacturers to use packaging as an
advertising vehicle. (98, 99, 102, 119–121) Manufacturers were advised:
If your brand can no longer shout from billboards, let alone from the
cinema screen or the pages of a glossy magazine . . . it can at least
court smokers from the retailer’s shelf, or from wherever it is placed
by those already wed to it. (101)
Packaging designers remained optimistic about opportunities to in-
crease the appeal of cigarette packs despite intrusive health warnings:
With the uptake of printed inner frame cards, what we will increasin-
gly see is the pack being viewed as a total opportunity for communi-
cations – from printed outer film and tear tape through to the inner
frame and inner bundle. Each pack component will provide an inte-
grated function as part of a carefully planned brand or information
communications campaign. (122)
One packaging firm urged tobacco companies to skirt ‘draconian legis-
lation’ by using pack over-wrapping to create an in-store advertisement.
Where cigarette advertising is banned by law . . . the retailer can
‘quite coincidentally’ stack up a kind of billboard using the products
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at the point of sale if, for example, the cigarette cartons of a particular
brand bear different parts of an overall design, which complete a puz-
zle or a caption when stacked up. (98)
Advances in printing technology have enabled printing of on-pack im-
agery on the inner frame card, (122) outer film and tear tape, (98)
and the incorporation of holograms, collectable art, metallic finishes,
(123) multi-fold stickers, (99) photographs and images in pack design.
(124–126) In the early 1900s, collectable cigarette cards were a major
form of in-pack promotion. (127) A contemporary return to the pack-
age as the primary source of advertising is apparent in numerous inter-
national examples.
Trends in tobacco industry pack design
Australia is a quintessential ‘dark market’ where all tobacco advertising
is banned.[56] Subtle changes to cigarette packs and trademarks were
observed on both Benson & Hedges and Winfield cigarette packs during
2000–2002. (42) When researchers called the company to inquire about
the changes, an employee said they were ‘playing with the logo because
we can’t do any advertising anymore.’ (42)
British American Tobacco Australia (BATA) introduced split Dun-
hill packs in October 2006 (see Figure 3.5). (128) The pack could be
split along a perforated line to create two mini packs, easily shared
between two smokers perhaps unable to afford a full pack. Children,
with limited pocket money, might be attracted to such an opportunity.
Once split, one of the two packs did not bear the mandatory graphic
health warning. BATA was forced to remove the packets from the mar-
ket when they were found to be in breach of tobacco product health
warning labelling laws. (129)
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Figure 3.5 Split package of Dunhill cigarettes. Source: Quit Victo-
ria.
In June 2005, Imperial Tobacco Canada introduced octagonal packs for
the du Maurier brand, presenting an eye-catching package but also ob-
scuring the health warning by wrapping it around the angled pack sides
(see Figure 3.6). (130) Imperial’s vice president of marketing received
an international industry award for theinnovative design, ‘considered
an outstanding example of the capacity of product packaging to influ-
ence the end user.’ (131)
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Figure 3.6 Octagonal packs for the du Maurier brand. Source:
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/15/3/150-a
In August 2006, BAT New Zealand packaged its Benson & Hedges brand
in collectable tins, priced identically to those sold in cardboard packs;
the required government issued health warning was affixed to the tin
with an easily removed sticker. (132)
In December 2006, KT&G, Korea’s largest tobacco manufacturer,
released new packaging for the Raison D’etre brand. The pack featured
a ‘variety of colourful designs, including graffiti, Indie band, B-boy and
X-sports’ (see Figure 3.7). (133) The one month limited pack release
sought to create a sense of product scarcity, a common marketing tactic
to enhance product desirability. (134)
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Figure 3.7 KT&G packaging for the Raison D’etre brand. Source:
http://www.djtimes.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=28832
Launched in December 2004 by the Thailand Tobacco Monopoly,
Chopper (as in Harley Davidson motorcycles) was described as ‘one of
the most complex and in-depth package design undertakings.’ (135)
The name and motorcycle imagery reflects the popularity of motorcy-
cles in Thailand.
In February 2007, RJ Reynolds (RJR) launched a new Camel cig-
arette aimed at women. Camel No 9 is packaged in black and pink or
teal (menthol variety) and designed to conjure images of sophistication,
referring to being ‘dressed to the nines’ (Figure 3.8). (136) Women’s in-
ternet sites featured positive commentary about the new packaging:
. . . with me being female and all, I have to say that the box and the
pink foil inside are appealing, as is the actual look of the cigarette it-
self. (137)
. . . yeah my husband bought them for me last night, because I
was so turned on by the black and pink package. (137)
I don’t smoke at all, but I keep seeing this [sic] ads for Camel
No 9. The packaging alone makes me want to try them. It just looks
damn good and doesn’t follow that style that seemingly every other
carton out there does. (138)
It is not possible to determine if these comments were posted by real
women, public relations people, or by RJR employees.
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Figure 3.8 RJ Reynolds Camel No 9 cigarette aimed at
women. Source: http://tiny.cc/e6iqox
RJR has proven to be particularlyinnovative in designing cigarette
packaging. In 2007, smokers were recruited to rate and propose pack
designs and logos. Consumers were directed to the Camel brand web-
site and blog, where they could discuss package design and vote on
what they wanted to see as a final concept. (139) The project, which
was initially targeted to engage 6,000 people, netted 30,000 participants
and resulted in four new flavours with eye-catching package designs
being introduced onto the market (Figure 3.9). These four flavour and
package variants were dubbed Frost, Mellow, Robust, and Infused. The
cigarettes contain a small bead in the filter that delivers the unique
flavours. The Camel Signature Blends packaging designs were subse-
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quently modified for the retail market due to the cartoon-like imagery
violating US advertising codes that tobacco packages not be appealing
to children.
Figure 3.9 Open source package designs for the Camel Signature
Blends – from left to right – Frost, Infused, Robust and Mellow.
Researchers from the Centre for Tobacco Control Research at the Uni-
versity of Stirling documented numerous changes in UK tobacco pack-
aging following the introduction of comprehensive legislation banning
tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship. (140–143) Packaging
design strategies were categorised into key themes:
1. value-based packaging
• selling products in smaller pack sizes
• selling products in pack sizes larger than the traditional 20 ciga-
rette and 12.5 grams of tobacco
2. revamping the packaging of brands traditionally seen as value
3. simplifying designs to communicate value-for-money
4. printing the price on the brand to imply a special low price
5. image-based packaging
• designing packs to appeal to various segments of the market, in
particular younger and female smokers
6. novel or innovative packaging
• novel ways of opening the pack
• novel shapes and sizes
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• novel materials
7. themed packs to encourage collection of sets
8. environmentally sustainable packaging.
• sustainably produced packaging
• Rizla rolling papers certified by the Forest Stewardship Council.
Evidence supporting the likely effectiveness of plain packaging
The bulk of evidence about the possible impact of plain packs neces-
sarily derives from experimental studies where subjects have typically
been presented with both branded and mocked-up plain packs and
asked about associations and preferences. A 2009 review of the evi-
dence on the effects of plain packaging concluded: (144)
The evidence indicates three primary benefits of plain packaging: in-
creasing the effectiveness of health warnings, reducing false health
beliefs about cigarettes, and reducing brand appeal especially among
youth and young adults. Overall, the research to date suggests that
‘plain’ packaging regulations would be an effective tobacco control
measure, particularly in jurisdictions with comprehensive restric-
tions on other forms of marketing.
International research on plain packaging
In 1995 an expert panel provided the Canadian health department with
a comprehensive review of the likely effects of plain packaging entitled
When packages can’t speak: possible impacts of plain and generic packag-
ing of tobacco products. (27) Until that time, only four sets of studies had
been conducted on the plain packaging of cigarettes. (23, 26, 117, 145,
146) The expert panel found that all four studies produced some evi-
dence to support the hypothesis that plain and generic packaging made
cigarettes less attractive and less appealing.
The expert panel also conducted a series of studies to further assess
the potential impact that plain packaging would have on smoking up-
take, health warning recall and cessation, and evaluated the expected
tobacco industry response to any packaging reforms. They found that
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teenagers were particularly vulnerable to linking specific tobacco
brands to specific types of people and that tobacco brands served to
help teenagers establish their own self-image. (147) On the basis of a
detailed analysis of the findings of all the studies, the expert panel con-
cluded:
Plain and generic packaging of tobacco products (all other things
being equal), through its impact on image formation and retention,
recall and recognition, knowledge, and consumer attitudes and per-
ceived utilities, would likely depress the incidence of smoking uptake
by non-smoking teens, and increase the incidence of smoking cessa-
tion by teen and adult smokers. This impact would vary across the
population. (27)
Since the Canadian expert review, further research has been conducted
in Canada, (28, 112, 148–152) Australia, (153–156) the United King-
dom, (157) New Zealand (158) and the United States. (159) This re-
search has focused on the effects of plain packaging on: awareness,
recall and impact of health warnings, (23, 160) on perceptions of risk-
iness of tobacco products, (28, 150, 157, 159) and the appeal of brands
and products. (26, 145, 148) (151–156, 158) Overall, this body of re-
search confirms and strengthens the original findings of the Canadian
expert panel.
Impact of plain packaging on effectiveness of health warnings
A multi-country tobacco survey examining the effectiveness of warn-
ings showed that smokers in Canada, who were at the time of the study,
exposed to large, picture-based warnings, were significantly more likely
than others to report thinking about the health risks of smoking, to
stop themselves from having a cigarette, and to think about quitting be-
cause of the health warnings. (161) The same study also showed that
the larger and more prominent a health warning, the more likely it
was to be recalled. Plain packaging enables the warning size to be in-
creased and allows for additional information, elaborating on warnings
and about smoking cessation, to be printed on packs.
An Australian study specifically explored the question of whether
removing the colour and design features of packaging was more effec-
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tive in reducing theappeal of brands than simply increasing the size
of health warnings. (156) The study found that once packs were plain,
increasing the size of the front-of-pack health warnings from 30% to
more than 70% did not further reduce brand appeal. While other re-
search indicates that larger health warnings are likely to be noticeable
and memorable to consumers, in this study plain packaging was more
effective than further increasing the size ofhealth warnings in reducing
the brand appeal.
A New Zealand study (158) examined the combined effects of
health warnings and plain packaging on the likelihood of young adults
aged 18 to 30 years engaging in behaviours known to be linked to cessa-
tion. Smokers in this study were asked which pack they would be most
and least likely to choose when presented with four cigarette pack-
ets featuring different branding and warning size combinations. Packs
with the greatest number of branding elements were still preferred even
when the warnings were increased from 30% to 50%. However they
were less likely to be chosen with a 75% warning. Plain packets with
75% health warnings were significantly more likely to elicit stronger
cessation-linked intentions, such as reducing the amount smoked, in-
creasing quit attempts and seeking help to quit, than branded packs
with a 30% front-of-pack warning.
Impact of plain packaging on perceptions of harmfulness
Unregulated package colouring and imagery contributes to consumer
misperceptions that certain brands are safer than others. (43, 104, 150,
162) The colour of packs is also associated with perceptions of risk
and brand appeal. Marlboro packs with a gold logo were rated as lower
health risk by 53% and easier to quit by 31% than Marlboro packs with
a red logo in a study of UK adult smokers. (157) A study of 8243 smok-
ers from the US, the UK, Canada and Australia in 2006 similarly found
that smokers of ‘gold, silver, blue or purple brands were more likely to
believe that their own brand might be a little less harmful’ than smok-
ers of red or black brands. (159) Researchers in both studies concluded
that removing colours from packs, as well as misleading terms such as
smooth, gold, and silver, would significantly reduce false beliefs about
harmfulness.
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Impact of plain packaging on reducing the appeal of products
An Australian study involving more than 800 adult smokers examined
the effects on the appeal of tobacco products as the amount of pack
branding was progressively reduced. As illustrated in Figure 3.10, the
plainest packs were seen as less attractive (brand/pack characteristic),
smokers of the packs were seen as significantly less stylish and sociable
(smoker characteristic), and the cigarettes in the packs were thought to
be less satisfying and of lower quality (sensory perception). (154)
A similarly designed study involving adolescents found that pro-
gressively removing brand elements such as colour, branded fonts and
imagery from cigarette packs resulted in adolescent smokers seeing
packs as less appealing, having more negative expectations of cigarette
taste and rating attributes of a typical smoker of the pack less positively.
(155)
Canadian studies (151, 152) examined the effects of removal of
brand imagery on young female smokers aged 18 to 25 years. The re-
searchers found that removing both descriptors and colours from packs
substantially reduced the appeal of female-oriented brands for female
smokers. For example, the appeal of the most desirable brand in the
study, Capri Cherry, fell from 67% to 17% among women who viewed
plain packs without the descriptor ‘Cherry’ on the pack. Plain packs
were also associated with significantly fewer positive characteristics
than fully branded packs, including glamour, being slim, popular, at-
tractive and sophisticated. Among smokers who requested a pack at
the end of the study, branded packs were three times more likely to be
selected than plain packs. The researchers concluded that ‘plain packag-
ing and removing descriptors such as ‘slims’ from cigarette packs may
reduce smoking susceptibility among young women.’ (152)
Research has continued into many aspects of pack and cigarette de-
sign and the likely effects of standardisation. This has been summarised
in a review for the UK government (76) and most recently by Ham-
mond for the Irish government (163).
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Figure 3.10 Level of attractiveness of increasingly plainer tobacco packag-
ing. Source: Wakefield MA, Germain D and Durkin SJ. How does
increasingly plainer cigarette packaging influence adult smokers’ percep-
tions about brand image? An experimental study. Tobacco Control
2008;17:416–21. (154)
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4
Tobacco industry arguments,
strategies and tactics
In this chapter, we will review the main arguments, strategies and tac-
tics used by the tobacco industry, its acolytes and messengers to attack
plain packaging. At the end of the chapter, we will also describe some
of the initiatives taken by advocates of plain packaging to counteract
industry propaganda. We will start with the most prominent and com-
mon arguments and then move through to those used less often. Most
of these were also used in the blogosphere by citizens and anonymous
trolls, some of whom may well have been tobacco industry staff. (164)
It won’t work, so don’t do it!
Let us start with the most bizarre argument of all those used to oppose
plain packs. This was the ‘poacher turned gamekeeper’ spectacle of
those in the tobacco industry telling the Australian and later the Irish,
British and New Zealand governments that they knew that plain packs
would do nothing to decrease tobacco sales in children or adults, and
that therefore the government should abandon the policy.
This was always going to be a highly fraught strategy for the indus-
try. It is axiomatic that the tobacco industry wants as many people to
smoke as much as possible. That is what all its employees understand as
their collective key performance indicator as they arrive at work each
day and what shareholders expect from their company. Their targets in-
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clude those who smoke now, those who used to smoke and who might
be tempted back into it (165), and those who have not yet started but
who might be persuaded to start. This last group is overwhelmingly
young people, including those under 18 years of age who are legally un-
able to buy tobacco products, but who of course often do.
It is equally axiomatic that the future of the tobacco industry de-
pends on new generations starting to use its products. So for all the
public statements from the industry that children should not smoke,
and its denials that it ever tries to attract children via its marketing and
promotions, its own internal documents contain many examples going
back many decades about exactly the opposite. (91, 93) The tobacco in-
dustry is intensely interested in maximising the probabilities that young
people will experiment with cigarettes, become dependent on nicotine
and become daily, hopefully heavy smokers for many years.
Over the years, tobacco retailers have stood side-by-side with the
manufacturers in opposing any measure proposed by governments or
public health advocates that threatened to reduce their sales. Tobacco
retailers similarly do not open up their shops each day hoping that sales
will fall. Like any retailer for any product, they routinely offer price
discounts knowing that this will increase sales. And like purveyors of
any and all consumer goods, they appreciate that elegant, striking, eye-
catching, desirable market-researched packaging helps promote the at-
tractions of their products more than dull packaging incorporating
hideous graphic warnings. On the eve of the release of the Chantler
report on plain packaging, commissioned by the British government,
Simon Clark from the tobacco industry-funded FOREST and ‘Hands
off our packs’ campaign obligingly put the power of branded tobacco
packaging this way: ‘It’s like showing them a picture of a Lamborghini
and a beaten-up Ford Escort and saying “Which one do you prefer?”’
(166)
Plain packaging poses two massive threats to the tobacco industry.
First, it pulls the heart out of branding, the very core of tobacco mar-
keting. As we saw in Chapter 3, branding invests tobacco products with
rich signification and personal badging that is bound up in consumers
being attracted to smoking and selecting brands, displaying them many
times a day and remaining loyal to those brands. Plain packaging evis-
cerates the ability of tobacco companies to present packaging intended
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to make these products more desirable – and making smoking less ap-
pealing is a major goal of tobacco control.
Second, both tobacco manufacturers and retailers earn more from
sales of some brands than others. Plain packaging poses a major threat
to the profitability of premium, more profitable brands. Appearing
identical to all other brands, apart from the permitted brand and varia-
tion names on the packs, many smokers reason: ‘Why pay a lot more for
a premium brand that looks exactly the same as a budget brand?’. These
expensive brands are likely to taste little different to less expensive
brands anyway (95). Plain packaging threatens to gut a major compo-
nent of profitability of the tobacco industry as it dawns on smokers that
they were paying more for a fancy packet that now looks identical to all
others, except for the brand name.
In itself, this second effect is not of any primary interest to tobacco
control because expensive cigarettes are no less deadly than cheaper
cigarettes. It is just collateral damage to the tobacco industry caused
by the policy objective of making all tobacco products less appealing.
This is entirely the industry’s problem, but one that is irrelevant to the
prevention of diseases caused by smoking, and therefore to the public
health goals of plain packaging.
On this, the Chantler report (76) makes this critical observation.
The intent of standardised packaging is indeed to remove appealing
brand differentiation. Standardised packaging is aimed at encourag-
ing smokers to see all cigarettes as equally harmful and unappealing,
rather than to identify with particular brands and associate them
with positive qualities such as glamour, slimness or sophistication.
So when we hear anyone from the tobacco industry intoning earnestly
that they believe that plain packaging ‘won’t work’, and explaining that
it would be sensible for government to abandon it, it is always sensible
to decode such statements through a commercial reality checker. What
possible motivation would anyone profiting from selling tobacco have
to urge governments to not pursue strategies that supposedly would not
impact on sales? The idea that anyone in the tobacco industry might se-
riously think that their advice on best practice in tobacco control would
be given even a nanosecond’s credibility is more than comical. But let’s
be generous for a moment and reflect that on hearing such advice, some
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people might think that those in the tobacco industry actually might
know pretty well what might impact on smokers. ‘They research smok-
ers. Retailers talk to them every day. They might actually know.’
Yes, they certainly do know. It is instructive to watch delivery
trucks dropping off tobacco supplies to retailers. These supplies have
often been electronically ordered by retailers and the drivers electron-
ically record every carton delivered. In this way, the tobacco manufac-
turers have instant access to data on every brand sold to every retailer
in every suburb on every day. They can then map this data against any
variable they choose: season, month, day of the week, macro-economic
indicators, suburban demographic indicators, proximity of shops to
schools or factories, the introduction of new brands and variants, of
changes in pack design, price changes, tax rises, presence or absence of
anti-smoking campaigns, and the introduction of new laws or regula-
tions on smoking. They also know how long such changes to demand
last.
Armed with such information, their statements about a policy not
going to ‘work’ or having no serious impact, take on a different perspec-
tive. If a policy like plain packaging was not going to negatively impact
on sales, why would they waste any breath, let alone many millions of
dollars, in opposing it? As Hamlet’s mother Gertrude might have put it:
‘The [tobacco industry] doth protest too much, methinks.’ The indus-
try’s frequent, insistent attempts to convince us that plain packaging is
a silly idea ironically helps convince us that the exact opposite must be
true.
It’s never been done before
Equally bizarrely, the industry thought it was onto a winning argument
by repeatedly emphasising that no nation had ever introduced plain
packaging. They doubtless reasoned that this argument rested on sev-
eral subtexts that would convey to the public that such a proposal was
therefore reckless, adventurous, foolhardy and naïve. This argument
implied that it was obvious that no other nation had introduced plain
packs because all other nations – unlike the cavalier Australian govern-
ment – had thought it through properly. If something has never been
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done before, it’s always because it’s been considered and rejected for
good reason.
And because no country had ever introduced such legislation, an-
other taunt therefore became available: there was of course no evidence
to be found anywhere that plain packaging would achieve what it was
meant to achieve. This evidence-free zone in turn allowed the industry
to hitch a ride on the evidence-based policy mantra that has swept
through governments over the last 15 or so years. How could the gov-
ernment possibly promote a policy for which there was no evidence?
They were onto a winner, surely?
But in all the excitement, the industry had painted itself into the
corner of championing opposition to innovation. It sought to make
a virtue out of Australia only ever marching behind other countries.
In a political science satire Microcosmographia Academica written in
1908, FM Cornford advised aspiring politicians that ‘every public ac-
tion which is not customary either is wrong, or if it is right it is a
dangerous precedent. It follows that nothing should ever be done for
the first time.’ (167) This was the tobacco industry’s mentality in a nut-
shell.
In public health and medicine, as in every facet of life, there are
many examples of things having being done for the first time. Impor-
tant examples from public health history include vaccination, countless
new drugs, the introduction of seat belts in cars (which was first legis-
lated in Victoria, Australia in 1970) and a huge range of product inno-
vations. The British Medical Journal once published a tongue-in-cheek
systematic review that pointed out that there were no randomised con-
trolled trials that parachutes would save the lives of someone jumping
from a plane before (or after) the first time someone jumped using a
parachute. (168)
In tobacco control, there have also been many ‘firsts’ – policies
adopted in one country before any other jurisdiction had done so.
These included the first introduction of advertising bans; smokefree
workplaces, restaurants and bars; strong public education (mass media)
campaigns; health-based tax increases; the first pack warnings; and the
first graphic pack warnings. Each of these vanguard innovations has
now been adopted in many nations as tobacco control proliferates glob-
ally through the stimulus of the WHO’s FCTC (75) and the strong
support of international and national medical and health groups.
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Senior Sydney Morning Herald journalist Ross Gittins was one who
lampooned this argument:
Plain packaging of cigarettes . . . has never been adopted anywhere
in the world. Great argument: it has not been done before, therefore
you shouldn’t do it. This is the poor little stupid Australia argument.
We should always merely follow the lead of other countries because
we’re not smart enough to dream up anything good ourselves. Its
logic is foolproof: if it has never been done before there’s no evidence
it works, and if we never try it there never will be. But if the idea’s so
unlikely to work, why are the global giants fighting so hard to stop it
being tried? (169)
There’s no evidence it will work
The fraternal twin of the ‘it’s never been done before’ argument is the
even hairier-chested ‘there’s no evidence’. BATA ran advertising show-
ing an empty filing cabinet to emphasise this point (Figure 4.1)
In fact, there was a good deal of published evidence. This was
gathered together under the one cover in a review by Quit Victoria and
the Cancer Council Victoria in August 2011 (170). Angela Pratt empha-
sised the importance of the assembling of this research:
the amassing of the evidence base. I mean, the number of times that
was in all of our talking points. That was incredibly, incredibly im-
portant because it enabled Nicola to make the case publicly that this
was something that had an evidence base.
As we saw in Chapter 3, before Australia introduced plain packaging,
there was considerable experimental evidence that consistently demon-
strated that young smokers and potential smokers rate fully branded
packaging as being far more appealing across many dimensions of
appeal compared with plain packaging. In these studies, subjects are
typically presented with fully branded and mocked-up plain packaging
and asked to rate them on a variety of attributes and characteristics.
Five reviews summarising this extensive body of evidence showing
how packaging influences consumer attitudes, beliefs and behaviour are
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Figure 4.1 BATA advertisement ‘Where’s the proof?’
the Tobacco labelling and packaging toolkit (Canada, 2009) (171), Plain
packaging of tobacco products: a review of the evidence (Australia, 2011)
(170), Plain tobacco packaging: a systematic review (UK, 2012) (172),
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the Chantler review (England, 2014) (76) and Hammond’s review for
the Irish government (2014) (163). The main conclusions of this body
of research are that:
• packaging is an important element of advertising and promotion,
and its value has increased as traditional forms of advertising and
promotion have become restricted
• packaging promotes brand appeal – it is difficult, if not impossible,
to separate this from the promotion of tobacco use or to exclude
children and young adults from its effect
• the inclusion of brand names and other design embellishments are
strongly associated with the level of appeal and perceived traits asso-
ciated with branding such as sophistication
• plain packaging is less appealing for young people who may be
thinking of trying smoking
• on-pack brand imagery distracts from the prominence of health
warnings and reduces their impact
• package colours and imagery contribute to consumer mispercep-
tions that certain brands are safer than others
• plain packs reduce the appeal of cigarettes by lessening both the at-
tractiveness of the product and the social desirability of the users of
the product
• innovative packaging shape, size, and opening create strong asso-
ciations with level of appeal and perceived traits associated with
branding
• tobacco in plain packs is perceived to be less satisfying, of lower
quality, and potentially more harmful.
Exploiting public misunderstanding of ‘plain’ packs
In the years since plain packaging was announced by the Australian
government, we have often had to pause in our explanations of the con-
cept when people interrupt and say, ‘so, do you mean they are just . . . all
plain? All white? Is there no health warning, for example?’ Opponents
of plain packaging sought to exploit this understandable lack of pub-
lic understanding of the words ‘plain packaging’ and tried to give the
impression that plain packs would be plain white boxes with no mark-
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ings at all. For example, BATA ran the advertisement in Figure 4.2 in
Australian newspapers. It proposed that if plain packaging were to ap-
ply to cans of cola drinks, then the cans would be all the one colour and
only have the word ‘cola’ on the front, thereby not allowing purchasers
to know if they had been sold the particular brand of cola drink they
wanted. In Britain, plain packaging has been often depicted in the press
as in Figure 4.3 following.
Depicting plain packaging in these ways is highly misleading for
two reasons. First, unlike the BATA advertisement which shows a drink
can with the word ‘Cola’, Australian tobacco plain packaging carries the
brand and variant names of each different brand. Packs do not just say
‘cigarettes’ as the BATA advertisement implies, and as BATA knew full
well would not be the case. Second, as Figure 2.1 shows, Australian
plain packs do not look anything like the BATA comparisons with hy-
pothetical ‘plain’ cola cans: they have massive coloured health warnings
on them.
In March 2014, Linda McAvan, Britain’s member of the European
parliament for Yorkshire and The Humber, told the 6th European Con-
ference on Tobacco or Health in Istanbul that tobacco industry lob-
byists had been distributing plain white boxes like those in Figure 4.3
to members and staff of the European parliament. The mendacity of
this exercise shows the tobacco industry today is little different to its
decades of dishonest conduct we have witnessed repeatedly since the
1950s.
‘Plain packaging’ was the term initially used and that is now well
understood in Australia.Plain packaging does not mean packaging
without graphic health warnings. Other countries may wish to avoid
potential confusion and could consider using terms such as ‘generic’
or ‘standardised’ packaging, which is the term used in the April 2014
Chantler review for the British government. (76)
It will be easier to make fake copies
This exploitation of the lack of understanding of ‘plain’ also played for
the tobacco industry in proposing that plain packaging would create a
paradise for counterfeiters. What could make life easier for counterfeit-
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Figure 4.2 BATA’s attempt to depict the equivalent of ‘plain pack-
aging’ for other products
ers than to reduce the challenges of counterfeiting sometimes complex
packages by just requiring plain white boxes?
BAT’s website featured a video sent to many MPs in the UK and
Australia. The high production video dramatised the line that retail dis-
play bans (now adopted by a growing number of nations), plain packs,
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Figure 4.3 How plain tobacco packs have been frequently shown
in British news media.Source: http://www.examiner.co.uk/news/
west-yorkshire-news/kirklees-council-backs-call-plain-4928229
tax increases and banning additives would all contribute to increased
crime, terrorism and prostitution. The video had everything from a
cheesy script, to a swarthy eastern European drug dealer stereotype, an
innocent and clueless European Union bureaucrat and a shifty English
bad guy (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpFx7pLy2L0).
The entire premise of the message was that these control measures
would be manna from heaven for organised crime: ‘Plain packs – easy
for us to copy . . . no logos to match . . . easier to counterfeit . . . lots
more profit,’ said a fingernail-removing Budapest crime boss from the
back of a limo.
The truth, however, is that copying branded packs has never been
a serious barrier to tobacco counterfeiters. On the streets of many
low and middle-income nations, fake leading brands are openly sold
through street vendors because of chaotic law enforcement and corrup-
tion. I once edited a research paper from Tehran showing that 21% of
cigarettes are smuggled there. (173)
But that is not remotely the situation in Australia, nor in most
OECD nations. Forecasts of massive black markets assume that smok-
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ers will be able to access these products with the ease that they today
are able to buy cigarettes from every second shop.
As anyone who has travelled to nations where counterfeited con-
sumer goods like watches, perfumes, clothing, books, DVDs, CDs, lug-
gage and luxury pens are openly on sale, it is obvious that copying a
cigarette pack is child’s play. It has long been the case that counterfeiters
have been able to easily make extremely good, near-to-perfect copies of
fully branded tobacco packs. Australia’s plain packaging would be no
more or less easy for professional counterfeiters to copy than the fully
branded packaging it replaced. It is a major misunderstanding to as-
sume that challenges in copying packaging present a substantial barrier
to professional counterfeiters. The tobacco companies know this, so for
them it is nothing but the wilful attempt to promote a lie.
Former Scotland Yard chief inspector Will O’Reilly, now a regular
‘spokesman’ for Philip Morris, (174) emphasised another angle here,
saying: ‘If . . . we cut criminals’ costs by giving them just one pack de-
sign to copy rather than 101, then it’s criminals that win.’ (175) This
catchy sound bite rests on the falsehood that counterfeiters see their
task as making faithful copies of every brand and brand variant that is
available for sale in a licit market. Sometimes there are hundreds of le-
gal brands and variants on sale, however counterfeiters have no interest
in going to the trouble of copying brands with tiny market share. Few
smokers want these brands when they are sold openly, so why would
they suddenly want them, when popular brands are also cheaper when
sold illicitly? In Australia a small number of brands are responsible for
a large majority of market share.
Nonetheless, as shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, the tobacco industry
decided that it should exploit the public misunderstanding that plain
packaging meant all plain white boxes which any small business with
rudimentary packaging equipment could make in a suburban factory.
For many months it relentlessly promoted the idea that plain packaging
would see the market flooded with such all white packs.
In 2011 the Australian prime time television news magazine pro-
gram A Current Affair sent a reporter to Hong Kong where he inter-
viewed a person said to be a tobacco smuggler. The reporter showed
the smuggler a branded pack of a leading Australian brand, Winfield
Blue, and asked: ‘How close to that can you get?’ In an instant the smug-
gler replied: ‘100 per cent’. Winfield Blue has a basic, minimalist pack
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design with just three colours: blue, white with black text. By contrast,
Australia’s plain packs have 14 different fully coloured rotated graphic
warnings. They too, would be readily reproducible by anyone with the
right equipment. But if anything, they would present far more of chal-
lenge to counterfeit than fully branded packs like Winfield.
The British government’s 2014 Chantler report contained a bomb-
shell admission from a BATA staffer who had spoken with the Chantler
review team in March. Chantler summarised:
There is no evidence of increased counterfeiting following the intro-
duction of plain packaging in Australia and this is now accepted by
tobacco manufacturers locally. [as] Mark Connell of BAT told the re-
view team.
[Mr Connell:] One of the things that we did say . . . is that there
would be an increase in counterfeit of the standardised packaging. In
other words, the legislation was virtually a blueprint that was given to
counterfeiters . . . That hasn’t happened, well, it may have happened
in small quantities . . . Our biggest brand which was counterfeited
all the time, very professionally I have to say, at least contained a
health warning and a graphic health warning [unlike these illicit
white brands now prevalent].
Review team: Have you actually seen a reduction in counterfeit?
Mr Connell: Absolutely. Absolutely. [our emphasis]
Illicit trade in Australia has nothing to do with plain packs. Such levels
that exist are unquestionably a reflection of the high price of tobacco
products in Australia, and a small section of the market’s willingness to
buy far cheaper illegal substitutes. As Connell says, there has ‘absolutely,
absolutely’ been a reduction in such fake copies since the introduc-
tion of plain packs. Connell’s now public emphatic statement should
effectively put an end to tobacco industry claims that plain packaging
encourages counterfeiters – but it won’t. The industry will just keep on
repeating the lie.
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Illicit trade: pick a big number
This ‘boon to illicit trade’ argument was quite easily the most promi-
nent of those run by the tobacco industry and its supporters in Aus-
tralia. The same can be said about industry opposition in Britain, Ire-
land and New Zealand. For many months, the Twitter accounts of
BAT’s offices in London, Australian and New Zealand have tweeted on
little else than the illicit trade, including claims that plain packaging
would increase it.
Since 2005, there have been 10 tobacco industry-commissioned re-
ports on illicit trade in Australia prepared by three consultancy firms
– PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) in 2005, (176) 2007 (177) and 2010
(178); Deloitte between 2011 and early 2013 (179–183) and KPMG in
2013 (184) and 2014. (185) The PWC and Deloitte reports used in-
terview data collected by a market research company for the tobacco
industry in five Australian cities to then calculate estimates of the size
of illicit tobacco consumption throughout the country.
The 2011 report from Deloitte contained a stop-in-your-tracks
caveat:
We have not audited or otherwise verified the accuracy or com-
pleteness of the information, and, to that extent, the information
contained in this report may not be accurate or reliable. (179)
David Crow, CEO of BATA, gave evidence to the House of Represen-
tatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing’s hearings into the
Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011. Crow pushed the illicit trade ar-
gument and referred to the tobacco industry-commissioned Deloitte
report, (179) saying:
It is robust research. It is based on thousands of interviews of con-
sumers done in a very thorough way by Roy Morgan Research, who
work with Deloitte. The aim was to estimate – and you will never get
a real answer?–?the size. That size has been consistent over the past
18 months. The last report found that about 15.6% of the industry is
illicit. We say one in five; one in 5½ cigarettes smoked in this country
is illicit. (186)
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There were a couple of rather large problems with what Crow told the
parliamentary committee. He presumably had read the Deloitte report,
which states on page 20 that: ‘This initial sample comprised of 9206
identified people. However after allowing for natural sample attrition,
949 respondents completed the survey.’
So 949 smokers in five capital cities, not ‘thousands’, answered
questions about whether they believed they had used illegal tobacco
(loose chop chop, counterfeit or contraband/duty not paid).
Then there was the problem with Crow’s arithmetical (or was it his
rhetorical) ability. 15.6% is not one in five (that’s what 20% would be)
or one in 5½ cigarettes. It is one in 6.41, which is less than one in six.
So what’s the difference between ‘one in five’ and ‘less than one in six’?
Not much you might think? But when you’re talking about the number
of cigarettes that would be involved, this means a difference of 741.69
tonnes of tobacco, using the Deloitte data. Depending on what assump-
tions are made about the average weight of a cigarette (0.75–1g), this
translates to between 750 million and 900 million cigarettes and roll-
your-own cigarette equivalents.
Crow would have been aware that in the week before he gave
evidence, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) pub-
lished its then latest estimate of how many smokers regularly used
illicit tobacco in Australia. Surveying 26,648 people across Australia, of
whom 15.1% were daily smokers (and with 17% smoking at all?—?4530
smokers), the AIHW found just 1.5% of Australian smokers regularly
smoked unbranded tobacco in 2010 – see Table 3.11 p39. (187) Crow
did not refer to this substantially lower estimate.
The tobacco industry-sponsored reports rapidly became objects of
ridicule as the manifold problems with them became apparent. The
Cancer Council Victoria produced detailed critiques of the reports.
(188, 189)
One commenced with:
The Deloitte report on illicit trade released 3 May 2012 once again
beggars belief first because (like the previous years’ reports) it fea-
tures an implausibly large estimate of the size of the illicit market –
does anyone seriously believe that one in every eight cigarettes they
see people smoking in Australia are fake or come out of plastic bags?
(188)
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Ultimately, the idea that one in eight cigarettes being smoked (or as
high as one in five, if you listened to BATA’s chief executive) were
obtained from illicit tobacco suppliers requires that there be an ex-
tremely widespread network of illicit tobacco retailers. These suppliers
risk massive fines for tax evasion and so cannot trade openly. If one
in eight ordinary Australians, predominantly from low socioeconomic
backgrounds (190) and therefore often with minimal levels of edu-
cation, could so easily find such a network of illegal suppliers, why
could the Australian Federal Police, with all its resources, not find the
same suppliers? While police corruption is not unknown in Australia,
Transparency International ranks Australia ‘very clean’ in its 2013 Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index, (191) so the idea that police throughout the
country may have been corrupt and turning a blind eye, was also not
credible.
In April 2014 the three Australian tobacco companies released a re-
port produced by KPMG LLP Strategy Group, London entitled Illicit
tobacco in Australia: 2013 full year report. (185) This was an update of
the half year report produced in October 2013. (184)
Again, Quit Victoria and the Cancer Council Victoria rapidly pub-
lished a lengthy critical review of this report. (189) A key component of
the KPMG report was a study of discarded packs found in streets. Quit
Victoria’s critique concluded that discarded packs were highly unlikely
to be representative of total consumption of tobacco in Australia and
that KPMG’s ‘estimate of the size of the illicit tobacco market is likely to
be substantially higher than is warranted.’
The litter survey largely comprised packs either dropped by smok-
ers or blown out of street rubbish bins but did not include domestic
rubbish. Quit Victoria noted:
The survey is therefore not a representative sample of all packs used
in Australia and is likely to over-represent packs used by people who
work or otherwise spend a lot of time outdoors, and packs used by
people who litter. A review conducted by the International Agency
for Research on Cancer has suggested that people who use illicit to-
bacco may also be more inclined to litter. . . .
It is highly likely that the empty pack survey over-represents the
packs used by tourists and other overseas visitors and students, all of
whom are more likely than the average Australian smoker to be eat-
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ing out and socialising at outdoor venues, and much more likely to
be in possession of packs purchased overseas.
Areas frequented by high numbers of overseas students would
also be places where there would be a high volume of discarded
packs. Many overseas students live close to the institutions in which
they study, in budget-style accommodation . . . Students also tend to
eat out a lot in cheap eating places close by, including many serv-
ing cuisine from their countries of origin—for instance those in
Swanston and Lonsdale Streets in Melbourne. It is interesting that
each of the cities surveyed in the report – all of the capital cities
plus Geelong, Newcastle, Wollongong, Cairns, Townsville, the Gold
Coast, the Sunshine Coast and Toowoomba – is home to at least one
university with high numbers of students from overseas.
Sir Cyril Chantler in his report (76) concluded about the KPMG report:
I note that Australian government departments, both Health and
Customs, appear to be strongly of the view that KPMG’s method-
ology is flawed. These departments point to official Customs data,
which shows no significant effect on illicit tobacco following the in-
troduction of plain packaging, backed by analysis undertaken by the
Cancer Council Victoria (based on data from the National Drug
Strategy Household Survey) that suggests that illicit tobacco in Aus-
tralia is only 10–20% of the level proposed by KPMG. In a situation
where estimates differ by such magnitudes, I do not have confidence
in KPMG’s assessment of the size of – or changes in – the illicit mar-
ket in Australia.
The most bizarre claim about illicit sales was an online national in-
teractive map promoted by BATA (interestingly since removed from
http://www.illegaltobacco.com.au/) which allowed searching for the
amount of illicit tobacco being sold in any Australian electorate.
Browsers could look up the usage estimates in an outer suburban area
of a large city like Sydney or Melbourne, as well as look up how much
was being sold in the remotest central desert electorate (see a screen-
shot taken at the time in Figure 4.4). The amount per capita was exactly
the same, regardless of location. Illicit sales rates per head of population
were claimed to be the same throughout the country. The designers
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of the website had simply taken the highly questionable estimates of
use obtained from the five-city (Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth or
Adelaide) survey of just 949 smokers and applied them across the coun-
try. Apparently, illicit tobacco is as easy to buy in the remote South
Australian outback town of Oodnadatta as it is in the outer western
suburbs of Sydney or Melbourne and in the most affluent suburbs of
cities around the country.
Paul Grogan from the Cancer Council Australia picked up a lot of
cynicism about the reports from politicians he often spoke with:
Nobody I spoke to ever took them all that seriously. I’m happy to say
most people saw them for what they were worth. Most people in gov-
ernment are pretty aware of reports that are produced to meet the
goals of the commissioning agency. People get a report done by [a
commercial agency] and it’s got this disclaimer and everyone knows
it’s nonsense. It’s good for a headline. It gets stuff stirred up in the
media, but I never met anyone who was seriously worried about
whatever it was . . . one in in five . . . cigarettes being illicit.
Price falls will drive up consumption
Tobacco companies make most profit from their so-called ‘premium’
expensive brands. I once received a BATA staff training video dating
from 2001 from an anonymous sender which included the following
exchange:
Senior executive 1: Another example is our guys in marketing and
trade marketing, they need to sell five packs of [a budget brand] to
get the same profit they would get from one pack of [a premium
brand].
Senior executive 2: I mean, five packs of [the budget brand] for every
pack of [the premium brand], I mean it’s just a clear statement of fact
of what our intentions are. If we don’t sell [premium brand A] and
[premium brand B] and [premium brand C], the amount of sheer
volume we have to do of [budget brand] to make up for that is just
ridiculous. I mean, the factory couldn’t produce it.
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Figure 4.4 Screenshot from now removed BATA sponsored website show-
ing illicit tobacco use in every Australian electorate
Tobacco companies promote and price expensive brands as being of
‘superior’ quality to less expensive brands. However, the industry has
known for decades that many smokers cannot tell the difference be-
tween similar brands (95) if they are not aware beforehand of which
brand they are about to smoke.
Smokers who buy more expensive premium brands to display their
supposedly more expensive taste in cigarettes have had this ability se-
verely curtailed by plain packaging. Unless someone looks closely at
another’s pack to see what brand is being smoked, all brands – budget
and premium – look exactly the same other than for the brand and
variant names. This may well cause smokers to ‘trade down’ to cheaper
brands, reasoning that they are getting no added value for paying more
for a brand that looks the same as all others. This scenario is known in
the trade by the dreadful expression ‘commoditisation’. If this scenario
became widespread, it would be a major threat to company profitability,
forcing price to be a far greater factor in competition between compa-
nies. Here, there is some plausibility to the argument that plain packs
might cause a downward price war, which could make tobacco more af-
fordable to young people and those on low incomes, which is why the
tobacco industry has emphasised this issue.
However, the 2014 Chantler report (76) found that post plain pack-
aging, with the exception of some budget brands, the price of Australian
brands has been rising above those caused by tax rises because of the
industry increasing its prices. Chantler went on to say:
This objection also assumes that plain packaging is introduced in iso-
lation, without any relationship with broader government tobacco
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control policies. While tobacco companies may indeed seek to re-
duce price as a short-term countermeasure, this is a possible problem
that is easily counteracted. When the Australian government an-
nounced its intention to introduce plain packs, it also introduced
an immediate 25% increase in tobacco tax. In 2013, it announced a
further four successive rises, each of 12.5%. Concerns or threats of
price wars causing unintended greater affordability of tobacco can
thus easily be countered by tax increases, which force prices up. Gov-
ernments can monitor tobacco prices and if necessary increase tax to
counteract such developments.
Importantly, with the exception of some ultra low-cost ciga-
rettes, prices for leading brands in Australia have increased above tax
rises. Rather than leading to complete commoditisation, it appears
that the price differentials between premium and low-cost brands
have widened, as the Australian pricing model moves closer to that
of other high tax jurisdictions like the UK, with four distinct price
segments. Some new ultra low-cost brands have been developed, but
this is likely to reflect tax changes more than plain packaging. [our em-
phasis]
Therefore there is no evidence to date of a commoditisation of
the market leading to immediate and widespread price reductions in
Australia. It is too soon to make definitive conclusions, but the fact
that leading brands are increasing prices above tax suggests that pre-
dictions of widespread price reductions are exaggerated, at least in
the short run.
This was to prove something of an understatement. In July 2014, the
Australian Financial Review ran a lengthy report (193) on what it head-
lined as a ‘$2.2 billion pay day for Australian tobacco companies’. While
they had been vigorously prosecuting the case for plain packs and high
taxes causing a race to the bottom of prices, the same companies had
been quietly raising their own prices. And how. As Neil Chenoweth
wrote, Cancer Council Victoria price monitoring showed that the local
industry had regularly increased prices above tax increase rates, but this
went into overdrive when the intent to introduce plain packaging was
announced:
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From August 2011 to February 2013, while excise duty rose 24¢ for
a pack of 25, the tobacco companies’ portion of the cigarette price
(which excludes excise and GST), jumped $1.75 to $7.10. While ex-
cise had risen 2.8% over the period, the average net price had risen
27%. Philip Morris’ budget brand Choice 25s rose $1.80 in this pe-
riod, with only 41¢ of this being from excise and GST. (See Figure
4.5)
Figure 4.5 Contributions of tobacco tax to net sales price,
Australia
An Imperial Tobacco Australia spokesman dismissed this by arguing
that the data were recommended retail prices, not after-discount retail
prices. But Chenoweth noted that:
4 Tobacco industry arguments, strategies and tactics
77
tobacco industry sources say the level of the manufacturing rebates
has remained relatively constant, which allows comparisons between
time periods that show the sharp rises. Wholesale prices show sim-
ilar gains, with Winfields up 13.2% from August 2012 to February
2013.
Chenoweth also wrote:
The overall market moved to low-price and deep discount brands,
which grew 5.6% to comprise 37.3% of the market in 2013. It’s the
higher prices for top and middle brands, where rusted-on customers
stayed loyal to the brands, that have allowed tobacco companies to
discount cheaper brands, yet increase profits.
In July 2014, the AIHW released its report on smoking in Australia in
2013. It stated that current use of ‘unbranded’ tobacco (ie: ‘chop chop’)
had fallen from 6.1% in 2007, to 4.9% in 2010, to 3.6% in 2013. (194)
With retail display bans, plain packaging not needed
In April 2011, the trade magazine Retail World ran an item titled ‘Re-
tailers facing duplication of tobacco laws’. It stated:
The Australian Retailers Association (ARA) is concerned about the
duplication of regulatory burden and compliance costs associated
with national plain packaging legislation. ARA Executive Director
Russell Zimmerman said in a statement: ‘Retailers have invested in
new store fit-outs to ensure they are compliant with state tobacco
display bans but they are now left wondering what exactly they are
hiding behind cupboard doors if federal legislation will dictate stan-
dard packaging.’
Note here that the tobacco manufacturers pay for the new storage facil-
ities, not the retailers. It continued:
National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia Pty Ltd
(NARGA) stated that tobacco products are already sold from closed
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displays at one point of sale in a shop and are not generally visible to
customers. ‘The closed displays make the proposed plain packaging
pointless,’ NARGA said in a statement.
This argument was one that also featured in the TV ads run by the
Alliance of Australian Retailers (AAR). Yet again, it was quite bizarre.
Those using it appeared to acknowledge that keeping branded packs out
of sight in shops might be appropriate in reducing tobacco’s appeal (‘out
of sight, out of mind’) and in further denormalising tobacco to be a
non-ordinary consumer good. But of course as soon as tobacco prod-
ucts are sold and brought out from hidden display, they immediately
become portable tobacco advertisements, being displayed every time a
smoker takes them out to smoke, or places them on public display on a
café table etc.
Plain packaging turns the cigarette pack from a glossy fashion ac-
cessory into an ugly product purposefully designed to be off-putting for
both children and adults. Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that
Australian smokers have reduced the ‘display’ of their cigarette packs
after the introduction of plain packaging. In an observational study of
smoking and pack display conducted before and after the introduc-
tion of plain packs, researchers found a 15% decline in pack display
and a 23% decline in observed smoking in bars, cafes and restaurants
with outdoor dining areas. Increases were observed in the propor-
tions of smokers not displaying their packs face up, and covering them
with wallets or other material, and a small increase in the (very small)
proportion of smokers who had placed in their cigarettes in other con-
tainers. (195)
Plain packaging as an example of ‘nanny state’ legislation
In February 1985, The Age reported that at least three Australians had
been disembowelled in the past two years after sitting on swimming
pool skimmer box covers shaped like children’s seats that have since
been banned. Before the advent of mandatory shatterproof safety glass
for showers, many people suffered major lacerations and occasionally
died after bathroom accidents. Before 2008, it was legal for fast-buck
retailers to sell children’s nightwear that could easily catch fire: many
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children were hideously burnt and scarred for life. Random breath test-
ing was first introduced in 1976, to the chagrin of the Australian Hotels
Association. In New South Wales it was followed by ‘an immediate 90%
decline in road deaths, which soon stabilised at a rate approximately
22% lower than the average for the previous six years’.
These are just four of many examples of changes to laws, regula-
tions, mandatory product standards and public awareness campaigns
that were introduced following lobbying from health advocates. (196)
With these, as with nearly every campaign to clip the wings of those
with the primitive ethics of a cash register, there was protracted re-
sistance. Bans and brakes on personal and commercial freedoms are
routinely ridiculed as the interventionist screechings from that reviled
harridan, the nanny state.
Similar attacks once rained down on Edwin Chadwick, the archi-
tect of the first Public Health Act in England in 1848. He proposed the
first regulatory measures to control overcrowding, drinking water qual-
ity, sewage disposal and building standards. After he was sacked for his
trouble, The Times gloated:
We prefer to take our chance with cholera and the rest than be bullied
into health. There is nothing a man hates so much as being cleansed
against his will, or having his floors swept, his walls whitewashed, his
pet dung heaps cleared away.
Yet on the 150th anniversary of the Public Health Act, a British Medical
Journal poll saw his invention of civic hygiene, and all of its regulations,
voted as the most significant advance in public health of all time.
Those opposed to state intervention in markets subscribe to often
unarticulated social Darwinist values that imply that those with the
misfortune to be killed, injured or made chronically ill by their par-
ticipation in untrammelled marketplaces had it coming to them. The
unregulated marketplace and community is a kind of noble jungle
where the fittest survive thanks to their better education and judgement
in their consumer choices, their better ability to pay for superior, less
dodgy products, to keep up repairs on their cars and homes, and to get
employment in work that is not dangerous or toxic. Children living in
poorer housing near busy roads in the leaded petrol era had only their
parents to blame for their lead-lowered IQs – they didn’t have to live
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there! When a toddler drowned in a backyard pool before mandatory
pool-fencing laws, it was the fault of the feckless parents for not being
more vigilant, and nothing to with failure of government to mandate
the cost of a fence as part of the cost of a pool. When kids ingested lead
or other heavy metals from dodgy toys when these were legal, their par-
ents should have just done their homework and not bought them.
So in the best traditions of nanny state invective, Imperial Tobacco
ran a brief multimedia campaign in June 2011 seeking to conflate plain
packaging and the government’s greed for tobacco tax as the twin
horsemen of a nanny state apocalypse. The centrepiece of the campaign
was a severe, stout ‘nanny’, dressed like an archetypal state official-
cum-Gestapo officer. In the TV ads (see http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=G-31ew2k95w) she bellowed and belittled an unseen but
voiced young male smoker. Life-size cardboard figures of the nanny ap-
peared in tobacconists.
Imperial’s public statements accompanying the campaign were vac-
uous bluster about unspecified sinister ‘unintended consequences’ and
‘dangerous precedents’. Without blinking, Imperial advised us that all
Australians should be concerned about being on a ‘path to a nanny
state’. This pantomime-like campaign ran only briefly on television, sug-
gesting that it was not effective.
Chaos in shops
Tobacco retailers joined the chorus of manufacturers protesting against
retail display bans because the manufacturers had been giving retailers
financial incentives to display particular brands in positions which
maximised customer attention. (‘Plain packaging would have a negative
impact on retailers, who currently benefit from manufacturer payments
for shelf displays and visibility.’) (192). Some retailing representatives
stood ready to support the tobacco companies in their attacks on plain
packs.
Since December 2012, all Australian packs have been clearly
marked with the brand name and any registered variant name (eg:
‘smooth’). Each brand is delivered to retailers in brand-specific bulk
supply boxes. Retail staff then transfer the new stock into the retail dis-
pensers typically located behind them, behind the shop counters. Here,
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they are placed in brand-specific columns, with either the bottom or the
top face of the lowest pack in the column showing to the shop assistant.
Both the top and bottom panel of all packs show the brand name and
variant. This is exactly the way that fully branded packs were stored,
prior to plain packaging. The shop assistant then selects a pack of the
requested brand from these columns, when serving a customer.
The tobacco industry and its supporters decided that they could
make a big play about the utter chaos that all this was going to cause
anyone selling tobacco products. In February 2011, it got the astroturf
group it had created, the Alliance of Australian Retailers, (see p95) to
run this message to the public, armed with a report from Deloitte, the
global consultancy firm.
Astonishingly, Deloitte’s research (197) was based on discussions
with just six retailers around Australia (‘Deloitte conducted consulta-
tions with two retail operators in each of the following categories: ser-
vice stations/convenience stores, tobacconists and newsagents.’). These
six told Deloitte’s wide-eyed investigators about all the ways in which
they imagined plain packs would increase transaction times with cus-
tomers and Deloitte summarised this in Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: Estimated increase in transaction times and associated costs
(Deloitte report)
Operator Estimated number
of daily transactions
Indicative addi-
tional time
(hours)
Indicative extra
annual costs ($)
Service station /
convenience store
200–400 455–1,692 9,000–34,000
Tobacconist 100–200 323–1,218 6,500–24,000
Newsagent 50–200 216–834 4,500–17,000
Source: Data extracted from Deloitte, Alliance of Australian Retailers,
Potential impact on retailers from the introduction of plain tobacco
packaging https://www.australianretailers.com.au/downloads/pdf/de-
loitte/2011_01_31_AAR_Plain_Packaging2.pdf
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The range in transactions reflects the different sizes of the six outlets
researched. Aside from the unbelievably inept approach to sampling in
this report, there would appear to be something very seriously wrong
with this table. Consider tobacconists, who serve only tobacco products
and so might be expected to be most familiar with tobacco transactions.
Table 4.1 shows a range of 100 to 200 daily customer transactions, tak-
ing between 323–1218 additional hours (ie. between 193.8 minutes for
the shops with 100 customers per day, to 365.4 minutes for those with
200 customers a day!) Later in the report, another table states a further
additional 10–45 minutes per day would be needed for ‘stock manage-
ment’ of the new plain packaging.
Somewhere out of this chaotic report the AAR extracted the sound
bite of each transaction taking an additional ‘up to 45 seconds’, as it put
in a submission to the government. (198) All based on the guessing of
six retailers in a report published 17 months before plain packaging was
actually introduced. As you read this, pause from your reading and say
to yourself ‘a packet of Marlboro Red, please’ as if you were standing at
the counter of a petrol station or convenience store. Then look at your
watch and time out 45 seconds. Ask yourself if you can ever recall any
interaction with a store employee needing to reach any item within a
step or two from the cash register which has taken 45 seconds to find.
And then remember that the claim was being made that 45 seconds was
the length of the increase in time being claimed, not the actual time.
Perhaps they were saying it would take well over a minute for a shop
keeper to find an item that they would be asked for many, many times
every day.
The really interesting question was what was a company with De-
loitte’s reputation doing putting its name to nonsense like this? The
Deloitte report was prefaced with an interesting caveat: ‘No one else,
apart from the AAR, is entitled to rely on this report for any purpose.
We do not accept or assume any responsibility to anyone other than the
AAR in respect of our work or this report.’ Fine: there was no reason to
rely on the report for any purpose, unless you were the AAR.
In June, the AAR released another Deloitte report (199) with lots
of shocking numbers and findings in it about an Armageddon that was
going to descend on Australia’s corner stores because of a policy that
we’ll recall wasn’t going to work. Here was ‘research’ to prove it. So let’s
take a look at how this research was conducted.
4 Tobacco industry arguments, strategies and tactics
83
First, Deloitte told us that: ‘Roy Morgan Research was engaged by
the AAR to conduct a consumer survey to verify the risk of channel
shift following the introduction of plain packaging.’ Channel shift is re-
tail jargon for your customers switching to buying their tobacco from
bigger outlets like supermarkets, which of course have been attracting
small business customers for decades because of their cheaper prices on
everything.
Note importantly, that the survey was not designed to examine
whether there was a risk in channel shift arising from plain tobacco
packaging, but to ‘verify’ it. It was a foregone conclusion, apparently.
Great science!
We read that those surveyed ‘were presented with an overview of
the proposed regulation and asked whether they thought their shop-
ping experience at a small retailer would be affected.’ So they were
presented with an overview that would assist in ‘verifying’ the risk of
channel shift. Hard to imagine any chance of push polling effect oper-
ating there!
Catastrophically for corner stores, independent petrol stations and
newsagents, more than one in three smokers (34%) and 18% of non-
smoking consumers told the polling company after hearing the
overview that they were ‘either somewhat likely or very likely to change
where they shopped as a result of plain packaging.’ So why would they
do this? Smokers thought they would be ‘more likely to be given the
wrong tobacco product’. So presumably they think that small shopkeep-
ers are a cut below the staff in supermarkets and specialist tobacconists,
and won’t be able to read the name on the pack or the column on the
pack shelving behind the counter. Why else would there be more mis-
takes in handing over the brand requested in small businesses than in
larger outlets? They would be packaged the same wherever they are
sold.
Another reason given was that small store staff ‘would have a
harder time finding what I want and so ‘queues would be longer’. Again,
how could this be different in small stores compared with large stores,
given that the packs will be the same in all outlets? Particularly when we
discover below that small shopkeepers think supermarkets will stock
far more brands, which presumably might make the search more diffi-
cult in the larger outlets.
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The report also presents results from focus groups with small re-
tailers who believed that channel shift may occur because of:
• the increase in time required to complete a tobacco-related transac-
tion would lead to customers becoming increasingly frustrated due
to delays and longer queuing time
• the knowledge that a larger retailer, e.g. a major supermarket with a
broader range of products, would always have what they require.
Let’s repeat that. Small shopkeepers think that the introduction of plain
packs will cause them to cut back on the range of products they offer,
but that supermarkets won’t do this? How could that be?
These unacceptable delays would have seriously consequences for
small businesses, Deloitte argued, saying:
The increase in time required to complete a tobacco-related transac-
tion would lead to customers becoming increasingly frustrated due
to the delays and longer queuing time. As a result, many small retail-
ers believed such customers would leave their store without making
a purchase and would opt to visit a larger retailer with more staff.
However, reading deeper into the report produces not a little amuse-
ment. At the end of Table 3 (see top of page 24) (199) we read reasons
why customers shop at small retailers. ‘Convenience’ and ‘location’ rank
highest. And what is the least important reason that tobacco customers
choose to shop at small retailers? That’s right. It was ‘quick service’, at
just 2%. Plain packaging might only improve matters!
The industry then promoted this ‘big enough’ number, hoping that
no one would question it. It also had a small chorus line of dedicated
supporters who were willing to repeat this nonsense. One was Alex
Hawke, one of the federal Opposition’s rusted-on opponents of ‘exces-
sive regulation’. In July 2011 he intoned in parliament:
I also rise tonight to put on record my opposition to proposals such
as plain paper packaging legislation – ill thought out proposals put
forward by government committees and the bureaucracy which will
not achieve their ends and which will artificially burden small busi-
nesses around our country. I was visited by the Alliance of Australian
Retailers on behalf of those small businesses which will be most im-
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pacted by this bad legislation – an ill-considered idea put forward
by a government addicted to legislative response. An independent
report by Deloitte, funded by the Australian Alliance of Retailers,
identifies key areas in which small businesses will suffer from such a
piece of legislation. One area is stock management – the legislation
could double the time spent managing cigarette stocks. Increases
in sales transaction times could cost independent retailers up to
$30,000 a year. Other problem areas identified were product selec-
tion errors and increases in shrinkage. The list goes on. We must
remember that these are products which are already required by law
to be behind a counter.
We now have a situation in our country where we pay a gov-
ernment bureaucracy to determine – by government decree – that
the ugliest colour in this country is olive green. What if you happen
to like olive green? What if you happen to be a government-man-
dated freak? That is what the government has paid a bureaucratic
committee to determine – that olive green is the ugliest colour in
our country. That is what we are paying people in government to de-
termine today. I want to record my sympathy for all of those small
retailers and those people making a stand against this ridiculous
form of nanny state legislative response to ordinary, everyday prob-
lems. (200)
The Australian Retailers Association ran a similar line:
Like retail display bans, plain packaging is likely to significantly in-
crease the time taken to complete a transaction including the sale of
tobacco products. Regulations that increase transaction times have
been estimated to cost businesses up to half a billion dollars [$461
million], equivalent to 15,000 jobs. Increased transaction times also
often lead to ‘retail rage’ at the checkouts which is a health and safety
concern for retail employees, particularly young workers. (201)
Five months after the December 2012 implementation, this ‘store chaos’
theme continued unabated. Jeff Rogut, a store owner and chief exec-
utive of the Australasian Association of Convenience Stores, flew to
London to speak at a Philip Morris sponsored meeting about plain
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packs in April 2013. In an article published in Asian Trader he wrote
that staff:
. . . have to put the stock away, which has again caused enormous
angst in terms of layouts in the stores. Remember they are behind
closed doors already, they then have to open the doors and where do
they put the packs? Previously you used to have the best sellers in the
middle, easy to reach and easy to identify. Now we’ve had to think
through – do we do it by brand, alphabetically, by company? How do
we make it easier for our people to serve? And that decision has re-
ally not been made – every store is working through finding the most
efficient way to get their staff to recognise the product.
Every time any new product or newly packaged existing product is sold
in any store, staff obviously have to make decisions about where to store
these products. Cigarettes in new packages are no different.
Rogut then painted a fascinating story of plain packs being respon-
sible for the collapse of security in Australian shops:
Generally you have one person behind the counter and they have to
physically turn their back to the customer to look for the product. In
that time, a car could have filled up and driven off, somebody could
have pulled out a knife, a gun or a baseball bat. It really is a security
issue for our industry.
The problem with this ludicrous account is that those serving in Aus-
tralian tobacco retailers have always had to ‘physically turn their back
to the customer’ when selecting a pack of cigarettes from the storage
shelves – plain-packaged or not.
And finally, Rogut painted a picture of utter chaos with not 55%,
not 60%, but 59% of cigarette transactions resulting in the wrong brand
being passed to the customer.
About 59% of the products being given to customers are actually in-
correct because staff are confused. Fortunately when they scan it, it
recognises it’s not a Windfield [sic] Blue but happens to be a Wind-
field [sic] Red – the feedback is that there has been a high incidence of
that. Recording of the stock was easy before – you could see it was a
4 Tobacco industry arguments, strategies and tactics
87
Red, Blue or Green. Now they physically have to read it using a hand
scanner to make sure that they have the right stock in store.
But this gripping apocalyptic vista was still not yet finished. Rogut con-
tinued about stores having to bring in additional staff to train shop
assistants where to look for the different brands and ‘how to serve cus-
tomers better.’ Imagine such a training session:
Trainer: Now, behind you – as they have always been – is your to-
bacco stock. Open the doors to reveal the storage columns. Now, try
and find a pack of brand X.
Trainee: Well, here it is, where it’s always been . . . in the column for
that brand.
So what does independent research show actually happened in shops
after plain packaging was introduced? It shows that plain packaging
had no lasting impact on serving times. A study examining cigarette re-
trieval times before and after the introduction of plain packaging has
been published (202). In June and September 2012 (before plain pack-
ing was implemented), and in the first two weeks of December 2012
(the first two weeks after plain packaging became law in Australia), and
again in February 2013, 303 stores were visited in four Australian cities
by trained fieldworkers. They asked for a cigarette pack of a pre-deter-
mined brand, variant and pack size, unobtrusively recording the time
from the end of the request to when the pack was scanned or placed on
the counter.
The study found that the average
. . . December retrieval time (12.43s) did not differ from June (10.91s;
p=0.410) or February (10.37s; p=0.382), but was slower than Septem-
ber (9.84s; p=0.024). In December, retrieval time declined as days
after plain packaging implementation increased (ß=-0.21, p=0.011),
returning to the baseline range by the second week of implementa-
tion. This pattern was not observed in baseline months or in Febru-
ary.
The study authors concluded that:
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Retailers quickly gained experience with the new plain packaging
legislation, evidenced by retrieval time having returned to the base-
line range by the second week of implementation and remaining so
several months later. The long retrieval times predicted by tobacco
industry-funded retailer groups and the consequent costs they pre-
dicted would fall upon small retailers from plain packaging are un-
likely to eventuate.
Here is a link to a video of a person buying cigarettes in a Sydney shop
in early 2013. The time taken for the shop assistant to find the requested
brand is negligible. The time taken to transact the credit card payment
takes far longer. (203) http://tiny.cc/yttrox
Plain packaging will cause great financial hardship to small
retailers
This was a highly misleading argument that sought to conflate the sales
reduction threats posed by plain packaging with the competitive price
disadvantage that small retail tobacco outlets experience when compet-
ing with large retail chains like supermarkets. Large retailers can offer
cheaper prices for cigarettes (and all products) because of economies
of scale that allow them to trade off smaller profit margins per pack
against the much larger volume of trade they attract. Small retailers
have long been aware that smokers can buy their supplies at cheaper
prices from supermarkets or ‘cigarette barn’ chains. The threat of plain
packaging to all retailers is of reduced sales caused by more smokers
quitting and fewer new smokers starting. Any such effects will impact
all retailers across the board – not just small retailers – because all
packs, regardless of where they are sold, come in plain packaging. There
is no plain packaging impact for small business and another one for
larger tobacco retailers.
Further counters to these arguments follow:
• Efforts to engender sympathy for small retailers should not blind
us to the reality that they are knowingly selling a lethal product.
Nobody now selling cigarettes has taken up this role without being
aware that they are lethal. Many small retailers also sell cigarettes to
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children. The interests of consumers and public health should over-
ride sympathy for those who may not make so much profit from
sales of a product that kills one in two of its regular users.
• Changes to smoking patterns occur over time. Retailers can and do
develop other sales lines. When smokers quit, they do not place all
the money they would have spent on cigarettes in a box under the
bed. Like people who have never smoked, they spend their money
on other goods and services instead. These purchases benefit many
small retailers.
• There is an obvious contradiction between the industry argument
that plain packaging ‘won’t work’ and their frequent claims that it
will harm retailers through loss of sales.
The slippery slope
No other consumer good kills half of its long-term users (13) when
used as intended by the manufacturer. No government or recognised
health authority in any nation has ever called for the plain packaging of
any other consumer product. While governments and health authori-
ties are rightly concerned to reduce harms from alcohol or junk food,
tobacco is unique as a consumer product where the clear and intended
aim of government policy is to end use.
Tobacco advertising began to be banned in Australia from Sep-
tember 1976, when the government implemented legislation to end
direct advertising of cigarettes on radio and television. Over the next
16 years further legislation incrementally stopped tobacco advertising
and promotion through other media, with state bans starting in 1987
in Victoria, culminating in 1992 with the national Tobacco Advertising
Prohibition Act. In 2014, 38 years after tobacco advertising began being
banned, and 64 years after the lethal nature of cigarettes was incon-
trovertibly demonstrated, other categories of harmful products (eg.
alcohol, energy dense foods) have not been subject to similar forms of
legislative restrictions on their advertising. If there is a slope leading
from tobacco advertising bans to those in other areas, then that slope
appears to be decidedly non-slippery.
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You’re on your own with this, Big Tobacco
The desperate tobacco industry sought to pull in likely allies from other
industries into its slippery slope campaign. But this was likely to prove
difficult: even the corporate world has now started to turn on its own
rotten apple, with an editorial in Packaging World stating: ‘The tobacco
industry should steer clear of complaining of being singled out, which,
in large measure, stems from its products being like no other consumer
packaged good.’ (118)
The slippery slope ‘what product will be next to fall to plain pack-
ing?’ argument was implied in a BATA advertisement, but this drew
immediate criticism from a section of the alcohol industry. Stephen
Strachan, chief executive of the Winemakers Federation of Australia
said his industry rejected any suggestion of an equivalence between al-
cohol and tobacco implied in the ad. ‘Our industry does not like any
association between tobacco and alcohol’ (204) he said. Tobacco was on
its own in this one.
Illicit drugs aren’t sold in glossy packaging but many still use them
The obvious retort to this claim is to point out that, if illicit drugs were
beautifully packaged, displayed in shops and advertised, even more
people would be likely to use them than do now. Of the few nations
and states that have decriminalised the personal possession of cannabis,
only Colorado, USA, allows it to be sold openly in shops, as if it was
another ordinary item of commerce. None allow it to be commercially
packaged or advertised.
The repackaging turnaround time was too short
The industry argued that companies needed many months to set up the
new printing processes to completely repackage all of their brands at
once. However, the requirement to change all packaging to ‘plain’ poses
exactly the same challenges to a nation’s tobacco industry as a require-
ment to introduce new pack warnings when all packs are required to be
reprinted by a specified date. With almost every nation requiring health
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warnings, and as of November 2012, 63 nations required graphic warn-
ings (205), there are many nations which have experience in setting
deadlines for the tobacco industry to comply with legislation to change
the printing for all packs.
In Australia, Imperial Tobacco issued a press release in November
2011 arguing that it would need 17 months after the plain packaging
legislation was declared law to change its printing for all its brands.
Asking colleagues in other nations, the typical time given to companies
to change all packaging for new generations of pack warnings has been
6–12 months.
There is ample evidence from other consumer products that com-
panies can move speedily to introduce new forms of packaging either
following legislation or for commercial reasons. While the tobacco in-
dustry needs to be given a reasonable period to comply with repackag-
ing of all its products, government officials should be very circumspect
about any claims for lengthy transition periods, and share information
with other nations about the times that were required for repackaging
in the past for packaging changeovers.
Won’t plain packaging prevent the industry and governments from
providing information about less harmful tobacco products?
The tobacco industry often cites freedom of speech protection, arguing
that they have a right to inform consumers about their products, espe-
cially those that may be potentially less harmful (although the tobacco
industry has a long history of misleading consumers about such claims
(206)). This erroneously implies that cigarette advertisements contain
important consumer information and that smokers base their decision
to smoke by weighing up such information and making an informed
choice.
The tobacco industry has used this argument for decades to try
to retain the right to advertise. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 3 to-
bacco advertising is one of the least informative forms of all advertising.
And aside from a number indicating the number of cigarettes in a
pack, packs rarely if ever contain any ‘information’ beyond the brand
name and number of cigarettes in the pack. The last time Australian to-
bacco companies tried to be ‘informative’ on their packs was when they
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used descriptors like ‘light’ and ‘mild’. In 2005, the Australian Compe-
tition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) accepted court-enforceable
undertakings from the three major Australian tobacco manufacturers,
Philip Morris (Australia) Limited, British American Tobacco Limited
and Imperial Tobacco Australia Limited, under which the companies
agreed to stop using terms such as ‘light’ and ‘mild’ and to provide a to-
tal of $9 million for corrective advertising to be run by the ACCC.
Tobacco companies are the last bodies who should be involved in
making decisions about health information. If the government wishes
to provide such information, on the basis of expert advice rather than
tobacco company lobbying, it has many different options.
Covering up the packs
With the exception of the first very small pack warning introduced
on packs in 1973, with all three subsequent warnings, Australia saw
a succession of knowing predictions from talk-back radio callers that
smokers would be one giant step ahead of out-of-touch governments
by simply transferring their cigarettes to elegant cases, or buying natty
covers to hide their eyes from the warnings. But it never happened to
a less than trivial and rapidly vanishing degree with any of the three
generations of pack warnings, including the graphic warnings required
from 2006. With plain packs, we didn’t have to wait long before it
started again.
First out of the blocks was a cartoonist for Rupert Murdoch’s The
Australian newspaper, Bill Leak, who was incensed about the nanny
state implications of the imminent plain packs. He sought legal advice
on whether he could produce covers with fake brand names like Hon-
eymoon, Post-Coital Cigarettes, Tree Huggers, Vegetarian Cigarettes,
Man Up: Smokes for Blokes, Ripped: Fitness Cigarettes and Fatales:
Diet Cigarettes 99 per cent fat free (‘with a sexy sheila on the pack’). His
legal advice was apparently that he would likely end up in court. Health
Minister Nicola Roxon responded to this superbly, saying: ‘Everyone
likes a laugh, but when so many people die from smoking, it doesn’t
seem so funny anymore.’ (207) We never heard from Bill again.
But with the 1 December 2012 full implementation date, an oppor-
tunistic small businessman from Queensland was not to be denied his
4 Tobacco industry arguments, strategies and tactics
93
15 minutes of fame, announcing that smokers could now buy stickers to
cover the front and back of the new packs (see http://boxwrap.com.au/).
Just $8.75 would buy enough for six packs, with choices ranging from a
map of Australia to a rear view of a young woman with her legs apart.
A month after the launch, I noted that since launching his box wrap
stickers in early December, he had been deluged with a whole 386 Face-
book ‘likes’, and 1319 views of his YouTube promotion. A whole 24
people had followed him on Twitter, 21 of whom lived outside Aus-
tralia. These were mainly pro-smoking groups who saw plain packs as a
strike at the heart of their inalienable freedom to buy a product in beau-
tiful packs, all market tested to their last square-centimetre, that will kill
half its long-term users. English libertarian Chris Snowdon got char-
acteristically very excited when he came across publicity for the wraps,
blogging triumphantly: ‘You’d have to be simple not to have predicted
this (Simon Chapman said it would never happen, natch). Plain pack-
aging was always going to create commercial opportunities for those
who make covers, stickers and cigarette cases.’ (208)
The threat of covers and wraps being taken up extensively never
eventuated. In an observational study of people displaying cigarettes
packs before and after the plain packaging legislation, use of ‘covers’
rose from only 1.5% to just 3.5%. In 1000 smokers, only 35 were ob-
served to have gone to the bother of using covers. (195)
Like all the opportunists who lost their money with previous cover
gimmicks for the older health warnings, our Queensland entrepreneur
looked like an early candidate for a 2013 Darwin award for heroically
failed business acumen (see http://www.darwinawards.com/). On 2
February 2014, his Twitter following had fallen to just four
(https://twitter.com/boxwrap) and his Facebook page
(http://www.facebook.com/boxwrap) had grown to just 687 likes – less
than many 14 year olds have – with the last post made in July 2013.
Anyone who takes the trouble and expense of hiding their eyes
from the pack warnings is engaging in obvious denial. Evidence shows
that smokers who actively try to avoid exposure to pack warnings by
covering them up, have higher subsequent rates of quit attempts than
those who don’t. (209)
The news media were interested in this for about two days in early
December 2012, and then the story died. Advocates prepared the fol-
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lowing communication points in the improbable event that it might
have spread.
• Every generation of new pack warnings over last 30 years has seen
minor entrepreneurs trying to cash in like this. We are now seeing it
with covers.
• A tiny minority of smokers buy them maybe once, but then can’t be
bothered.
• Many suburban markets have forlorn vendors with tables covered
with pack covers, but nobody is buying. They have lost their money.
When you think about it, the very act of going out of your way to cover
up a warning shows that such people are actively avoiding being re-
minded of what smoking is doing: a bit like a child covering up their
eyes for the scary scenes in movies – but unlike movies, the scare here
is real and won’t going away by not looking at it.
We now turn to a consideration of the strategies and tactics used by
the tobacco industry across the four years of their campaign.
Astroturfing: the Alliance of Australian Retailers
As discussed, the tobacco industry had long sought to avoid coverage
in the Australian news media because of the endless potential embar-
rassment provided by its now very public internal documents, made
public in the 1990s through whistleblowers (210) and the millions re-
leased under the Master Settlement Agreement. (211) It also knew it
had very poor public credibility and was held in low public trust. So
it invested further in the time-honoured strategy of ‘astroturfing’: the
finding and/or founding and funding of seemingly independent third
party organisations and spokespeople. It hoped that many would not
understand that these groups were connected to the tobacco industry.
Tobacco companies have used astroturfed organisations for many years
globally, including in Australia.
Knowing the welcome mat laid out for it was like that offered to the
Grim Reaper,1 the Australian tobacco industry was an early pioneer in
1 Indeed, in this segment from The Chaser, the Grim Reaper seeks employment
at BATA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wu8TqMRBNk4
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the development of apparently independent lobby groups set up to at-
tack everything from pack health warnings to attacks on sponsorship.
For example, it helped establish the Confederation of Australian Sport
in 1976 where ‘the salary and office expenses of the confederation’s
president, Wayne Reid, are paid by the Australian tobacco manufac-
turers under a separate consultancy agreement with each of the three
companies.’ (212)
Less than three weeks out from the federal election polling day of
21 August 2010, we learned of the existence theAlliance of Australian
Retailers. No one had ever heard of it before it took to the media,
opened a website (https://www.australianretailers.com.au/) and began
running advertising in newspapers and on television. Initially, it was
publicly fronted by Sheryle Moon, the executive director of the Associ-
ation of Convenience Stores.
The board of the Association of Convenience Stores was chaired by
the supermarket conglomerate Coles, owned by the Wesfarmers group.
On learning that it had been misled about the funding for what was os-
tensibly an anti-Labor party campaign, Coles ordered the association
to withdraw from the campaign. (213) Moon was no longer the public
face of the alliance. Two days later, the other main supermarket chain,
Woolworths, revoked its membership of the association over the cam-
paign and demanded that its $15,000 in annual fees be returned. (214)
Any tiny ray of respectable big retailer support the alliance might have
hoped for was now gone. But as we’ll see below, it had major funding
from the three tobacco companies and advertisements continued to be
published and broadcast.
Those in tobacco control were incredulous when Moon made her
debut. Angela Pratt from Nicola Roxon’s office told us: ‘When Sheryle
Moon first appeared, we kind of thought, well, is this the best that they
can do? Surely not?’
When she first appeared, I searched for Moon on Facebook, to
learn more. I found this https://www.facebook.com/pages/Sheryle-
Moon/119524304805507?ref=ts and noticed that Moon had no Face-
book friends. Feeling sorry for her as she struggled through questions
about smoking and disease on the Lateline program, I became her first
and only Facebook friend, telling the Sydney Morning Herald that ‘the
loneliness of a tobacco industry shill is something special.’ (215)
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It transpired that the Facebook account was almost certainly a fake.
Moon never posted to it. No one in tobacco control ever owned up
to setting it up. Moon later made occasional statements against plain
packaging wearing her association hat. (216)
Advertising blitz
The AAR’s television (http://tiny.cc/a0trox, http://tiny.cc/81trox) and
print media pre-federal election ads featured shopkeepers – apparently
real, although possibly played by fully scripted actors – who ran the fol-
lowing arguments around the themes of ‘It won’t work. So why do it?’
and ‘Good policy requires more than good intentions.’ It used the fol-
lowing messages:
• plain packing was rejected in the UK and Canada
• there’s no real evidence it works
• governments can rush into policies without good evidence
• this is just another poorly conceived government campaign that
won’t work
• because all states already ban retail displays of tobacco, how will
plain packs make any difference?
Big Tobacco funding
From the very start of the campaign, the AAR was open about being
supported by the tobacco industry. But it was not for some weeks that
the extent and purpose of the support became understood when a
dossier of emails and documents between Philip Morris Australia and
staff at the Civic Group, a public relations agency, found its way to ABC
television’s Lateline reporter Peter Lloyd, who was one of the first to
cover the entrance of the AAR. (217)
The dossier opened with a helpful guide to the various organi-
sations and individuals who would feature in the pages to come. It
then gave a breakdown of the amount of funding contributed to date
by the three tobacco companies, Philip Morris, BATA and Imperial
($5.44 million together) and noted that a further $3.74 million had
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been promised for the next phase of the campaign, talking the total to
$9.18m.
One of the emails from Philip Morris in the dossier stated plainly
that the launch and planned activities of the AAR was targeted directly
at attacking the Labor government in the forthcoming election (August
21), stating: ‘We envision the election being a major decision point’. It
asked the public relations (PR) agency to provide a budget for a three-
phased campaign. Emails in the dossier commented on Moon’s media
performances – they thought she was ‘not spooked’, but then noted
that she had been accepting media interviews without first checking
with the PR agency (‘They called her and she agreed without telling us.
Could be long couple of weeks!’).
An email from a media buyer to the Civic Group dated 1 Sep-
tember 2010 post-campaign showed that the group’s commission on
the advertising expenditure was $145,788. The jubilant sender asked:
‘Would you like me to transfer it to your bank, or hold it for drinks in
Barbados? Let’s know either bank details or flight number. Regards, and
thanks!’
An invoice from the Civic Group to Philip Morris, dated 31 August
2010, requested that $788,444.10 be paid within 14 days.
A particularly interesting email between staff of the Civic Group
dated 1 September 2010, after Moon’s exit, showed the gossamer-thin
status of the alliance:
They still have not registered the business name.
Why, you ask? Because instead of asking Bob Stanton to just sign
the form and get one of the three legal departments or three external
law firms to do it, the Alliance asked him to take care of the entire
process. But because the Alliance has no bank account and it costs
$83, Bob does not think it should come out of his own pocket.
Therefore a month later nobody has done it.
So, if this campaign is successfully stopped over a legal chal-
lenge, it will be over $83. (218)
A Craig Clasby would emerge as the new spokesperson in early 2011
(219) by which time the alliance’s website listed only the Service Station
Association Pty Ltd, the Australian Newsagents’ Federation Ltd and the
National Independent Retailers Association Inc. as its member bodies.
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With the exception of newsagent’s federation, these bodies do not rep-
resent the majority of retailers trading in retailing or petrol stations.
Mike Daube tells the story of the dossier:
We didn’t know who they [the AAR] were, and some of that advertis-
ing was getting a bit of traction and it was clearly continuing. It was
a bit frustrating and I remember one night I woke up at around mid-
night and checked my emails, as you do. There was an email from
somebody I had never heard of, I still don’t know who he or she was
or is, and it said ‘Dear Professor Daube, I have seen you on television.
Would you like some real time confidential tobacco industry docu-
ments about plain packaging?’
So I of course emailed back saying, ‘yes please’. They came ab-
solutely piling in, more than 40 pages, all showing that this was as-
troturfing on a grand scale. Everything was being run from London
and New York. Direct instructions in detail. Why is such-and-such
appearing on this program and so on? Telling them what they should
do.
ABC TV’s Lateline also obtained the documents. (217) Daube says: ‘It
did a huge amount to undermine the industry because (a) that cam-
paign, if it was getting any traction, lost it and (b) it just showed how
the industry hadn’t changed its spots.’
The leak bore all the signs of being an inside job. It was unlikely to
be a hacker, as it would have been unclear where a hacker might begin
to look once inside a tobacco company, or which of many advertis-
ing, PR and lobbying agencies might have been involved. The industry
probably reached this conclusion as well. Knowing its internal security
was breached, this would have put a major brake on how those involved
communicated freely about what their next steps were.
Sunlight on the cockroaches
In the 1970s and 80s, the companies and their (now defunct) jointly-
funded propaganda arm, the Tobacco Institute of Australia, (220) were
regularly seen and heard across all Australian news media. Their
agenda included reassuring smokers about smoking and health, (221)
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denying that nicotine was addictive and attacking policies like health
warnings and smoking restrictions. This clip from the early 1980s
shows John Dollisson, then head of the Tobacco Institute, and Bill
Webb from Philip Morris issuing point-blank denials under question-
ing from the ABC’s Huw Evans (see video here (222)). But during the
1990s the tobacco industry began withdrawing from making public
comment when whistleblowers and a succession of US court cases saw
a flood of some 14 million, previously internal, documents running to
over 80 million pages, become publicly available.
California’s Professor Stan Glantz is fond of saying that tobacco
companies are like cockroaches: they spread disease and dislike sun-
light. These millions of documents put white hot, withering sunlight on
the industry and caused them to retreat from all public debate.
All the industry’s standard policy platforms (health harms from
smoking unproven; nicotine not addictive, only a ‘habit’; secondhand
smoke harmless; we don’t want children to smoke) were contradicted
by hundreds and sometimes thousands of their own documents which
showed that they knew, and thought, quite the opposite. All these po-
sitions could therefore no longer be sustained against the revelations
in the documents, which henceforth acted like a public truth serum
against industry lies. Continuing to make public comment, and appear-
ing in interviews and debates suddenly became highly risky.
In a 2008 interview BATA’s Bede Fennell, then head of public af-
fairs, told the interviewer that she was the first journalist for at least a
decade to be admitted to the company’s national headquarters in Syd-
ney. For years, the policy was to keep as low a profile as possible. ‘When
I got here, we never talked to the media,’ he says. ‘We didn’t even return
the calls.’ (223)
But plain packaging panicked the industry so much that this long-
standing policy was shelved as it stared down the barrel of the biggest
threat it had arguably ever faced.
British American Tobacco Australia
Of the three transnational companies operating in Australia, BATA was
by far the most prominent in its public attacks on plain packaging.
May 2011 was an historic month for the company. It held its first
press conference in many years, commenced an aggressive advertising
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campaign against the policy, started several web sites, and opened Twit-
ter accounts. A company account (@BATA_Media) and at least three
staff (chief executive David Crow (@DavidCrow_BATA), ‘company
spokesperson’ Scott McIntyre (@Scott_BATA) and Louise Warburton
(@Louise_BATA – now deleted) began tweeting regularly on plain
packs.
Both Crow and McIntyre seem to have had advice from the corpo-
rate lawyers when they tweeted early that ‘[this] Twitter account has not
been set up to sell or promote BATA products in any way.’ In just over
six months in 2011 McIntyre tweeted 420 times, with a modest 370 fol-
lowers, but in 2012–2014 tweeted only 31 times. McIntyre’s boss Crow
seemed to tire of it more quickly, sending only 66 tweets. The decision
seemed to be to mainly use the @BATA_Media account (937 followers
and 688 tweets by 18 April 2014).
BAT plainly has a global Twitter policy. In three nations (Australia,
New Zealand and the UK) BAT’s Twitter accounts have been almost
totally preoccupied with tweeting about the folly of plain packaging,
particularly the extent of illicit trade and how plain packaging will al-
legedly make this worse.
On 17 May 2011, BATA’s years of near total absence from public
statements was broken by Crow, who held a press conference in Sydney.
It caused a frisson of anticipation among journalists. Several called me
earlier in the day saying pretty much the same thing: ‘You’ll be amused
to know that BATA is holding a press conference. They must be pretty
worried. They generally won’t comment on anything.’
A press release (224) and Crow’s presentation covered the usual
industry lines about there being no evidence, the fearsome legal costs
the government was risking, and the inevitability of the market being
flooded with black market tobacco. But the big news to emerge was
that BATA would be running a multi-million dollar advertising cam-
paign produced by the advertising agency G2, and a threat by BATA
that it would significantly drop its retail prices (and so its profit mar-
gins) in order to compete with the certainty of downtrading the in-
dustry was promoting. Crow told journalists: ‘If we have to lower our
prices, we will to compete with illegal product flooding in from abroad.’
(see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FTldddUlrls) He thought this
would be tragic as it would make cigarettes more affordable to children.
Crow was a parent too, and didn’t want to see this happening: ‘I’ve got
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a 13-year-old, an 11-year-old and a seven-year-old and if they smoke
I tell them absolutely, categorically, “Do not smoke”’ (225). But with
his duty to his company, this concern that more children might smoke
would unfortunately just have to take a back seat. It was all the govern-
ment’s problem.
Crow has a reputation as an ebullient, ‘blokey’, swaggering CEO.
A 2008 portrait of BATA’s senior staff in a weekend newspaper by Jane
Cadzow described him thus:
Crow, 45, is a strapping figure – 195 centimetres tall, with broad
shoulders and such an exuberant personality that he seems to take up
more space than he actually does. The son of an oil company exec-
utive, he went to Cranbrook, one of Sydney’s most expensive private
schools, then studied economics and commerce at university. He is a
keen sailor and a former rugby player.
He described his company, whose most dedicated customers have at
least a 50% mortality experience because of their smoking, (13) as a ‘fun
and funky place’. (223) A bemused Roxon staffer remarked that Crow
signed some of his letters to the government with just ‘Crowie’.
The Sydney Morning Herald’s Mike Carlton was the most acerbic
about the re-emergence into public view of industry spokespeople:
So the chief drug dealer at British American Tobacco Australia, one
David Crow, is threatening to flood the country with cut-price fags
if the federal government brings in plain packaging for cigarettes.
That would mean ‘more people will smoke, more kids will smoke,’ he
said on Tuesday, oozing regret from every pore, as if he were helpless
to prevent such wickedness . . . As a corporate bully-boy attempt to
browbeat a government, it doesn’t come more crude than that. The
insolence is staggering. Mr Crow will not like being called a drug
dealer, I suspect. But that’s what he is, the bumptious twerp. (226)
Cadzow reported that photographs of staff in the BATA building are
captioned with quotes explaining why the person likes working there.
Says one: ‘All my heart and mind needs are met.’ Says a second: ‘It
makes me happy and alive.’ Says a third: ‘The people I work with are
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like a family to me and the goals of the company are close to my
heart.’ (223)
Other tobacco companies
Philip Morris and Imperial took far lower profile roles than BATA. Im-
perial ran a brief ‘nanny state’ campaign (see p 82). Philip Morris set
up a website www.plain-packaging.com, which was later taken down,
and started another in April 2011 called I deserve to be heard
https://www.ideservetobeheard.com.au/ to attract smokers opposed to
the legislation and other forms of tobacco control. The site invited
smokers to share their stories, to invite friends to join in and to write
to their MP. None of our colleagues nor any politicians we spoke with
could recall anything that seemed to flow from this name-gathering ex-
ercise. This was very predictable: most smokers wish they didn’t smoke
and many support tobacco control measures that might help them stop
or reduce the amount they smoke.
Here is an example of the sort of robot-generated messages that
those who registered with I deserve to heard received.
Dear [name],
Did you know that your local MP [name] supports plain pack-
aging legislation for cigarettes? Click [here] to find out more.
You have every right to be disappointed that your local represen-
tative is not listening to your concerns about plain packaging.
It’s time to send a clear message that you oppose plain packaging
and that you deserve to be heard.
Many people like you have told [politician’s name] that they op-
pose plain packaging and other policies that unfairly target smokers.
Despite this, [politician’s name] has chosen to push a policy that
just does not make sense.
With cigarettes already hidden behind doors in most shops
across the country, plain packaging will just make it harder for you
to identify and purchase your cigarettes, causing long queues and all
for a policy that has not been proven to prevent or stop people from
smoking.
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The government will put legislation for plain packaging into
Parliament within the next couple of months, so the time to let
[politician’s name] know that you oppose plain packaging is now!
Write to [politician’s name] and have your say to today!
How did the industry perform?
I asked a senior lobbyist from a non-government organisation
(NGO) and Mike Daube about their perceptions on how the tobacco
industry had handled their campaign against the legislation.
Daube was unimpressed:
I think they performed very poorly. The reason for that, and I know
it’s a point we slightly flippantly mention from time to time, but I
think it’s real – it’s hard for the industry to get really good people.
They pay a lot of money, but it’s very hard for them to get good
people. Second, it’s hard for them to get good groups to work with
them. Third, their public credibility is zilch, so they’re always battling
against that. When people and politicians hear that it’s thingamajig
from BAT, initially just a blanket distrust descends over them. So
that’s an issue.
The next issue, which I think is a pretty fundamental one, is that
it’s not an indigenous industry. It’s all controlled from London and
New York. So my guess would be that for years the industry here
had stayed below the parapet because they’d learned from experience
that once their heads appear, then we will kick them with glee and
nobody believes them and so on. My guess would be that the indus-
try people here would probably have preferred a similar approach
to plain packaging. They would probably have liked to have worked
more in the dark, but there were people screaming down the phones
from London and New York saying: ‘Do something!’ You must do
this, you must do that. You must run advertising campaigns. You
must do some astroturfing. You must this, you must that.’ And that
just backfired monumentally.
The campaign, the whole approach was being directed from
London and New York, [which] meant that they just didn’t read Aus-
tralia. They didn’t understand how much the industry was on the
nose. Those awful nanny state ads, they were enough to repel any-
body.
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The astroturfing approach: setting up phony organisations, guar-
anteed to come out in the end and to hit them slap bang in the face.
Same with the lobbying of politicians. Some of what I heard was
pretty crass stuff. The commentary in the media, do you remember
one of them, I have forgotten what her name was, saying on radio:
‘Yes I do understand that smoking kills people and that’s very sad, but
. . .?’ Do you remember that?
I think they just totally mishandled the lobbying. They could
all have done a whole lot better. Also even the people they used, so
demonstrably second rate. They just sounded like junior PR interns
and very little credibility. They put a cartload of money in and I don’t
think we should fool ourselves, you can spend a lot of money on ad-
vertising and you can do a bit of turning around, but it didn’t get
them very far.
A senior health NGO employee reflected on BATA’s main spokesper-
son:
The guy who always popped up, I mean every time he’d just put his
foot in it so badly that I think people would also ask the question, I
mean, people who work in public affairs would think ‘Is this the best
they can do?’ Every time this guy opened his mouth it would be a
free kick.
Angela Pratt was equally blunt:
I was surprised, and I think we were all surprised, at how unso-
phisticated their public spokespeople were, both during the election
campaign at the very beginning and subsequently. None of their
people seemed to have any credibility. Their arguments were un-
sophisticated, over the top, extremist and ultimately that, for my
money, characterised their campaign broadly and that’s why it was
unsuccessful, because they went so extreme, but also kind of not in a
very sophisticated way.
For example, in August 2013 BATA’s Scott McIntyre was asked on radio:
‘How many people do you believe that tobacco kills in Australia?’ He
replied: ‘We’re not in the business of running health departments. We’re
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in the business of selling cigarettes.’ Pressed, he continued: ‘I don’t have
any figures off the top of my head.’ (http://www.abc.net.au/newsradio/
content/s3815878.htm at 4m01s) This was a stunning statement. Here,
the main spokesperson from Australia’s largest tobacco company was
claiming to not be able to recall what was probably the most repeated
statistic in Australian tobacco control: that some 15,000 people die an-
nually from tobacco-caused disease.
I asked Daube if anything the industry did got them any traction.
Yes, some traction. They planted various stories, particularly in the
Murdoch media. I think some of their advertising, just the constant
weight of advertising, probably did have some impact, and that
clearly comes through from some of the tracking work they did, but
overall, it took them from a D minus to a D, rather than even a D
plus, rather than getting a significant change. I don’t think it had
good traction.
Submissions to government and international lobbying
In April 2011, the Australian government began a 60-day public consul-
tation period to allow the Australian public and international commu-
nity to comment on the proposed Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill (2011).
By the close of the public consultation period in June 2011, 265 submis-
sions had been received by the Australian government, not including
1566 ‘form letters’ received (see below). Ninety-nine submissions sup-
ported the bill (many from substantial health or related organisations,
themselves with many member groups and individual members), and
158 opposed it. Another eight submissions commented on matters re-
lating to the bill, but in a way that was not clear whether they supported
it or were against it. Most submissions were from Australian-based in-
dividuals or groups, (221) with only some from overseas (44).
Form letters
Three different form letters were submitted, all opposed to the policy.
One sent by 1100 people came from smokers; a second (n=447) came
from small retailers; and a third was sent in by 19 respondents.
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With the exception of a few individuals (and even here it is difficult
to identify which were indeed linked indirectly with or generated by
tobacco interests), the only opposition is likely to have come from to-
bacco interests and their associates, and possibly organisations with
philosophical or commercial objections to curbs on industry.
Overseas-based organisations making submissions against plain
packs in Australia included: tobacco companies, intellectual property
associations, civil liberties associations and chambers of commerce.
Australian retailer and business groups opposing plain packaging in-
cluded those involved in packaging, and retailing (supermarkets, liquor,
newsagents, motor vehicle service stations). A summary of the submis-
sions can be found here (227).
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) had already
sent the Australian Cabinet a copy of a unanimous resolution (228)
originally sent to the Obama administration. It detailed a diatribe of
specious arguments about the importance of free trade. To anyone with
any familiarity with the global tobacco industry, this was as predictable
as Father Christmas appearing in stores in December. PR Watch has
a large entry on ALEC, noting that it ‘is an influential, under-the-
radar organisation that facilitates collaboration between many of the
most powerful corporations in America and state-level legislative rep-
resentatives. Elected officials then introduce legislation approved by
corporations in state houses across the US, without disclosing that the
bills were pre-approved by corporations on ALEC task forces.’ It has a
long relationship with the tobacco industry, dating from 1979, and it
has essentially worked in total lock-step with that industry’s interests.
(229)
Freedom of information deluge
In October 2011, the Sydney Morning Herald (230) reported that Big
Tobacco was ‘abusing’ the freedom of information (FOI) process over
plain packaging. The Department of Health and Ageing had been
swamped with 64 FOI requests relating to plain packaging, with 53 of
these lodged by the tobacco industry. The department’s secretary Jane
Halton detailed to a Senate estimates committee in February 2012 how
the industry was inundating the government with FOI requests in a
move she said was designed to ‘tie up resources’.
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In July and August 2010, BATA lodged 17 FOI requests concerning
plain packaging and related issues. Halton told the committee:
Our initial estimate of processing these requests was over $1.47 mil-
lion, based on the need to examine 5265 files and make decisions
on an estimated 81,791 documents. The department negotiated with
BATA to reduce the scope of these requests and the associated
charges over a five-month period. As part of this negotiation, BATA
withdrew seven of the requests and reduced the scope of the remain-
ing 10. This left 242 files and an estimated 13,137 documents to be
processed.
We issued a revised charges estimate of just over $367,000 in July
2011. BATA agreed to the charges estimate and paid the deposit –
it sounds like buying a house – of $91,776. . . . Because of the large
amount of duplication on the files and a smaller number of docu-
ments on which decisions had to be made and due to efficiencies
in decision making as officers became more familiar with the docu-
ments, the final charge arrived at for the BATA 10 was $135,734.60.
The department estimates the actual cost of processing the requests
at over $643,000. The charges therefore represent only 21 per cent
of the final costs. I should say that the net cost to the department is
worth four staff who should have otherwise been working on popu-
lation health issues.
‘In a separate case, BATA took legal action in June 2011 against the Aus-
tralian government after the Department of Health and Ageing refused
to reveal confidential legal advice written for it 16 years ago. BATA ap-
plied for the advice under FOI laws but was rebuffed. Lawyers for BATA
told a federal court that the legal advice, written in 1995, was needed
in the current public debate about plain packaging in Australia.’ (231)
BATA’s case was unsuccessful. (232)
In June 2010, Philip Morris lodged FOI requests with six govern-
ment agencies concerning 19 questions on tobacco plain packaging and
related matters. Halton told the committee:
Again there was a lengthy negotiation over scope and costs, and a de-
cision was made to release a number of documents in February 2011.
PML (Philip Morris Limited) requested an internal review of this re-
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quest, which was completed in April 2011. They then appealed to the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal. A hearing was scheduled for 4 No-
vember and significant work was done in the department to prepare
for the appeal, including the release of some additional documents.
They withdrew the case a week before the hearing, on 26 October.
That is just to give you an indication of the costs and the tactics,
which are basically designed to tie up departmental resources which
we cannot cost recover.’ (231)
Pro-plain packaging tactics
The Australian government did not run any advertising campaigns to
inform the public about why it was planning to introduce plain pack-
aging. It ran a national information campaign for tobacco retailers
informing them of their obligations at the time of implementation.
(233) Australian health NGOs rarely run mass reach advertising cam-
paigns on any issue because of the costs involved. Instead they rely on
‘earned media’ (news coverage and commentary) on internet-based in-
formation and awareness raising, and very occasionally on ‘packaged’
advocacy campaigns targeted at politicians.
The Cancer Council Victoria produced two video ads, but could
not afford to run them on television. Sometimes TV news will cover
such campaigns, sending lots of traffic to websites for viewing. One of
the Victorian ads released just after the December 2012 implementa-
tion was titled ‘No more hiding’, and showed smokers trying to hide
and cover up large graphic health warnings on the new plain packs.
It ended with the words ‘You can’t hide the effects of smoking’ (see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GgcYn2YQ0t4#t=16). As of 5 Octo-
ber 2014 it had received 66,773 views.
Another featured a well-known political satirist, John Clarke, im-
personating a tobacco industry chief talking earnestly about a total
product recall and then laughing like a drain as he said: ‘Because we
care about your health’ (see https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=3jKDW9MTF48). As of 5 October 2014 it had attracted
16,361 views.
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A coalition of NGOs ran one print media advertisement (see Figure
4.6) in 2010 to underscore that the AAR campaign was merely a front
for Big Tobacco.
Quit Victoria was contacted by a marketing executive with 27
years experience, including four years with the former tobacco com-
pany, Rothmans. Craig Seitam spoke at a seminar
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cEqt0n40aX0) and wrote an opin-
ion piece in the Sydney Morning Herald and Age newspapers where he
supported the case for regarding packaging as advertising by emphasis-
ing the importance of packaging to branding, and particularly to young
smokers. (234)
I’ve seldom been persuaded that petitions and open letters were an
advocacy strategy worth the effort involved. On many occasions, I’ve
heard staff from political offices remark that they are over-used, sel-
dom read and of little impact. But our experience with a plain packs
multi-signature open letter caused me to revise this negativity. The
Australian Council on Smoking and Health (chaired by Mike Daube),
Cancer Council Australia, the National Heart Foundation, the Public
Health Association of Australia and I organised the collection, within
two weeks, of a list of over 200 health and medical professors from
around the country, and all seven medical former Australians of the
Year to sign an open letter addressed to parliament. When I sent an
email to all professors within my own medical faculty at the University
of Sydney, replies began pouring in immediately. Feedback from politi-
cians was that the letter, which was cited in federal parliament, played a
valuable role. This approach has since been used by other groups in the
health arena.
Australian smokers’ reactions: not with a bang, but a whimper
Australian smokers were made conspicuous by their absence from op-
position to plain packaging. The voices that were heard against the in-
troduction of the packaging were almost all connected with the tobacco
industry and industries associated with it, particularly retailing. Other
than the industry, the industry-funded Institute of Public Affairs, a few
fringe libertarian internet forums like Menzies House, (235) and the
usual presence of mostly anonymous trolls on blog comment sections,
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Figure 4.6 Guess who’s pulling the strings? Source: http://tiny.cc/59trox
(164) there was no apparent organised local opposition to plain pack-
aging nor evidence of any widespread anger among smokers. Enquiries
to politicians revealed negligible complaints from their constituents.
The tobacco industry is well aware that most smokers wish they
had never started smoking – 90% regret ever having started to smoke
(236) and around 40% make a serious quit attempt each year. They
would also be aware of national and international polls that show that
many smokers support tobacco control measures, particularly if the
measures are explained as being principally targeted at preventing chil-
dren from starting to smoke.
For example, a paper published in 2013 found that 25% of New
York smokers surveyed favoured increasing taxes on cigarettes, climb-
ing to 60% if taxes were used to fund healthcare programs. Thirty per
cent smokers favoured limiting the number of tobacco retail licences,
and 60% supported raising the minimum age to purchase cigarettes
from 18 to 21 Almost half of smokers favoured keeping tobacco prod-
ucts out of customers’ view and prohibiting price promotions. (237)
A telling indication of the extent to which smokers will put their
‘rights’ about other considerations ahead of those about their smoking
came in the 2013 national election where a Smokers’ Rights party
fielded Senate candidates in all six states. (238) Its candidates attracted
just 25,123 first preference votes out of 13,464,123 votes cast in these
states (or one vote for every 536 votes cast). In Victoria, only 78 people
voted for two individual Smokers’ Rights candidates out of 3,499,438
who voted – one in every 44,865 voters.
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5
Plain packaging – why now?
And why Australia?
Any history of tobacco control in Australia, and indeed in nearly all
nations, would report with incredulity the lack of urgency in the pace
with which governments went about trying to reduce smoking. In Aus-
tralia, in 1957 the NHMRC noted the research being published from
1950 in the USA and Britain on the association between lung cancer
and smoking, and recommended to the minister for health that public-
ity campaigns should be considered to warn the public about the risks
(see Figure 5.1).
It took another 16 years before Australians saw the first health
warnings peeping in small font from the bottom of cigarette packs. And
it was not until 1982 – 25 years later – that any significant (multimedia)
statewide anti-smoking campaigns commenced in Australia at a level
going beyond simple posters and pamphlets.
Smoking was first banned in cinemas, in public halls and on buses
and trains from the mid-1970s. The Australian Capital Territory began
to stop indoor smoking in pubs and bars under health ministers Wayne
Berry (1994) and Michael Moore (1998), but other states and territories
delayed until 2005 and later.1
Advocacy for banning smoking in cars carrying children com-
menced in Australia in 1995. It took until December 2007 – another 12
1 See details of Australian smoke free environments legislation here
http://tiny.cc/ydurox
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years – before Tasmania became the first state to introduce legislation
on smoking in cars in Australia. (239)
Direct forms of tobacco advertising ended on Australian radio and
television in September 1976, but it was another 16 years until all re-
maining forms under the control of Australian governments ended
with the 1992 Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act.2
Figure 5.1 Extract of letter from NHMRC to minister for health, 4
July 1957
Those working in tobacco control in Australia were therefore used to
long gaps, perhaps of decades, between early advocacy for a proposal
and its eventual complete political adoption. All major advances in to-
bacco control policy have been subject to heavy attack and sustained
lobbying by the tobacco industry. As outlined in Chapter 1, there had
been advocacy for plain packaging since the late 1980s, with the evi-
dence base steadily growing. It is always interesting to consider what
makes proposals once considered radical, like tobacco advertising bans
2 See http://tiny.cc/4eurox
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and smokefree public places, morph into sensible ideas whose times
have now come.
Table 5.1: Major milestones in the introduction of plain packaging in
Australia
Year Milestone
2008 9 April: Nicola Roxon announces establishment of the National Preventa-
tive Health Taskforce
10 October: Release for consultation of the draft report of the National
Preventative Health Task Force recommending plain packaging (240)
17–22 November: Parties to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Con-
trol adopt guidelines on advertising and package labelling that
recommend the use of plain packaging (241)
October 2008 to February 2009: Public submissions and consultation ses-
sions by the National Preventative Health Taskforce (242)
2009 30 June: National Preventative Health Task Force provides final report to
government (243)
1 September: Minister releases final report of the National Preventative
Health Task Force, which includes recommendation on plain packaging
2010 29 April: Kevin Rudd and Nicola Roxon announce plain packaging will be
introduced (244) and an immediate 25% increase in tobacco tax
24 June: Prime minister Kevin Rudd deposed by deputy prime minister
Julia Gillard
4 August: Public launch of tobacco industry astroturf group, Alliance of
Australian Retailers
21 August: Federal election. Gillard government returned to power, but re-
lies on support from three crossbench members in House of
Representatives to pass legislation
12 September: Coles and Woolworths withdraw from Alliance of Aus-
tralian Retailers
2011 1 March: Release of Deloitte report on illicit trade
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Year Milestone
7 April: Australia notifies the WTO of its intention to implement plain
packaging (245)
17 May: BATA launches major advertising campaign against plain packag-
ing
31 May 31: Nicola Roxon honoured by WHO; Coalition decides it will not
oppose plain packaging legislation
June: 260 submissions received by government on bill (246)
7 June: First discussion at WTO of Australia’s move (247)
21 November: Final passage of amended bill through House of Represen-
tatives (248)
21 November: Philip Morris Asia Limited, Hong Kong, owner of Aus-
tralian affiliate, Philip Morris Limited, announces that it has begun legal
proceedings (249) against the Australian government by serving a notice
of arbitration under Australia’s bilateral investment treaty with Hong Kong
2012 17 April: High Court case commences
15 August: High Court decision
1 October: Henceforth illegal to manufacture or import fully branded
packs
1 December: Plain packaging fully implemented – henceforth illegal to
sell any non-complaint packs
Removing the emperor’s clothes
116
Table 5.2: Milestones in passage of Plain Packaging Bill through Aus-
tralian Parliament, 2011
Date Action
6 July3 Bill introduced into House of Representatives, read and second
reading moved (250)
7 July House of Representatives refers bill to Standing Committee on
Health and Ageing (251)
22 July Submissions close for House of Representatives Standing Committee
on Health and Ageing – Inquiry into Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill
2011: 63 submissions received (252)
4 August Hearings of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on
Health and Ageing (253)
18 August Senate refers bill to Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee
which calls for submissions by 2 September (254)
22 August House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Aged
Care tables the report on its inquiry into plain packaging (255)
24 August Second reading debate, third reading agreed to passage of legislation
through House of Representatives (250)
25 August Bill introduced and read a first time in Senate, then second reading
moved (250)
2
September
Submissions received by Senate’s Legal and Constitutional Affairs
Committee (256)
13
September
Hearings of the Senate’s Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee
(257)
3 It is common for politicians to acknowledge the presence in the public
parliamentary gallery of people who are affected by new legislation or who
have played a major role in its development. In speaking to the bill, Nicola
Roxon noted ‘Can I particularly say that it gives me great pleasure that the
parliament has been able to accommodate Mike Daube on his 63rd
birthday. I hope that this is a good birthday present for him.’
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Date Action
11
October
Second reading debate in Senate commences (250)
2
November
Nicola Roxon, announces that the implementation of plain packag-
ing will be delayed until 1 December 2012 as a result of delays in the
Senate review of the bill (258) which followed industry lobbying
9–10
November
Second reading debate continues and second reading agreed to.
Third reading agreed to (with amendments) (250)
21
November
Final passage of amended bill through House of Representatives.
Vote on Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill and Trademarks Amendment
Bill as amended by the Senate. (250) Official Hansard No 18, Mon-
day 21st November, Forty-third Parliament, First session – Fourth
period 2011:12913. (248)
28
November
Signing into law by Governor General of Tobacco Plain Packaging
Act 2011 (72)
I asked Nicola Roxon a question asked of me many times: ‘What made
the government you belonged to take such an important step?’ She em-
phasised several factors, including the evidence base, the reputation
and coherence of the tobacco control community, and expertise in the
public service, legal profession and in the public health sphere.
The evidence base
Roxon repeatedly highlighted the critical role that evidence played in
the government’s decision to adopt plain packaging. The public health
effort to reduce smoking in Australia from as far back as the 1970s has
been an evidence-based enterprise. Australian researchers have been
major contributors to the international research literature in all areas of
tobacco control.
The most important group researching tobacco packaging in Aus-
tralia has been Professor Melanie Wakefield and her team at the Cancer
Council Victoria. The Centre for Behavioural Research in Cancer at
Cancer Council Victoria was established in 1986 as a scientific research
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centre specialising in the understanding and monitoring of behaviours
that contribute to cancer, and in the evaluation of programs and poli-
cies aiming to change such behaviours. It is funded largely through
competitive research grants which depend on the high levels of aca-
demic rigour and strong track records of publication in the peer-re-
viewed scientific literature. As noted in the government’s response to
the recommendations of the National Preventative Health Taskforce,
the results of studies by Wakefield et al of the effects of reducing design
features on smokers’ perceptions of attractiveness and social desirabil-
ity of smoking provided important evidence of the potential impact of
plain packaging. Wakefield also advised the government on research it
conducted to guide the design of standardised packaging and size and
placement of health warnings.
An associate of the centre, Dr Michelle Scollo also deserves partic-
ular mention. Her meticulous and encyclopaedic data banks on nearly
every aspect of tobacco control in Australia that form the backbone
of the massive online resource, Tobacco in Australia: facts and issues
(http://www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.au/), and her peerless grasp of is-
sues concerning tax and apparent consumption, brought invaluable
expertise to the development and evaluation of plain packaging.
Reputation and coherence of Australian tobacco control
community
As well as the research evidence on the appeal of tobacco packaging,
another crucial factor in the government’s decision to proceed was the
national and international reputation of Australian tobacco control in
all its achievements over the previous decades. Roxon said:
It was an attractive next step after all the Australia had done suc-
cessfully over decades. It would be fair to say that there wasn’t any
groundswell from the public service at that time [about plain packs].
The taskforce pulling together the evidence and presenting options
helped move that significantly – and they [the public servants] were
very enthusiastic converts once we, as government ministers, said we
were interested in it. My interest was definitely sparked by the cohe-
sive arguments the whole public health community in Australia put
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to us. Without their track record, the strong impression made when
groups put those ideas to us would have been much weaker.’
The tobacco control research and policy advocacy communities in Aus-
tralia have long been a relatively small, tightly knit, personally close and
extremely communicative network. Most of the leading individuals in
these communities today have been working in it for well over 10 years,
with several approaching or exceeding 30 years. (259) Their strate-
gic research contributions and advocacy have often been followed by
sweeping policy change successes, such as ending all forms of tobacco
advertising and promotion and the roll-out of smokefree areas. Unlike
some other areas of public health where policy goals are more complex
and nuanced, tobacco control’s goals have long been clear and consis-
tent.
Roxon was very aware of this coherence, talking about:
. . . well respected people, coordinated. So not 10 different people
all asking for 20 different things. That [cohesiveness] happens much
more rarely than you would imagine in politics. I think the value of
the cut-through of a message like that, and how easy it then is for
governments to pick it up, shouldn’t be underestimated.
She also emphasised the attraction of plain packaging as being a strat-
egy that would not be expensive for government to implement, with all
packaging costs being borne by the companies. ‘What were the options
for interventions that could have an impact and not necessarily be ex-
pensive?’ she asked. ‘Plain packaging ticked that box.’
Besides the researchers who were publishing the evidence for the
policy, there were several other groups of highly skilled and experi-
enced individuals working in different areas to whom Roxon would
have been referring as ‘well respected’ people.
Legal white knights
Lawyers have played important roles in several stanzas of Australian
tobacco control over the last 35 years. They have assisted in drafting
laws and regulations, advising governments on potential legal risks and,
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especially in the case of Peter Gordon from Victoria, have run cases
for individuals who were seeking redress for harms. But plain pack-
aging acted like a clarion call to a phalanx of academic legal experts
who produced a small tsunami of legal scholarship on the many domes-
tic and international issues arising from the legislation. These included
Greg Craven, Mark Davison, Tom Faunce, Jonathan Liberman, Benn
McGrady, Andrew Mitchell, Mathew Rimmer, Don Rothwell and Tania
Voon. Most of these lawyers contributed to a large volume of both
scholarly and journalistic writing, and several were often heard in radio
commentary. An edited book of legal papers was published. (36) Sev-
eral of them worked closely with the government at different stages of
the saga.
It is also critical to acknowledge the vital role of the Australian
government’s lawyers who provided legal oversight at all stages of the
legislation and its regulations, and of the successful defence of the bill
in the High Court (see Chapter 6). Their work is continuing in interna-
tional forums.
Commonwealth public servants
Everyone with even the slightest engagement in the passage of the bill
through to law appreciated the extent and sheer quality of the expertise
available in the health department and in the solicitor general’s office
in Canberra. These were beyond consummate public servants who rose
magnificently to meet the extraordinary range of challenges that were
their responsibilities in the passage of the bill. They provided detailed
input to the development of the regulations preparing the government’s
defence for the High Court case, they weathered the carpet-bombing
freedom of information requests from the industry (see pp107), and
they collated and summarised public submissions. They also handled
numerous public enquiries and much correspondence, and provided
close collaboration with other government agencies on a range of issues
pertinent to the legislation, and on the conduct and handling of tar-
geted and public consultation on the legislation and the regulations.
Angela Pratt from Roxon’s office was effusive about the role played
by staff in the Department of Health and Ageing:
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The health department, Jane [Halton], Simon Cotterell, there are
a couple of different deputy secretaries that oversaw it at different
stages of the process, were all magnificent. Really seriously magnifi-
cent. The detailed work involved in the legislative drafting was really
difficult, complex work. If we had had a lesser team of people on that
job, the kind of risk for problems in the legislation would have been
very high. But the health department team were absolutely magnifi-
cent.
Very fittingly, the department was awarded the American Cancer Soci-
ety’s Luther L Terry Award for outstanding leadership by a government
ministry at the 2012 World Conference on Tobacco or Health, held in
Singapore.
Public health experts and advocates
In addition to the lawyers mentioned above, Professor Mike Daube
(Curtin University and chair of the Australian Council on Smoking and
Health in Western Australia), Anne Jones and Stafford Sanders from
ASH (Action on Smoking and Health), Cancer Council Australia and
Victoria staff Professor Ian Olver, Paul Grogan and Fiona Sharkie and
ourselves were the most frequent voices being interviewed, calling ra-
dio stations and writing opinion pieces and blogs over the four-year
period since the April 2010 decision to proceed was announced.
Mike Daube played a pivotal quarterback role in plain packaging
from the time of his chairing the National Preventative Health Task
Force’s tobacco committee. Vastly experienced in both senior levels of
government (he spent time as director general of health in Western
Australia) and in advocacy dating from his time as inaugural director
of ASH UK in the 1970s, Mike was in on every important conference
call. He and I would speak often several times a day, whether to share
information, review an incident or plan a line of attack. Most important
of all, Mike was the main go-to person for the minister’s office.
Angela Pratt:
It was absolutely helpful to the government and the fact that all of
you guys were incredibly well organised. You know, Mike Daube
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would ring me and say we’ve got a new opinion poll; when would be
a good time to release it? I’d sort of say, well, don’t do it on Tuesday
because something else is happening on Tuesday and it will get lost.
But if you could do it on Thursday week that would actually be great
because on Friday we’re planning to do X, Y or Z. So there was this
very strong sense that we were working very closely together in sup-
port of a mutual goal.
I knew that if I talked to Mike the message would get out. It was
just this great sense of there being a very well organised group of
NGOs and academics in support. No single thing is decisive, but it
all kind of builds into a campaign.
Mike travelled from Perth to Australia’s east coast so much that we all
joked that he must have had not a platinum frequent flyer card, but a
black diamond one. We referred to him as ‘Midnight Mike’ for his inde-
fatigable willingness to give live interviews seemingly around the clock
nationally and internationally. He is a consummate media performer
whose instincts on how to best respond to the latest tactic from the in-
dustry are remarkable.
Non-government agencies
Australia’s network of health and medical NGOs all sang from the same
song sheet on plain packaging. The Cancer Council Australia and the
Heart Foundation both employed in-house lobbyists (Paul Grogan and
Rohan Greenland) who both gave high priority to supporting the bill
throughout its course. Both of these organisations had for years jointly
funded ASH, and tobacco control for them was core business.
ASH in turn provided a large amount of media commentary on the
issue and orchestrated a coalition of smaller NGOs to contact MPs at
strategically important times to show their support. Stafford Sanders,
who worked at ASH for 10 years, told me: ‘What most MPs would have
experienced was a flood of letters and calls from small NGOs, par-
ent groups, local health professionals and other influential local figures
supporting plain packs.’
The Australian Medical Association is widely regarded as having
a more natural affinity with politically conservative parties. They were
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at loggerheads with Roxon and the Labor government on a range of
proposed reforms (including nurse practitioner and midwife reforms,
Medicare Locals, hospital funding and various Medicare rebate
changes) but, to their great credit, were resolute supporters of plain
packaging. They issued many press releases, were often heard providing
commentary, and were known to have urged the Opposition to support
the bill.
Other health organisations, in particular the Public Health Associ-
ation of Australia and its CEO Michael Moore, also made substantial
contributions as part of the lobbying team.
News media
With a few exceptions (particularly News Corp newspapers), Australia’s
news media reported the saga of plain packaging in overwhelmingly
positive ways. I had no hostile interviews across the entire period, but
recall a good many openly negative, and often scathing, comments
about the tobacco industry’s response from journalists, producers and
camera and sound operators before, during and after interviews. To-
bacco control has almost attained the status of a no-brainer issue for
most in the news media. Like immunisation, it has long evolved into a
story that does not need ‘two sides’ in its telling. (260)
Angela Pratt shared this view:
I think by and large the media were supportive, and I think that just
goes to show how discredited the industry has become, that basically
anything the industry said, they kind of scoffed at. Ridiculed is too
strong a word, though in some cases they did because some of the
things that the industry said were ridiculous. I don’t remember it be-
ing something that we felt like the media were part of the enemy,
whereas other issues we absolutely felt like we were in the trenches
against the media.
Columnists
A large number of opinion pieces on plain packaging were published in
Australian-based newspapers and online news outlet and blogs.
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Table 5.3: Opinion page and blog authors on plain packaging, 2008–14
Supportive Opposed
David Campbell (261)
Mike Carlton (226)
Simon Chapman (262–279)
Simon Chapman and Becky Freeman
(280, 281)
Mike Daube (282, 283)
Mark Davison (284–287)
Matthew Day (288)
Simon Evans (289)
Thomas Faunce (290)
Becky Freeman (291)
Mia Friedman (292)
Ross Gittins (169, 293)
Steven Greenland (294)
Nathan Grills (295)
Paul Grogan (296)
Paul Harrison (297)
David Hill (298)
Jessica Irvine (299)
Stephen Leeder (300)
Ross MacKenzie (301)
Colin McLeod (302)
Rob Moodie (303)
Ben O’Shea (304)
Reema Rattan (305)
Matthew Rimmer (306–309)
Don Rothwell (310)
Craig Seitam (234)
Kyla Tienhaara (311)
Julian Vieceli (312)
Tania Voon (313)
Leo Bajzert (advertising
worker) (314)
Chris Berg (IPA) (315)
Julie Novak (IPA) (316)
Tim Wilson (IPA) (317)
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These were overwhelmingly positive to plain packaging, and often
scathing of the tobacco industry and congratulatory of the government.
Table 5.3 lists authors of all those that we have been able to locate, writ-
ten by both professional journalists and guest authors.
Cartoonists and satirists
Australian cartoonists, satirists and current affairs panel programs
feasted on plain packaging, rarely with anything but biting support.
This site features 18 such cartoons, nearly all of which rained down vi-
cious blows on Big Tobacco’s arguments: http://atodblog.com/2012/11/
20/editorial-cartoonists-did-their-duty-in-australias-tobacco-war/
‘Everyone hates them’
For many years, tobacco companies in Australia have suffered from
public perceptions that they are not to be trusted, that they are corpo-
rate pied pipers with intense interests in children, rapacious corporate
leviathans who put profit before all else, and are indifferent to the
suffering that their products cause (260). Two surveys of Australians’
attitudes to the tobacco industry put it very plainly (318, 319). One of
these found that:
80% of respondents and 74% of smokers thought tobacco companies
mostly did not or never told the truth about smoking and health,
children and smoking and addictiveness of tobacco. With regard to
perceived standards of honesty and ethics, tobacco company exec-
utives were rated the lowest of all professional groups, with 74% of
respondents judging them to have low or very low standards. (319)
Philip Morris’ own commissioned market research from 1993 had told
them the same thing:
Philip Morris is almost universally known among the public and
opinion leaders . . . The company’s overall favourability ratings aver-
age in the low 30s on a 100-point scale places it in the company of
two other tobacco companies – W.D. & H.O. Wills and Rothmans –
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well below the normal mid-50s to mid-60s typically found for most
companies. These ratings for the company are very similar to those
found among comparable audiences in the United States. (320)
Eighteen years later, things had, if anything, sunk even lower for Big
Tobacco. In 2011, the Reputation Institute published results of a global
survey of 85,000 respondents (including an Australian sample of 5,611)
conducted by the Reputation Institute and AMR Australia in January
and February 2011. It rated all major industries in 25 categories for rep-
utation. The top categories were consumer products (73.8), electrical
and electronics (73.2) and computers (70.3). By far the worst perform-
ing category was tobacco, which scored only 50.1, well behind the next
lowest category (utilities with 59).
A Google search with the string ‘just like the tobacco industry’ re-
turns many thousands of examples of how the tobacco industry has
become an index case or benchmark in everyday talk for all manner
of malfeasance in corporate conduct. It has set the bottom feeder stan-
dard on trust, ethics and grubby conduct. No other industry is subject
to widespread policies of academic institutions refusing to allow their
staff or students to accept tobacco industry research grants or scholar-
ships. Our own university (Sydney) has long refused to allow tobacco
companies onto the campus to run job opportunity stalls at its annual
student employment fair. It is the only industry thus refused.
Politicians are highly sensitive about who they are seen to be asso-
ciating with. Political scandals involving associations with sex workers,
criminals and corrupt land developers are common around the world,
but in an increasing number of countries, being seen to be cosy with
tobacco companies has become a hallmark of political poor judgement.
As the CEO of the American Cancer Society, John Seffrin, has put it:
‘Politicians don’t like to stand next to a pariah in the next photo oppor-
tunity.’
Roxon was similarly emphatic that the industry’s appalling repu-
tation as corporate pariahs (260) was important to the decision to run
with plain packaging:
When the taskforce report came, marshalling all the evidence for
various measures including plain packaging, this was when I really
started to give it serious thought. I can remember one of my advisors,
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my personal staff, not the bureaucrats, saying to me well, this is just
a ‘no-brainer’. Meaning, it might be new and bold, but it hit a polit-
ical sweet spot too – you have good evidence, you have doctors and
researchers on side, you’re trying to protect kids and the only one
lining up against you is the tobacco industry. With a sceptical media
and pretty well informed public, fighting such a discredited industry
was not as dangerous as people thought.
Angela Pratt told us:
Basically my view about it at the time and since has been it was
a good old-fashioned political fight between good and evil. When
you’re fighting with the AMA [Australian Medical Association]
about something, it’s never that clear cut. It’s not really ever that great
to be in a big fight with the doctors. Even if it’s worthy and justified
and they’re being bastards, as a political strategy it’s never really that
great. I would almost say that the prospect of a fight with Big Tobacco
was something that people relished the thought of, rather than shied
away from it. That’s not the reason that we did it, but a fight with the
tobacco industry was not something that scared people off.
Pratt said that Rudd shared this view:
I think it’s probably fair to say that he didn’t mind the idea of a big
fight with the tobacco industry. You know, in politics it’s not bad to
have a fight. I mean, we didn’t do it because we wanted a fight. We did
it because we thought it was important and would make a difference.
But the prospect of the fight with the tobacco industry wasn’t some-
thing that put people off, particularly.
Like millions of Australians, Rudd had lived through several decades
where tobacco control was rarely absent from the news media (321,
322) for more than a week. In this time there had been years-long ad-
vocacy campaigns to get rid of all tobacco advertising and sporting and
cultural sponsorship, to upgrade pack warnings, to introduce smoke-
free indoor air on public transport, and in workplaces, restaurants and
bars. (323) There had been the train wreck of revelations about the
tobacco industry’s duplicity on health and addiction and designs on
Removing the emperor’s clothes
128
children when millions of their internal documents were made public
in the late 1990s. There had been large-scale public awareness cam-
paigns on the risks of smoking. And through all this, we saw virtually
continual declines in smoking, growing antipathy toward the tobacco
industry and support for governments to do more to reduce smoking,
particularly among young people.
Nicola Roxon
No analysis of why Australia acted on plain packs could fail to place
Nicola Roxon at centre stage. Across 35 years I have encountered many
federal and state ministers responsible for aspects of health, and worked
with several closely. Barry Hodge (Western Australia 1983–86), John
Cornwall (South Australia 1982–88), David White (Victoria 1985–89),
Michael Wooldridge (Federal 1996–2001), Frank Sartor (New South
Wales 2003–07 and 2009–11) and Verity Firth (New South Wales
2007–08) were all ministers who implemented major tobacco control
reforms while in power. Each of these people painted their reforms
on a state or national canvas, as did Roxon. But Roxon’s contribution
to tobacco control history looms as one of the most important initia-
tives with global ramifications ever taken. If, as expected, dominoes fall
around the world over the next decade, her contribution will have been
monumental.
Roxon was a spectacularly good media performer. Those of us who
had several decades of experience in advocating and debating for policy
reform in the news media have had many hundreds, if not thousands
of opportunities to rehearse particular framings, sound bites and lines
of arguments. On a big news day in tobacco control, it is not uncom-
mon to do 10 or more interviews for different media outlets, all about
the same issue. You quickly get a sense of how journalists see an issue,
and about which questions they see as central to a debate. You often
get these questions early and develop a sense about how you have han-
dled a question: which parts if an interview were strongest and which
needed work. Subsequent interviews then allow you to push forward
responses that you have used earlier to good effect. In this way, inter-
views throughout the day tend to get more polished. It’s a common
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experience to feel as thought you have nailed an interview with a turn
of phrase, an analogy, a killer fact or statistic.
Nicola Roxon gave many interviews on plain packs over 2010–12.
Seasoned advocates for tobacco control were in awe of her abilities to
calmly and firmly explain the policy, to defend every aspect of it from
attack and to go to the heart of the case for strong tobacco control.
For example, on releasing the report that recommended plain packs,
Roxon put the importance of firm action on tobacco by simply saying:
‘We are killing people by not acting’. (65) This stunningly direct, simple,
clear-sighted and courageous statement of moral principle was one of
several powerful sound bites she was to use in the months ahead. An-
other was her compelling observation that she had ‘never met a smoker
who hoped their children would grow up to become a smoker.’ There
was just no comeback on that point.
Angela Pratt told me that working with Roxon was an experience
she never expected to better.
Nicola was an outstanding minister. She was outstanding in every-
thing that she did. She was always across her brief. Whenever she
did an interview, she was extremely well prepared. She knew the ins
and outs of the arguments, and she wouldn’t agree to do the inter-
view until she knew that she could be. I guess with this issue, she had
an amplified sense of the importance of getting it right because she
knew that every word uttered on television could be something that
the industry would use in their legal case against us if she said slightly
the wrong thing.
She really believed in plain packs. She’s a formidable person.
She’s incredibly smart. She’s incredibly articulate. She has an incredi-
ble ability to go right to the point of an issue. She was very clear from
the beginning about the strategy for defending this, that it needed to
be placed in the context of a long history of tobacco control policy so
that we could argue that it was the next logical step.
She was very clear about the limits of what you could say about
the evidence base: while there was no proof that it would work – there
never is when you do something for the first time – but there was ev-
idence that it most likely would work. She was very clear about the
fact that we didn’t expect that it would have a major impact on long-
term smokers. Rather, it was all about preventing young people from
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starting up smoking. So it was for all those reasons that she was a
formidable advocate for the policy, and why it was such a delight to
work for her during that period.
The Coalition, the Greens and the crossbenchers
After the August 2011 election, the Labor Party was returned to power
in a hung parliament requiring the support of at least three of the five
crossbench members of the House of Representatives to pass its legis-
lation, such as the plain packaging bill. In the Senate, it was assured of
safe passage because the Greens Party was rock solid in its support for
the bill, and in voting with the government, guaranteed that it would
pass. Cross-party support was important, not only for the safe passage
of the legislation, but to ensure continuity of support in the event of a
change of government. It was also considered important to show the
world that plain packaging was unanimously supported in Australia,
historically a two-party nation, particularly at a time of minority gov-
ernment.
Health groups such as the Cancer Council and the Heart Foun-
dation enjoy excellent relations with all political parties, and it soon
became apparent that the three needed crossbench votes were assured
with the support of the sole Greens representative, Adam Bandt, and
two NSW independents Tony Windsor and Rob Oakeshott. Tasmanian
independent Andrew Wilkie was also emphatically supportive of the
legislation. None of these three, who had often voted in a bloc on other
legislative issues, needed any convincing. Maverick Queensland inde-
pendent MP Bob Katter described the policy as ‘rampant wowserism’
(324) and would have never voted for it.
But the tobacco control community knew how important it was
to make sure that the bill gained the support of the Opposition. This
would better ensure its preservation and consolidation down the track,
should they come to power.
As explained earlier (pp97), the conservative Liberal/National
Coalition Opposition was by no means pro-smoking. It had introduced
and sustained important platforms of tobacco control when previously
in government. But in Opposition, the task of trying to find fault with
most government activity is standard. The Abbott-led Opposition took
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this duty very seriously and developed a reputation for being extremely
negative about almost everything the Labor government supported.
Many expected that the Opposition would not be any different when it
came to plain packaging.
The Coalition had a good number of members – including Abbott
himself – who were almost genetically opposed to ‘unnecessary’ reg-
ulation of business and human behaviour. After the government had
announced its intentions on plain packaging, several equivocated and
publicly expressed reservations or declined to comment. Shadow health
minister Peter Dutton said in June 2009: ‘In my books, in the current
debate, providing a ban to packaging and to branding on packaging is
a bridge too far.’ Pushed in May 2010 by prime minister Julia Gillard
to say yes or no to plain packaging, Abbott eventually said: ‘If it shuts
you up for a second, yes Julia.’ (see https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=pjR9JbThk1I) In May 2011, on the day BATA launched its
campaign with a press conference, Abbott said: ‘My anxiety with this is
that it might end up being counterproductive in practice.’
Fragments of intelligence from Opposition members and occa-
sionally tobacco industry staff were gathered about the likelihood of
support for the legislation. These painted a mixed picture. For example,
a tobacco control colleague had been on holiday in Fiji resort in 2010
and got talking to some Australian businessmen. They turned out to
be staff from an Australian tobacco company and some retailers who
were being rewarded for achieving high tobacco sales levels. Without
disclosing her interest, the colleague asked whether they were worried
about the impact of plain packs. They brushed it aside and said that
their management had assured them that Tony Abbott would drop the
policy on gaining power.
But this may have been mere company bravado, because a leaked
fax from Philip Morris’s head of corporate affairs to a PR agency in May
2010 (see pp15) noted: ‘Please note that contrary to the proposal, the
Coalition’s “resolve” is not “strong”. It is at best neutral.’ This resolve re-
ferred to the industry’s hopes that the Opposition would oppose the
legislation.
However, there were at least four Coalition members (Liberals
Dr Mal Washer, Ken Wyatt and Alex Somlyay, and West Australian
National Tony Crook) who expressed support for the policy. (324) Ru-
mours spread that some of these may have been willing to cross the
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floor and vote with the government if a division had been necessary.
Of these, Mal Washer was the most forthcoming about his intentions.
A highly respected Perth general practitioner, Washer was a popular
and trusted figure across all sides of politics, often acting as a doctor
to politicians while in Canberra for parliamentary sittings. He was not
someone easily ignored.
When interviewed by The Age on 22 May 2011, just nine days be-
fore his party would decide that it would not oppose the bill, Washer
was asked about industry claims about increases in smuggled products.
His words were blunt:
All this talk of chop chop [loose, illegal tobacco] and crime gangs
sounds like bullshit to me. The tobacco industry is jumping up and
down because they’re worried about their businesses. I support these
reforms unequivocally and whatever my party decides to do, I don’t
give a shit. (325)
On 26 May 2011, the Cancer Council held its annual Australia’s Biggest
Morning Tea fundraiser event in parliament house. Opposition leader
Tony Abbott attended and told those present: ‘We all should do what
we can to fight cancer.’ (326). Lung cancer is Australia’s leading cause of
cancer death, with 8410 victims in 2012, more than double the cancer
causing the next most deaths (colorectal with 3950), prostate (3294)
and breast (2940).
The next day Michelle Grattan, perhaps the most senior member of
the Canberra press gallery who had attended the event, wrote an opin-
ion piece about the Opposition’s lack of leadership on plain packs. She
wrote:
There are issues that should be elevated above politics, and trying
to find ways to reduce the killer habit of smoking is one of them.
So it is particularly disappointing that Tony Abbott, a former health
minister, is dithering on the Opposition’s attitude to government
legislation for the plain packaging of cigarettes. The case for this
measure is overwhelming . . .
Abbott has to contend with serious divisions within his ranks on
the packaging issue . . . But Abbott will have to deal with the differ-
ences within the Opposition eventually, and he might as well do it
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sooner rather than later. The packaging legislation appears set to get
through the House of Representative even if the Coalition opposes
it – thanks to the crossbench and the Liberal dissidents’ will to cross
the floor. Politically it would look bad for Abbott to appear doubly
impotent; unable to stop the legislation and unable to keep his own
troops in line.
2011 World No Tobacco Day
On 31 May 2011 (World No Tobacco Day), Mike Daube and I, together
with the Public Health Association of Australia, arranged a special
event in Canberra to thank Nicola Roxon and the Labor government
for what it was doing in tobacco control, particularly with plain packag-
ing. This was the biggest policy advance any of us had ever experienced,
and we wanted to bring together all who had played big roles in both
the years leading up to it, and in all the defence of the bill described in
this book.
We had earlier nominated Roxon to the World Health Organiza-
tion to receive a WHO World No Tobacco Day medal. We had also
arranged for her to receive the Nigel Gray Award, named in honour of
the long-time head of the Cancer Council Victoria (1968–1995), widely
regarded as a global ‘godfather’ of tobacco control.
She was presented with both awards that day at parliament house,
where the WHO’s regional director for the Western Pacific, Dr Shin
Young-soo, flew down from Manila to make the presentation. Nigel
Gray was there to present the award under his name. (She was later also
awarded the Public Health Association’s Sidney Sax Medal).
Mike and I had drawn up a list of those around Australia who
had made outstanding contributions to tobacco control since the 1970s.
About 50 were able to attend, including politicians from all sides, senior
health department bureaucrats, long-time researchers, heads of leading
NGOs, John Bevins (the advertising writer who had created the
‘Sponge’ ad (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UbwsET7_6kQ))
and many others, and Dr Arthur Chesterfield-Evans, a leading figure in
the BUGA UP anti-tobacco billboard graffiti movement from the late
1970s and early 1980s. (327)
The award ceremony took place at 11am. Unbeknown to most of
those attending, the Opposition was also meeting at the same time in
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the parliament building, and one of its agenda items was plain pack-
aging. At noon, Rohan Greenland and Lyn Roberts from the Heart
Foundation met with Andrew Robb as part of their ongoing engage-
ment with the Coalition on the issue. Robb came straight from the
party room and told the two that the Liberals had decided not to op-
pose the plain packs legislation, and that they were the first to know.
Greenland told me: ‘He was very happy to break the news to us.’
Angela Pratt saw the timing of announcement as no mere
serendipity:
We, in combination with you and all your colleagues, had sort of set
out to create a real sense of building pressure on the Opposition in
the lead-up to and on that day. So I remember all of those things
coming together and culminating on that day successfully, because
that was the day the Liberal Party announced that they wouldn’t op-
pose the legislation.
I asked Nicola Roxon and Angela Pratt to comment on the Opposition’s
behaviour over the bill. Both took the stance that the Coalition were
never comfortable with the issue, but were clearly able to read the very
negative political realities of being seen to effectively side with Big To-
bacco and having principled party members being seen to cross the
floor of parliament.
Roxon said:
My personal view is they got embarrassed into it. Ultimately Oppo-
sition support came because the tobacco industry had no credit in
Australia, because of their past behaviour. Once the Liberals could
see that we were sticking to our guns – I think they were waiting to
see if we buckled or changed direction – but because we weren’t, they
saw that they were going to be very much on the wrong side of public
opinion.
Pratt’s view was similar. She said:
[Mal Washer] was prepared to cross the floor, if necessary. So really I
think Abbott and the political leadership of the Liberal Party made a
judgement that the risk of disunity – with Washer crossing the floor –
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was worse than any political downside of their supporting the legis-
lation. So they made a judgement that supporting the legislation was
the lesser of two evils. It was a pragmatic political judgement to avoid
an ugly show of disunity in the floor of the House of Representatives.
Angela Pratt’s view was that Washer’s position was made all the easier
because of the antics of the tobacco industry:
What gave strength to Mal Washer’s hand was this sense that the to-
bacco industry’s campaign was actually just really quite abhorrent. It
was over the top. They were being seen to be bullying the govern-
ment. And it’s the tobacco industry!
So I have always had the view that it was the extremity of the in-
dustry’s campaign – the fact that they went so hard, so extreme, so
over the top – that hurt them. I think it became clear to the Liberals
that it was politically completely unpalatable for them to be on the
same side as all of that.
I absolutely think that it was not Abbott’s or Dutton’s instinct
to support it, but it became a political liability for them not to be
supporting it. Because by not supporting, they were on the same
team as the tobacco industry, which was a kind of pretty unpalatable
prospect.
Pratt also acknowledged that:
Graphic health warnings were introduced under Abbott, so there is
sort of shared sense of pride in Australia’s tobacco control history. It’s
a shared sense because both parties have some ownership of differ-
ent parts of it. I still think that the Liberals would have preferred not
to support the plain packaging legislation. I have never seen any ev-
idence of them having become enthusiastic supporters of the policy.
So while broadly I would say tobacco control is a bipartisan issue, I’m
not sure that I would say plain packaging is a bipartisan issue.
The Adelaide Advertiser’s headline the next day was: ‘Libs yield on
smokes packaging’ (our emphasis). The article stated:
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There were also fears that Mr Abbott’s ‘brand’ could be damaged,
given the Government’s initiative had been unanimously supported
by health groups and normally conservative lobbies, including the
Australian Medical Association. (328)
On the evening of the day the awards were presented and the Coalition
made its decision to not oppose the bill, the Public Health Association
hosted a dinner in parliament house for Nicola Roxon, Nigel Gray and
the 50 or so tobacco control stalwarts who had been there for the cere-
mony. Roxon’s very proud mother came along, as did Mal Washer and
the Greens Senator Rachel Siewert.
I sing in a Sydney rock covers band. Our lead guitarist is Paul Gro-
gan, the Cancer Council Australia’s lobbyist. We had put an impromptu
version of a new take on the 1960s Shangri-Las’ hit Leader of the Pack
on YouTube (see http://tiny.cc/8qurox), recorded after dinner one night
at Paul’s house. Paul and I sang the song that night in tribute to Roxon.
Everyone in the room roared the chorus lines.
On the morning that the High Court case began in Canberra (17
April 2012), Tony Abbott went out of his way to make his support even
clearer. He said: ‘I think this is an important health measure. It’s impor-
tant to get smoking rates down further. We didn’t oppose the legislation
in the Parliament and I hope it withstands the High Court’s scrutiny.’
(329) It is noteworthy that after the 2013 election, the new Coalition
government maintained strong bipartisan support for tobacco control,
including plain packaging, regular excise increases and mass media
campaigns.
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Legal challenges, massive costs
The legislation has already faced one legal challenge (the one in the
High Court of Australia) and is set to face two more:
• World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes
• the challenge under Australia–Hong Kong Bilateral Investment
Treaty.
The High Court of Australia
When the passage of the government’s bill on plain packaging became
assured with the support of the Opposition, the Greens and key in-
dependents, an ever-desperate tobacco industry began to concentrate
on threatening the legal apocalypse that they promised would descend
on Australia first through the High Court and if necessary, through
international trade bodies like the WTO. Indeed, within hours of the
April 2010 political announcement of plain packaging, two tobacco
companies (BAT and Imperial) declared they would challenge the de-
cision in court using seizure of intellectual property arguments, and
seek billions in compensation. (eg: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=wEXH7mqEEWE) and Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1 BATA advertisement about the ‘billions’ government
might have to pay in compensation.
BATA ran several ads promoting the idea that plain packaging would
see the government, and therefore ultimately the taxpayer, having to
incur stratospheric legal bills and pay out compensation to tobacco
companies. Figure 6.2 shows an advertisement arguing that the govern-
ment has had poor legal advice before, and plain packaging was likely
to be another example.
These arguments were a house of cards, starting with the central
problem that plain packaging would not extinguish the industry’s val-
ued brand identities. All packages would still carry brand and variant
names, allowing smokers to clearly exercise their freedom to select be-
tween the much-vaunted but often non-existent differences in brands.
In the highly unlikely event of a ruling by the High Court in favour
of the industry, any calculation of compensation would need to take
account that branding differences had only been diminished, not ex-
tinguished. The companies would have needed to demonstrate with
precision that sales losses arose from losing colours, logos and different
pack shapes, but not brand names and variants.
Few of those megaphoning this legal Armageddon appeared to
have even read the draft bill itself. Section 11 of the bill made it clear
that plain packaging would not proceed if it were to be determined (by
a court) that its operation would result in an acquisition of property
other than ‘on just terms’. So in the unlikely event that the High Court
determined there was an acquisition of property (more on this below),
Section 11 created a fallback provision under which ‘the trade mark
may be used on the packaging of tobacco products, or on a tobacco
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Figure 6.2 BATA newspaper advertisement about poor advice re-
ceived by government.
product’ in accordance with requirements to be prescribed in subse-
quent regulations.
In other words, the bill had been drafted with a get out of jail free
card under which plain packaging would not proceed if the High Court
ruled that it involved an unjust acquisition. As a result, there could have
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been no compensable damage or loss incurred by any tobacco company
mounting a legal challenge before implementation of the Act, even if
such a challenge was successful.
Moreover, Monash University’s Mark Davison explained:
As for the constitutional argument that the legislation acquires prop-
erty on other than just terms, Professor Craven, a noted constitu-
tional expert, has since observed on Radio National’s Background
Briefing that the tobacco industry’s prospects of success are about the
same as a three-legged horse has of winning the Melbourne Cup. The
reason for his view is simply explained. The extinction of rights or
the reduction of rights is not relevant. The government or a third
party must acquire property as a consequence of the legislation. The
government did not want to use the tobacco trademarks. Nor does it
want third parties to do so. It does not desire to or intend to acquire
any property. The proposition that prohibitions on the use of prop-
erty do not constitute an acquisition of property was confirmed by
the High Court as recently as 2009. In that case, the High Court held
that the government was entitled to extinguish property rights in li-
cences of farmers to take bore water. (287)
Immediately the tobacco companies began threatening legal action,
Australian legal experts in constitutional and intellectual property law
began publicly ridiculing their prospects of success. Professor George
Williams (University of New South Wales) said: ‘The Commonwealth is
able to regulate the use of IP [intellectual property] and that is quite dif-
ferent to it acquiring that property.’ Professor Greg Craven (Australian
Catholic University) said: ‘I’m sure it would fascinate the High Court all
the way to deciding “No”’ and Professor Mark Davison (Monash Uni-
versity) described the industry’s argument as:
. . . so weak, it’s non-existent. There is no right to use a trademark
given by the World Trade Organization agreement. There is a right to
prevent others using your trademark but that does not translate into
a right to use your own trademark. (330)
In May 2010, Tim Wilson of the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) par-
ticipated in a seminar on plain packaging at Melbourne University.
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Wilson’s videoed contribution can be seen here (http://vimeo.com/
12106765), where ‘as a staunch constitutionalist’ he summarised his
take on the various laws and international treaties said to be possibly
relevant to a case against plain packaging. The next speaker, Professor
Mark Davison, critiqued Wilson’s presentation in a demolition job that
went near to being academic bloodsport for many of those present.
(266)
Of Wilson’s constitutional argument that plain packaging would be
an acquisition of property by the Australian government, Davison had
this to say:
I thought for example, you might have . . . I don’t know . . . picked up
a textbook. Look[ed] at a case. See, there is no acquisition of prop-
erty being proposed here. The mere extinguishment or deprivation of
rights in relation to property does not involve acquisition. The gov-
ernment does not want the pretty pictures [the branding colours and
logos]. It wants them not used. [pointing to his slide] There are six
cases. Six. And there are a lot more, that say precisely that . . . (see
http://vimeo.com/12108576)
No tobacco company ever compensated for pack health
warnings
Governments all over the world have been ‘seizing’ parts of the intellec-
tual property of tobacco companies since 1966 when the United States
became the first nation to require packs to carry a health warning. Over
the next 45 years, these warnings have become slowly more detailed
and explicit, embracing language like ‘addiction’, ‘cause’ and ‘kill’ that
saw protracted national and global lobbying against every new step that
was taken. After Canada became the first nation in 2000 to introduce
graphic, pictorial warnings in full colour, 63 nations followed suit over
the next 12 years, with Uruguay leading the way with 80% front and
back, until Australia’s new requirements saw it temporarily become the
new leader with 75% of the front and 90% of the rear given over to
health warnings. Thailand took the lead in June 2014 when it required
85% of the front of the pack to be a graphic heath warning.
But in all these years, no tobacco company has ever received a
cent in compensation from any government for these sometimes mas-
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sive appropriations. There were no financial barriers to any tobacco
transnational taking legal action against governments for this heinous
alleged theft of a part of their intellectual property. Such actions would
have posed negligible financial barriers to any tobacco transnational.
The big stick of legal action and compensation the industry keeps warn-
ing governments that they hold behind their backs is the threat of legal
action and massive compensation for trademark violation. But as we
shall see, in the case of Australia – at least within the domestic legal sys-
tem – this was a big case of crying wolf.
The $3 billion compensation factoid
There’s nothing quite like the threat of a massive legal penalty to get
headlines and frighten the political horses about proposed legislation.
A big number is required for such threats and the number that was se-
lected for plain packaging that the government was said to be facing
was $3 billion . . . per year! So where did this satisfyingly very large
number come from? It began circulating in May 2010 and was repeated
many times in the months ahead by frothing radio shock-jocks, and by
some who should have known better.
Step forward Tim Wilson, the then ‘director of intellectual prop-
erty’ at the tobacco industry-funded IPA. Wilson is a prominent ideo-
logical spear-carrier for deregulation and a sworn enemy of the odious
nanny state. In 2014 he was appointed by the new Abbott-led conser-
vative government as a Commissioner for Human Rights, with a focus
on ‘free speech’. In late April 2010, just a month after the government
had announced its intentions with plain packs, while not holding a law
degree, Wilson was all over the Australian news media promoting the
likelihood that the Australian government would be hit with a compen-
sation bill of up to $3 billion a year for having ‘confiscated’ the tobacco
companies’ intellectual property in the form of their packaging. (331)
So where did Wilson get his $3 billion number from? What were
his ‘rough calculations’ (332) as he described them in The Australian
newspaper? Wilson sent a submission to the Senate Community Affairs
Committee enquiry into the Family First-proposed Plain Tobacco
Packaging (Removing Branding from Cigarette Packs) Bill 2009 which
had been triggered by a bill proposed by the one-term Families First
Party Senator, Steve Fielding. The submission was based on an IPA re-
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port also authored by Wilson. Here, (333) in all its embarrassing glory,
we can examine Wilson’s prowess with the numbers and the birth of
one of the most ludicrous factoids in many years. His report’s subtitle,
presumably added with no trace of irony, was Australian governments
legislating, without understanding, intellectual property.
In his executive summary, Wilson provided ‘an indicative calcu-
lated range’ of between $378m and $3027m per year that a High Court
order under Section 51 (xxxi) of the Australian Constitution could
award the tobacco industry over plain packs. From whence did Wilson
pluck these estimates? Table 2 in his report shows two lines of numbers
showing the total value of tobacco sales in Australia in 2006: one for
the value including excise tax and one for the sales value ex-tax. Excise
tax is paid by tobacco companies to the government, but is then repaid
to tobacco companies by smokers when they purchase tobacco. This
means that it is smokers, not the tobacco companies, who actually pay
the tax. The sales value ex-tax represents the returns to manufacturers
and retailers combined.
By taking the trouble to differentiate the two like this, Wilson must
have known that no court would order the return of the tobacco tax
component of retail sales to the companies, for the elementary reason
that they never would have been entitled to that component of the retail
price: it is the ex-tax value only that fuels the industry’s pipedream of
massive compensation should any government be silly enough to take
the plain packs route. Wilson then calculated the tax-included and the
ex-tax values on two assumptions: a 10% and a 30% fall in sales each
year that might follow the introduction of plain packs. He calculated
these two figures at $378m and $1.135b. So where does the $3b factoid
come from? Are you ready for this? The tax-included sales value of a
30% fall is $3.027b – the biggest number on the page.
Even setting aside inclusion of tax in this $3 billion figure, how rea-
sonable were Wilson’s assumptions that plain packs would cause a fall
of a minimum 10% through to 30% each year? Between 1999 and 2003
the average annual fall in total dutied cigarettes was just 2.6%. The most
sales have ever fallen in one year was just shy of 10% in 1999 after the
combined impact of a change in the way cigarettes were taxed (from
weight to per stick) and a big budget boost to the national quit cam-
paign by the then Liberal health minister Michael Wooldridge.
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Wilson’s $3 billion number was thus based on a projected decline
which was the stuff of fantasy land. Worse, it appeared to be a wilful
selection of the tax-included biggest number he could sight in his own
specious table. To the delight of the industry, it quickly became a viru-
lent factoid. Google ‘$3 billion’ and ‘plain packs’ and you will see what
we mean.
ABC television’s Media Watch program was tipped off about Wil-
son’s antics and ran a segment about his claims in May 2010. (334)
Media Watch is said to be a program that many people like to watch
but no one wants to appear on. The segment highlighted the policy of
the IPA, Wilson’s employer, of never disclosing its funders. This is a
paradoxical position to take for an organisation obsessed with freedom
of speech. A tape of Wilson saying on radio that: ‘any funding [they
might have from the tobacco industry] has no impact on the policy
positions we take whatsoever,’ was included in the Media Watch seg-
ment, with the host noting that Wilson undoubtedly ‘sincerely’ held his
views, regardless of whether the IPA was funded by Big Tobacco or not.
However, another IPA employee Alan Moran, told a Productivity Com-
mission enquiry in 2001 that ‘. . . the IPA doesn’t represent anyone in
particular . . . we don’t represent the firms. . . there are occasions when
we may take positions which are somewhat different from those of the
funders. Obviously that doesn’t happen too often, otherwise they’d stop
funding us.’ (335)
Undeterred by any suggestion that the tobacco industry may have
had any influence over the IPA’s views on plain packaging or on Wil-
son’s economic flatulence, The Australian’s Christian Kerr (who has also
written for the IPA) kept the flame alive as late as mid-September 2010
for Wilson’s ‘rough’ calculation, describing it as an ‘independent esti-
mate’ (336).
In September 2011, when the plain packaging bill entered the Sen-
ate’s Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, David
Crow of BATA affirmed the ‘billions’ ballpark figure.
Senator Cash: In relation to your submission at 7.2, you actually state
whilst the amount of any compensation would ultimately be a ques-
tion of the courts, commentators have put a compensation figure for
the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership] bill and the proposed increase in
graphic health warnings could be in the vicinity of $3 billion. Is that
Removing the emperor’s clothes
146
a fair estimate? Is that an estimate that you have had a look at? Is that
just a figure that has been plucked out of the air?
Mr Crow: No, we are currently doing work on trying to do the eval-
uations of this, getting ready for any potential challenge.
Senator Cash: Are we talking millions, hundreds of millions or billi-
ons?
Mr Crow: It would be in the billions.
Senator Cash: It is in the billions?
Mr Crow: I think when they reviewed it in 1995 . . .
Senator Brandis: In the billions, did you say?
Mr Crow: In the billions, yes. Our business is worth approximately
probably $7 billion or $8 billion. The brands would be worth roughly
probably half of that.
In June 2013, the matter of whether the IPA received funding from the
tobacco industry was settled when BAT’s Simon Millson confirmed in
a letter to ASH (London) that it was a corporate member of the IPA.
(337)
The judgement
The tobacco industry’s challenge in the High Court of Australia com-
menced in Australia in April 2012 and judgement was handed down
in August, with the reasons for judgement published in October of the
same year. (338) The case against the Commonwealth of Australia was
brought by five tobacco companies (British American Tobacco Aus-
tralasia Ltd, Imperial Tobacco Australia Ltd, JT International SA, Nelle
Tabak Nederland BV and Philip Morris Ltd). Of the full bench of seven
judges hearing the case, six rejected the pleadings brought by the plain-
tiffs. The McCabe Centre for Law and Cancer provides a good summary
of the case made by the applicants, the reasons for the judgement and
many links to scholarly commentaries and media coverage of the case.
(339) A paper by Jonathan Liberman, the centre’s director, also provides
an excellent review. (340) A slightly edited version of the McCabe Cen-
tre summary follows.
In challenging plain packaging, the tobacco industry made two
principal arguments:
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. . . that the restrictions on its property and related rights (including
trademarks, copyright, goodwill, design, patents, packaging rights
and licensing rights) effected by the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act and
Regulations constitute an acquisition of its property (for which just
terms had not been provided); and
that the Act and Regulations give the Commonwealth the use of,
or control over, tobacco packaging, in a manner that effects an acqui-
sition of the tobacco industry’s property (for which just terms have
not been provided).
In her judgement, Justice Crennan observed that what the tobacco in-
dustry ‘most strenuously objected to was the taking or extinguishment
of the advertising or promotional functions of their registered trade-
marks or product get-up’.
The essence of the 6:1 majority’s reasons for dismissing the tobacco
industry’s challenge is set out in the summary provided by the court:
On 15 August 2012 the High Court made orders in two matters
concerning the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) (‘the Act’).
Today the High Court delivered its reasons in those matters. A ma-
jority of the High Court held that the Act was valid as it did not
acquire property. It therefore did not engage s 51 (xxxi) of the Con-
stitution, which requires any acquisition of property effected by a
Commonwealth law to be on just terms.
The Act imposes restrictions on the colour, shape and finish
of retail packaging for tobacco products and restricts the use of
trademarks on such packaging. The plaintiffs brought proceedings
in the High Court challenging the validity of the Act, arguing that
the Commonwealth acquired their intellectual property rights and
goodwill otherwise than on just terms.
A majority of the Court held that to engage s 51 (xxxi) an ac-
quisition must involve the accrual to some person of a proprietary
benefit or interest. Although the Act regulated the plaintiffs’ intel-
lectual property rights and imposed controls on the packaging and
presentation of tobacco products, it did not confer a proprietary ben-
efit or interest on the Commonwealth or any other person. As a
result, neither the Commonwealth nor any other person acquired
any property and s 51 (xxxi) was not engaged.
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All six members of the majority affirmed that under the Australian
Constitution, for there to be an ‘acquisition of property’ requiring just
terms compensation, the Commonwealth or another must obtain a
benefit or interest of a ‘proprietary nature’. As Justices Hayne and Bell
put it, this is a ‘bedrock principle’ which must not be eroded: ‘There
must be an acquisition of property’ (emphasis in the original). The to-
bacco industry’s arguments ‘[ran] aground’ on this bedrock.
As (now Chief) Justice French expressed it:
On no view can it be said that the Commonwealth as a polity or by
any authority or instrumentality, has acquired any benefit of a pro-
prietary character by reason of the operation of the TPP Act on the
plaintiffs’ property rights.
The achievement of the Commonwealth’s legislative objects would not
be such a benefit. As Justice Kiefel wrote, if the Act’s central statutory
object were to be effective, the tobacco companies’ business ‘may be
harmed, but the Commonwealth does not thereby acquire something
in the nature of property itself ’.
In addressing the tobacco industry’s argument about use of, or
control over, packaging, Justices Hayne and Bell observed that the re-
quirements of the Act:
. . . are no different in kind from any legislation that requires labels
that warn against the use or misuse of a product, or tell the reader
who to call or what to do if there has been a dangerous use of a
product. Legislation that requires warning labels to be placed on
products, even warning labels as extensive as those required by the
TPP Act, effects no acquisition of property.
Justice Crennan noted that: ‘Legislative provisions requiring manufac-
turers or retailers to place on product packaging warnings to con-
sumers of the dangers of incorrectly using or positively misusing a
product are commonplace’. Similarly, Justice Kiefel wrote that: ‘Many
kinds of products have been subjected to regulation in order to prevent
or reduce the likelihood of harm’, including medicines, poisonous sub-
stances and foods.
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Justice Crennan underlined the significance of the tobacco indus-
try’s ability to continue to use brand names on tobacco packaging, ‘so
as to distinguish their tobacco products, thereby continuing to generate
custom and goodwill’. She noted that the ‘visual, verbal, aural and allu-
sive distinctiveness, and any inherent or acquired distinctiveness, of a
brand name can continue to affect retail consumers despite the physical
restrictions on the appearance of brand names imposed’ by the Act; ‘an
exclusive right to generate a volume of sales of goods by reference to a
distinctive brand name is a valuable right’.
The High Court’s judgement reverberated around the world, con-
firming the analyses of many legal scholars and commentators who
had anticipated the judgement almost to the letter. Those few who had
confidently predicted that the court would order the Australian govern-
ment to compensate the companies to the tune of ‘billions’ were oddly
silent.
The IPA’s Tim Wilson was one who kept quiet. What had he learned
from all this? In February 2014, a reporter included the following ex-
change in a magazine portrait of Wilson (341):
But would Wilson concede he was wrong on plain packaging?
‘No.’
‘Have you ever been wrong on anything?’ I ask.
‘I’m sure there have been things,’ he says. ‘But I can’t think of them
right now.
World Trade Organization disputes
While plain packaging has been upheld domestically in Australia’s
highest court, challenges in international law are ongoing at the time of
writing.
In the World Trade Organization, five governments – Ukraine, the
Dominican Republic, Honduras, Cuba and Indonesia – have initiated
complaints against the Australian government’s plain packaging law.
In May 2014 the WTO composed the three person panel who will
examine the dispute of the five complainants together. (342) The panel
will next set a timetable for hearing the dispute. Typically, the WTO’s
dispute settlement system aims for panel reports to be provided to all
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parties approximately six months from the panel’s appointment, and
then to all WTO members three weeks later. However, due to the large
number of complainants and the complexity and breadth of the issues
argued, it is likely this panel will take much longer. If either party ap-
peals, the matter will be considered by the WTO’s appellate body, which
is expected to provide its report within a few months.
With the exception of Indonesia, none of these nations have any
significant trade of any sort with Australia, let alone in tobacco prod-
ucts. (343, 344) For all Big Tobacco’s outraged global tub-thumping
about plain packs and its success in whistling up sternly worded sub-
missions from a variety of US-based trade associations, it is telling that
with the exception of the geopolitically very important neighbouring
country of Indonesia, these other puppets are the heaviest hitters it
could influence to run its case with the WTO. Big Tobacco’s best team
are nearly all global minnows.
It has been reported that Philip Morris is providing support to the
Dominican Republic, and that British American Tobacco is doing the
same for Ukraine and Honduras. (345)
The WTO complaints are based on three WTO agreements: the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), In essence they claim
that what Australia has done is unnecessarily burdensome to trade, that
the new law is somehow discriminatory, that it is more trade restric-
tive than necessary, and that it unjustifiably infringes upon trademark
rights.
Australia argues that its laws are a sound, well-considered measure
designed to achieve a legitimate objective – the protection of public
health. It is vigorously defending the complaints.
Several legal scholars have published detailed examinations of the
merits of Australia’s stance that its laws comply with WTO obligations.
(346, 347) In support of Australia’s position, the McCabe Centre for
Law and Cancer notes that the laws represent a sound exercise of Aus-
tralia’s sovereign power to regulate, are non-discriminatory, are based
on evidence, are well-drafted and have behind them the legal and po-
litical force of the WHO FCTC, its article 11 and article 13, other
decisions of its Conference of the Parties, and other international
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instruments including the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health. (348)
Many governments restrict trade for health and cultural
reasons
In all this, it is also important to reflect that there are many examples
of governments introducing strong restrictions, bans or penalties on
the sale or promotion of different commercial products for cultural or
health reasons. Many nations – including Australia (349) – severely
restrict civilian access to firearms. Asbestos products are banned in sev-
eral nations. Pharmaceutical products are subject to stringent formula-
tion, dosage, access, packaging and sales controls, with direct-to-con-
sumer advertising of prescribed products allowed in only two nations
(the USA and New Zealand). Several Islamic nations totally prohibit
the sale of alcohol. Food safety regulations have been accepted as the
norm for many decades. Many nations impose strict quarantine regu-
lations on the importation of exotic animals, insects and biological ma-
terial. Every year, governments ban or restrict consumer goods deemed
to be unsafe. Prohibitions on pornography are common in many na-
tions, while not in others.
We have not seen, for example, firearms manufacturers seek to
lobby nations to bring cases to the WTO or other global tribunals in
an attempt to force such nations to relax their gun control laws. This is
because of the principle of nations being able to have sovereignty over
their own internal laws and regulations.
Restrictions and regulations on tobacco packaging need to be seen
against this background and against the exceptionally deadly and addic-
tive status of tobacco – a product which sees half of its long-term users
die prematurely from using the product directly as intended by the
manufacturers. In this, tobacco is unique among all consumer goods;
one of the reasons why tobacco was also the subject of the world’s first
global health treaty, now ratified by 178 nations – the WHO’s FCTC.
(75)
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What if Australia were to lose in WTO?
WTO rulings against a nation can result in the WTO sanctioning trade
retaliation against the nation. So in the highly unlikely event that Aus-
tralia were to receive an unfavourable decision in the WTO, the
prospect of Australia being subject to trade retaliation from nations like
Honduras and Ukraine with whom it has negligible trade would involve
all the pain of being flogged with a damp lettuce leaf. Notwithstand-
ing this, the Australian government would probably seek to ‘bring itself
into compliance’ by bringing the legislation into compliance with any
ruling given, in order to preserve its reputation as a country that follows
international trade rules.
Challenge under Australia – Hong Kong Bilateral Investment
Treaty
After losing the challenge in the Australian High Court in 2012 (along
with five other companies), Philip Morris, through Philip Morris Asia
(PMA), has brought proceedings against the Australian government
under a bilateral trade agreement between Hong Kong and Australia
signed in 1993. (285) The claim being made is that the Australian
plain packaging law breaches the agreement between the government
of Hong Kong and the government of Australia for the promotion and
protection of investments. This bilateral investment treaty is known as
the BIT, hence is known as the BIT claim. (350)
Unlike in the WTO system, this agreement contains a dispute set-
tlement provision which permits investors, in this case a tobacco com-
pany, to bring their own claim against governments directly. PMA has
made a number of arguments, including that plain packaging would ex-
propriate its intellectual property, and that it has not been afforded fair
and equitable treatment. PMA is seeking ‘billions of dollars’ in compen-
sation for potential corporate losses arising from the new legislation.
(351)
The timeline of facts/events in this instance are likely to be of crit-
ical relevance to the prospects of the case. On 29 April 2010, the Aus-
tralian government announced its intention to introduce plain pack-
aging. At that time Philip Morris tobacco products in Australia were
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manufactured by Philip Morris Australia. On 23 February 2011, Philip
Morris Asia purchased Philip Morris Australia and on 27 June 2011 –
a full 14 months after knowing the government intended to introduce
plain packs – PMA served its notice of claim to the Australian govern-
ment. (285)
Why is this sequence of events important? Imagine someone con-
sidering purchasing a property who had learned, 14 months earlier,
that the property would be badly affected by a new freeway being built
nearby. Then imagine them going ahead and purchasing the property.
And then imagine them taking the government to court for compen-
sation over damage to their investment. The PMA case would seem to
have the same prospects, quite apart from all the arguments against the
idea that a trade treaty should be able to override any government’s sov-
ereignty in public health matters in perpetuity.
The proceedings are governed by the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law Rules of Arbitration 2010 (UNCITRAL
Rules), (352) and are being overseen by a three-member arbitral tri-
bunal. (353) The process of arbitration differs from that in the WTO in
several respects. Despite the Australian government’s expressed com-
mitment to transparency in investor-state arbitration and request for
open hearings and published hearings, PMA has requested that the case
be heard in secret and only limited documents published (with redac-
tions), as it is entitled to do under the UNCITRAL rules. (354)
Mark Davison (285) was convinced that the case for compensation
was worthless.
Article 6 of the BIT specifically refers to how compensation should
be calculated. It states that the compensation shall amount to ‘the real
value of the investment immediately before the deprivation or before
the impending deprivation became public knowledge whichever is
the earlier’.
The investment is defined in Article 1 of the BIT as the invest-
ment of the Hong Kong investors, that is, PMA. So what was the
value of the ‘investment’ that PMA had before the impending ‘depri-
vation’ became public knowledge? It seems that it did not have any
investment at all at the time that the impending ‘deprivation’ became
public knowledge.
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No doubt PMA will have some argument on the point but, as a
general rule, the value of nothing is nothing.
It appears that PMA’s claim for ‘billions of Australian dollars’ has
about as much life as the parrot in the famous Monty Python sketch.
(see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aqz_4OgMi7M) It will be
interesting to see whether PMA argues that its claim is just resting or,
perhaps, just temporarily stunned by the Australian government tak-
ing it out of its cage and giving it a good hard whack with the facts.
In April 2014, Australia received a favourable order when the tribunal
decided to divide the proceedings into two phases (the ‘bifurcation
question’), in line with a request by Australia. As a result, the tribunal
will now first examine the jurisdictional objections raised by Australia
and will only then turn to the argument on the merits, if necessary.
Australia is arguing that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to
hear the case for three reasons, summarised in an email circulated by
the US-based Tobacco Free Kids:
1. The dispute falls outside of the scope of the Treaty because PMA
did not have any relevant ‘investment’ in Australia at the time the
introduction of plain packaging was announced on 29 April 2010.
PMA only acquired its interest in Australia on 23 February 2011,
10 months after the government announced plain packaging.
2. Further or in the alternative, PMA’s ‘investment’ needed to be ‘ad-
mitted’ by Australia subject to its foreign investment laws and
policies. The burden of proof falls on PMA to prove that its invest-
ments were so admitted, a burden which it has not discharged.
3. Further or in the alternative, PMA’s claim relies heavily on a series
of treaties over which an arbitral tribunal could have no jurisdic-
tion. The Treaty’s article 2 (2) umbrella clause does not extend to
obligations owed by Australia to other states under multilateral
agreements. Even if it were correct (which it is not) that article 2
(2) could somehow be understood as extending the tribunal’s juris-
diction to obligations Australia owes pursuant to other treaties, all
of those treaties have their own dispute settlement mechanisms. It
is not the function of the tribunal to establish a roving jurisdiction
to make determinations that would potentially conflict with the de-
terminations of the agreed dispute settlement bodies.
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The court will deal with these jurisdictional arguments as a preliminary
matter. If Australia prevails, the case brought by PMA will be dismissed.
Bifurcation is beneficial to Australia because the case will be dealt with
more expediently and the financial and other resources expended by
the parties will be reduced if the case is decided in this first phase. The
hearing of this first phase has been set down for three business days
(and two additional days in reserve) from 16 February 2015 in Singa-
pore.
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Evaluating the impact of plain
packaging
For different reasons, the Australian government, other governments
around the world, and the Australian and international tobacco control
communities, are intensely interested to know what impact plain pack-
aging might have on the goals of the legislation, as are the tobacco
industry and its supporters (see p53).
The Department of Health commissioned a team led by Professor
Melanie Wakefield to conduct a suite of research projects evaluating the
impact of the legislation on these goals. Wakefield is an international
giant in tobacco control research. In 2012 she was voted by a panel of
her international peers to receive the American Cancer Society’s Luther
L Terry Award for research in tobacco control. This is the field’s peak
global award for research excellence. Other winners have included the
late Sir Richard Doll and Sir Richard Peto, both from Oxford University
and authors of some of the most seminal ‘big epidemiology’ on smok-
ing and health ever published. She has also served as a senior editor on
a National Cancer Institute report on mass communication in tobacco
control (355), and is an elected Fellow of the Australian Academy of So-
cial Sciences.
The contract for research awarded to Wakefield’s team is a confi-
dential document. Other than the parties to the contract, the research
questions and the ways that these are being approached are unknown
to others. This confidentiality has no doubt been put in place because
the tobacco industry has an intense interest in doing what it can to
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show the world that what Australia has done has ‘not worked’ and that
other governments should therefore not go down the same track. If
the industry knew full details of the nature, timing and study popula-
tions involved, there are almost certain to be actions that the companies
could take to try to disrupt, confound and artificially influence the out-
comes of some of these studies.
‘Has it worked?’
The seemingly most obvious and basic question that is most frequently
asked about what Australia has done with plain packaging is ‘has it
worked?’ In the 20 months since the new packs began appearing in
shops, we and our colleagues have both been asked this many question
many times by Australian and international journalists, colleagues
working in other fields, friends and students from all around the world
doing assignments.
As will be discussed at length in this chapter, this apparently very
obvious question invariably rests on a number of assumptions by the
questioner about the objectives of plain packaging. These assumptions
are about the timing, magnitude and causal attribution of changes in
smoking (to uptake, cessation and total cigarettes smoked). What might
seem like a very simple question rapidly emerges as being very complex
as the often naïve assumptions beneath it are interrogated.
This complexity was fully appreciated by those responsible for
drafting the plain packaging legislation and is reflected in the objectives
contained in the legislation (see p53). The goal of Australia’s compre-
hensive approach to tobacco control is to reduce tobacco use, expo-
sure to tobacco smoke and diseases caused by it. When public health
advocates and researchers think about a policy like plain packaging
‘working’, they do not think about a cartoon-like caricature of a smoker
robotically responding in immediate Pavlovian hot-wired simplicity to
a single policy. They think about how one ingredient like a price rise, a
new health warning or campaign works over time in conjunction with
all the others. Everyone working in tobacco control knows that the var-
ious elements of tobacco control policy and programs do not work in
isolation from each other but in concert, with relationships that, to be
best understood, need to be researched longitudinally over many years.
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Proximal and distal factors influencing smoking
The decisions individuals make to not take up smoking or to stop
smoking are sometimes made suddenly and sometimes unpredictably
in response to specific stimuli named by those involved. These stimuli
can include the onset of symptoms like coughing up blood or a coro-
nary incident. Other common precipitating reasons for quitting include
pregnancy, highly memorable and personally relevant pre-operative
‘doctor’s orders’, a plea to quit from a loved one like a spouse or child,
a sharp tax or price rise, perhaps taking the cost of a pack through a
psychological barrier like $20 a pack, or the impact of a powerful new
piece of information via an anti-smoking campaign. These sorts of im-
mediate, sometimes quick-acting influences are called proximal factors,
and have often been reported in research literature on smoking.
But the far more common natural history of someone not ever tak-
ing up smoking or finally deciding to quit reflects the confluence of
many years of influences, both specific and general. Children and ado-
lescents might grow up in nuclear and extended family environments
where they never or rarely see a family member smoking. They may
also have few friends who smoke. They may be exposed in classroom
settings as well as via mass media to anti-smoking information. They
may often see smokers huddling outside of buildings and think that
being a smoker doesn’t look much fun. If they are aged 22 or under
in Australia today, they would have grown up never having seen to-
bacco advertising or a tobacco-sponsored sporting event, because these
were all finally banned in 1992. They may have read that a pack a day
smoker could spend more than $7000 a year on cigarettes, and count
their blessings that they do not have to accommodate such an outlay.
The chances are that they would be exposed to all or many of these in-
fluences.
Similarly, smokers who quit most commonly nominate a general
‘concern about health’ as the outstanding reason why they quit. This
concern may have been nascent for many years, but became steadily
amplified by emotions like regret, personal resentment at being ad-
dicted, concern about the expense of smoking and about not enjoying
being a smoker in a society where smoking is exiled from every indoor
public space, and from many private spaces like homes and cars. One
day, often after a history of several failed attempts, many such smokers
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finally decide to quit. Every year, many thousands succeed in perma-
nently stopping. Any attribution of this decision to just one of the
preceding factors, or an account of why they quit which was blind to
the complexity of the distal, life-course factors that have acted to finally
get a smoker to a point where they decide to quit, would explain little.
Plain packaging might well function as a ‘slow burn’, distal negative
factor against smoking, than as a precipitating proximal factor akin to
those described above. Plain packaging removes a major positive influ-
ence on smoking: the ability of smokers to handle and display a richly
semiotic connotative badge designed to reinforce a chosen sense of self
or to be an accoutrement of personal style.
Accordingly, in setting the objectives of plain packaging, those who
drafted the Australian legislation would have almost certainly reflected
on the likely role that the removal of this final form of tobacco promo-
tion would have in the overall mix of factors that together act negatively
on smoking.
For this reason, the Australian government appropriately did not
forecast any precise effect of plain packaging, but instead emphasised
the longer-term focus (especially in relation to preventing uptake of
smoking by children) and, through its National Tobacco Control Plan
(356), its commitment to a comprehensive, long-term approach to re-
ducing tobacco use.
The objectives in the legislation included ‘discouraging’ people
from taking up smoking, ‘encouraging’ cessation, ‘discouraging’ relapse,
reducing the appeal of tobacco and the ability of packaging to mislead,
and increasing the effectiveness of health warnings. Each of these objec-
tives embody what the Chantler report (76) calls ‘intermediate’ effects
that lie in three broad areas: reductions in the appeal of smoking,
increases in the salience of pack health warnings and increases in per-
ceptions of harm from smoking.
Studies monitoring the possible role of plain packaging in achiev-
ing these intermediate goals could for example consider changes in:
• negative attitudes about smoking
• negative views about the desirability of smoking
• knowledge about harms of smoking
• intentions to not smoke
• increased effectiveness of health warnings.
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For its part, the tobacco industry decided that acknowledging the sub-
tleties and complexities in all this would not be in its interests. Instead,
it opted to commission studies and frame data and expectations as
if plain packaging was a classic proximal variable. The test of the ef-
fectiveness of the policy was put succinctly by one of the industry’s
leading acolytes, the English libertarian Chris Snowdon, who wrote that
nothing less than ‘a sharp decline in smoking prevalence, particularly
underage smoking prevalence’ (357) was the test of whether plain packs
worked. He did not define the magnitude of ‘sharp’, but the average an-
nual fall in adult smoking prevalence over the past 30 years in Australia
has been just 0.5%. (358)
Critics of plain packaging played the game of demanding ‘hard’
evidence that would unambiguously show the precise impact of the leg-
islation, uncluttered by any other variable. The logical consequence of
this line of ‘hard’ argument was that nothing less than a randomised
controlled trial of the introduction of plain packaging which showed
that it reduced smoking prevalence in children would be satisfactory.
The Chantler report was brutally dismissive of such a demand:
I do not consider it to be possible or ethical to undertake such a
trial. To do so would require studies to be carried out within a suit-
ably large and isolated population free of known confounding factors
that influence smoking and prevalence. Such studies would expose
a randomised group of children to nicotine exposure and possible
addiction. Australia does not constitute that trial because a number
of things have happened together, including tax rises. Disentangling
and evaluating these will take years, not months.
I have been asked whether the evidence shows that it is likely
that there would be a public health impact. This is clearly not an issue
which is capable of scientific proof in the manner one might apply,
for example, to the efficacy of a new drug. There have been no dou-
ble blind randomised controlled trials of standardised packaging and
none could conceivably be undertaken. The most direct experiment
to test the efficacy of standardised packaging might be to compare
the uptake of smoking in non-smoking children with cigarettes in
branded packaging and to see which group smoked more. But given
the highly addictive and harmful nature of smoking, such an exper-
iment could, rightly, never receive ethical approval. In any case such
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an experiment would need to be conducted over a long period and
within a large population in which other variables were held con-
stant. Indeed in Australia it will be difficult in due course to separate
the effect of plain packaging from other factors such as changes in
pack sizes introduced by the manufacturers, and price and tax in-
creases.
Chantler concluded that the best evidence that could be in fact be ob-
tained would be in the form of the ‘intermediate outcomes’.
Having reviewed the findings of the Stirling Review and subsequent
Research Update, and the detailed critiques made of them, I believe
the evidence base for the proposed ‘intermediate’ outcomes is
methodologically sound and, allowing for the fact that overall effect
size cannot be calculated from it, is compelling about the likely direc-
tion of that effect. Taken together the studies and reviews based on
them put forward evidence with a high degree of consistency across
more than 50 studies of differing designs, undertaken in a range of
countries. (76)
Industry claims about impact
Various tobacco industry statements and reports about the impact of
the legislation began appearing from as little as five months after imple-
mentation and continue as we go to press. Almost uniformly, the spin
put on these reports by the tobacco claimed that plain packaging had
already been shown to be a failure.
Devastating to sales or zero impact?
In forecasting the impact of plain packs, the tobacco industry and its
supporters seemed to be intent on imitating the mythical creature from
Hugh Lofting’s Dr Dolittle series, the pushmi-pullyu. This was the two-
headed beast with two minds of its own. The beast would try to move
in opposite directions at the same time. For example, the Alliance of
Australian Retailers ran an industry-funded multimedia campaign as-
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serting that plain packs ‘would not work’ (see pp97) – meaning they
wouldn’t reduce sales.
This was a refrain megaphoned at every opportunity. But it created
a small problem for another central plank of the industry’s case, where
the other end of the pushmi-pullyu, the BAT-funded IPA, was warning
that plain packaging would work like nothing in the entire history of
tobacco control: it would reduce sales by up to an unprecedented 30%
in the first year and by further 30% tranches in every year after that
(see pp145). A back-of-an-envelope calculation shows that starting at
annual consumption of 24,032 million cigarettes and cigarette equiv-
alents1 in 2010–11, and reducing this by 30% every year, by 2020,
consumption would have fallen to just 969.4 million sticks – just 4% of
the starting point. The IPA confidently predicted that the High Court
would order the government to compensate the companies concerned
for all of this massive loss.
But after being humiliated in the High Court, the industry quickly
moved the pushmi-pullyu beast out of sight into a back paddock and
put all its efforts into three main arguments: (1) the packs were not
causing any reduction in sales; but (2) they were driving smokers down-
market to buy cheaper brands with lower profit margins for manufac-
turers and retailers, and (3) the illicit market was booming, all because
of plain packaging.
Imperial Tobacco: market down by 2% to 3%
In April 2013, just five months after plain packaging implementation,
Imperial Tobacco’s global CEO, Alison Cooper, appeared on a video for
the company’s shareholders. (359) Cooper said: ‘I should also mention
Australia – we’ve had the first six months of the plain pack environment
in Australia. We’ve seen the market decline roughly 2% to 3%, so maybe
not as bad as we might have anticipated.’ [our emphasis].
Coming from a tobacco company with access to its own sales data,
and almost certainly high-level intelligence on that of its competitors,
this was an important declaration about expected and actual changes to
sales in the first months of the implementation. To get perspective on
1 See http://tiny.cc/huurox
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this statement, we need to look at changes in consumption in Australia
in the years before plain packs were introduced. In April 2010, on the
same day that the government announced plain packaging would be in-
troduced, it announced an immediate and unprecedented 25% increase
in tobacco tax. A Treasury paper reported that while a fall in consump-
tion of 6% had been predicted, the impact was nearly double that at
11%. (66) In the years between 2003 and 2009, the annual change in the
number of cigarette equivalents dutied ranged from an increase of 2.3%
to a fall of 2.5%. The average change was a decline of 1.1% per annum
prior to the April 2010 tax increase. So a half year fall of 2–3% would
appear to be at least double the rate of the average annual fall.
The Imperial CEO’s carefully chosen rough ‘2–3%’ fall, rather than
precise estimate, might suggest that the fall was more toward the 3%
end. If the fall had been more toward 2%, this would have been clearly
worth stressing given the company’s strenuous efforts to attack plain
packs.
Another early example of the ‘it’s failing’ performance came from
Jeff Rogut, chief executive of the Australasian Association of Conve-
nience Stores. Rogut spelled out the unfolding disaster to an English
audience at a Philip Morris sponsored meeting in London in April
2012. He’d spoken to ‘a number of retailers’ to get ‘some open and hon-
est feedback on what’s happened in the last five months’. Using this
robust methodology, he told the audience that smokers were trading
down:
People are saying ‘why should I pay $17 when I can pay $12 or $13?
Nobody’s going to judge me in terms of what brand I’m smoking – I
might as well smoke the cheaper brand.
He explained that by paying cheaper prices ‘actual unit sales are up.
People are buying more cigarettes more frequently.’ But then a few sen-
tences later he asked: ‘Has it done anything to smoking rates or the
tobacco sales? Nothing at all. Our sales have been steady. After five
months there has been no noticeable reduction in people smoking or
buying cigarettes. ’ (360) [our emphasis]
So here we can presumably just take our pick: ‘actual unit sales are
up’ or ‘there has been no noticeable reduction in people smoking or
buying cigarettes. . . nothing at all’. All with the benefit of the authorita-
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tive Mr Rogut having supplied no data on national smoking prevalence
beyond his recollections of speaking to ‘a number’ of retailers and re-
porting this at a Philip Morris organised meeting in London.
London Economics report
In November 2013 a press release on ‘one of the first comprehensive
surveys of smoking prevalence since the introduction of plain packag-
ing in Australia one year ago’ was issued by a private UK consultancy,
London Economics, sponsored by Philip Morris. It stated:
Over the time frame of the analysis, the data does not demonstrate
that there has been a change in smoking prevalence following the in-
troduction of plain packaging despite an increase in the noticeability
of the new health warnings.
The message was that the legislation was not working.
Within hours, Cancer Council Victoria produced a critique of the
report, that would have seen any undergraduate researcher who had
authored the nonsense it contained humiliated by the basic method-
ological flaw in the study and its serious lack of statistical power, to
make the claims its authors made for it. The demolition is so complete,
we publish it in full.
This Philip Morris-funded survey has been conducted on the mis-
taken assumption that adult smoking prevalence ought to have
markedly declined immediately following the introduction of plain
packaging and refreshed larger graphic health warnings in Australia.
No tobacco control intervention in history has ever achieved that.
Unsurprisingly, this was therefore not the expectation of government
or the public health community.
Rather, the more proximal aims of the plain packaging legisla-
tion were to reduce appeal of packaging, especially for young people;
increase the salience of health warnings; and reduce the ability of
packaging to mislead consumers about the harmful effects of tobacco
use. The legislation was introduced as one of a number of tobacco
control strategies, including tobacco tax increases and mass media
campaigns, to contribute to reducing overall smoking prevalence.
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The most important methodological difference between this at-
tempt to assess smoking prevalence and the approach used in the
three-yearly government-funded survey called the National Drug
Strategy Household Survey (NDSHS), is that the Philip Morris study
failed to use a probability-based sampling approach. It is a basic tenet
of population survey research that the most representative samples
are those where every population member has an equal probability
of being included in the survey.
Because the Philip Morris survey used an online panel to obtain
responses from Australians and it used those responses to estimate
prevalence, only Australians who are members of online market re-
search panels could be included. While panel members comprise
people of a wide range of demographic characteristics, these people
opt-in to become members of an ongoing online panel for the pur-
pose of taking part in many different surveys or studies and they
earn rewards each time they participate. In this way, they are going
to be different from a representative cross-section of the Australian
population. The Philip Morris survey would likely have mixed to-
gether several online panels to achieve these numbers. The survey
used quota-sampling (that is, it required its sample to have a partic-
ular mix of age, gender and regional characteristics), presumably to
try to compensate for its non-probability-based sampling approach.
However, quota-based sampling cannot ensure the survey is repre-
sentative of the wider Australians population who are not members
of online survey panels.
By comparison, the NDSHS uses a household sampling ap-
proach, where all residential Australian private households are eli-
gible for inclusion in the sample. The non-representative nature of
internet panels in Australia is the most likely reason that the London
Economics Philip Morris report estimates daily smoking prevalence
(around 20% in each survey attempt) to be much higher than the far
more representative NDSHS, when it recorded 17.4% daily smoking
among 18+ year olds back in 2010.
The three attributes the report authors highlight to suggest it
is a high quality survey (under ‘quality assurance’) are in fact or-
dinary, basic elements of survey practice. However, this section is
silent on the survey response rate achieved, which is another critical
survey attribute – that is, out of all people approached to do the
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survey, what proportion responded. Since the survey did not use
a probability-based sampling frame, it is unlikely to be a reliable
reflection of Australian smoking prevalence (and its overestimated
smoking prevalence figures show that in each of the surveys), but
since it did not report survey response rates, readers cannot know if
it is even a true reflection of Australian online panel members.
The relatively large numbers used in the survey and the use of
questions consistent with those used in the NDSHS, cannot make up
for the failure to use a probability-based sampling frame from which
to select a sample in the first place, and the lack of information on
survey response rate.
As noted at the outset, the aim of the legislation that introduced
plain packaging with larger graphic health warnings was to weaken
the appeal of smoking and strengthen knowledge of health effects:
it did not involve any immediate call to action. Its effect is likely to
be a longer-term one, enhancing the effects of campaigns and tax in-
creases in discouraging youth smoking uptake and prompting quit
attempts and thereby contributing to the decline in the prevalence
of smoking over the longer term. But even if the aim had been to
prompt an immediate drop in prevalence, the Philip Morris study
was not sufficiently powered to find one.
While survey samples of around the 5000 mark are adequate
to detect large changes in attitudes and behaviour, this number is
nowhere near large enough to detect the very small changes in preva-
lence in any country that might be expected year to year. The NDSHS
with a sample of 24,000 Australians is large enough to pick up de-
clines in prevalence of smoking of 1% to 2%, the sorts of drops that
might be feasible over a three-year period. To pick up a 0.5% decline
in prevalence (a decline of the sort of magnitude that might be ex-
pected over a 12-month period) would require a sample size of over
90,000 respondents. The follow-up surveys of just over 5000 respon-
dents used in the London Economics reports would be able to detect
any decline in prevalence over a one-year period only if that decline
were larger than 2% points – a drop in relative terms that would be
unprecedented in tobacco control history.
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Table 7.1: Sample sizes required to detect various declines in prevalence
At a starting daily
prevalence of . . .
. . . to detect, at alpha = 0.05 and power of 0.80, (two-
sided test) a decline of . . .
2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5%
20% 6,039 10,844 24,641 99,519
17.5% 5,406 9,728 22,149 89,630
Source: http://www.stat.ubc.ca/~rollin/stats/ssize/b2.html
Governments are understandably eager for information about the im-
pact of plain packaging. Well-designed studies on changes in attitudes
and beliefs will be highly instructive. But given the likely mode of effect
of this policy, it is likely to be many years before an impact on the de-
cline in prevalence can be accurately assessed.
Never say die
On the day after the Chantler report (76) was released, BATA issued a
press release (361) declaring:
Since plain packaging was introduced, industry volumes had actually
grown for the first time in over a decade while the decline in the
number of people smoking had dropped by over half.
From 2008 to 2012 smoking incidence, or the number of people
smoking, was declining at an average rate of -3.3% a year. Since plain
packaging was introduced, that decline rate slowed to -1.4%,’ Mr
McIntyre said. ‘Over the five years in the lead-up to the introduction
of plain packaging, total tobacco industry volumes were declining at
an average rate of -4.1%.
Subsequently, since plain packs were introduced on 1 December
2012, industry volumes have actually grown for the first time in a
long time to +0.3%. ‘Further, the number of cigarettes smoked on
a daily basis declined at a rate of -1.9% in the five years leading up
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to plain packaging, while it slowed to -1.4% after green packs hit
shelves.
The long-term decline of people giving up smoking at a fairly
consistent rate and also smoking less has changed for the worse.
So here was BATA, a company normally breathless with excitement in
being able to report growth in market volume to its investors, reporting
the trifecta of a bounce-back in growth (the first ‘in a long time’) a slow-
ing in the decline in the number of cigarettes being smoked each day,
and an apparent halt in smoking cessation and attributing this growth
to the introduction of plain packs. Recipients of this press release were
supposed to understand that BATA was really unhappy about all this re-
newed growth and that they would have preferred the pre-plain packs
days when each of these basic indicators were heading south for the
company.
BATA’s press release was issued in spite of the Chantler report say-
ing of their data on the alleged 0.3% growth in market volume:
This data is [sic] likely to be affected by transitional impacts. For ex-
ample, retailers returned a significant quantity of tobacco stock in
branded packaging during the first half of 2013 which was subse-
quently destroyed rather than smoked. Stockpiling in anticipation of
pre-announced tax increases will also have affected the data.
Data on volumes at the final point of sale, which is less affected
by these transitional impacts, shows consumption has fallen since
the introduction of plain packaging. Cigarette sales in grocery stores
fell by around 0.9% in 2013 according to the Retail World trade
magazine. It is noteworthy that the population over 15 years of age
increased by 1.5% in 2013.
Chantler’s comments about old non-compliant stock being dumped or
sent back to the manufacturers were supported by remarks made by Jeff
Rogut in comments made to the same Philip Morris organised meeting
in London in 2013 mentioned earlier. He told the meeting:
There was an enormous amount of work for retailers to clear out the
old stock. Some stock was taken back and some retailers chose to
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dump the stock. So the small retailers were really acting as the imple-
menters of government policy.
Implementers of government policy? Well, yes. That would be in the
same way that dairy companies are ‘implementers’ of government pol-
icy on pasteurisation, and petrol companies on lead-free petrol policy.
What a burdensome thing it is to be a retailer! Plain packaging was
the fourth time since 1973 that Australian retailers had been required
to change all tobacco stock over to packs with newly legislated health
warnings. Any retailer who was unaware that it would be illegal to sell
the old branded packs after 1 December 2012 would have had to have
been in a deep coma. They had 12 months’ high profile notice about
the impending changeover. Rogut failed to note whether the supply-
ing manufacturers were still off-loading their old stock to retailers too
close to the date after which it would be illegal to sell it. And if retail-
ers were silly enough to overstock the soon-to-be illegal fully branded
packs, those in the meeting were presumably supposed to all agree that
this was yet another catastrophe to be heaped on the towering plain
packaging debacle.
Impact of plain packaging on children
Most analysts of the likely impact of plain packaging believe that its
main impact will be on children over the next generations – the pri-
mary intent of the legislation as outlined from the outset by Nicola
Roxon. Just as no Australian child aged born since 1992 has ever seen
a local tobacco advertisement or tobacco-sponsored sporting event,
no child growing up after December 2012 will ever see carcinogenic
tobacco products packaged in carefully market researched attractive
boxes. Smoking rates among youth today are the lowest ever recorded.
Plain packs are expected to preserve and continue that downward mo-
mentum, starving the industry of new generations of new smokers as
older smokers quit and die early.
Australia has been very successful in reducing smoking by children
and young people aged under 18 years. Data from 2011 show that only
3.6% of 12–17 year olds are ‘committed smokers’ (ie. smoked on three
or more days in past week), the lowest on record. (362) Moreover, to-
Removing the emperor’s clothes
170
tal underage tobacco consumption by secondary school students was
only just over 100 million cigarettes in 2011 (based on average reported
weekly consumption of 17.16 cigarettes per week for the 44,683 chil-
dren 12–15 years and 22.66 cigarettes per week for the 57,328 students
aged 16 and 17 who were estimated to be smoking at least weekly).
(362) This represents less than 0.5% of the total 22 billion cigarettes
(manufactured cigarettes or equivalent roll-your-own cigarettes or cig-
ars) that were subject to excise and customs duty in the same year. (363)
This context is critical for any discussion about what plain packag-
ing might do to total demand for cigarettes among children, the main
target of the policy, both now and into the future. Even if plain packag-
ing was to cause an immediate fall in tobacco use of 5% (which would
catapult the policy into the vanguard of proximally impactful strate-
gies), the problems in being able to detect this effect using available or
any conceivable data set are insurmountable.
It would not be possible to use customs and excise clearance data
on apparent tobacco consumption to make claims about what pro-
portion of any changes were attributable to changes in consumption
by young smokers because those survey-based data are of course not
matched in any way to customs and excise data on who is consuming
the cigarettes released into the market by local manufacturers or im-
porters. Instead estimates of the amount being consumed by different
population segments are estimated by applying survey data extrapola-
tions to total apparent consumption (customs and excise) data.
If we hypothesised that plain packs might cause what would be
a remarkable and possibly unprecedented additional 5% (relative) de-
cline in the proportion of under 18 year olds being committed smokers
(smoking on three or more times per week) in a year after the introduc-
tion of plain packaging, we would need to conduct a before and after
study capable of detecting a 5% shift from the current 3.6% down to
3.42%.
To detect with a significance level of 5% and a power of 80%, we
would need to survey 164,087 children (364) in each of two separate
surveys, before and after the introduction of plain packaging to detect
such a difference. Such an undertaking is completely out of the ballpark
of any study of smoking prevalence ever conducted in Australia. The
national Australian Secondary Schools Alcohol and Drugs study of
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children’s drug use (including smoking) samples just under 25,000 chil-
dren nationally. (362)
University of Zurich report
In March 2014, the industry made yet another attempt to convince the
world that plain packs had been a flop. This time, they focused on the
impact on children via a Philip Morris-commissioned report from two
researchers at the University of Zurich. (365). This report used 13 years
of data on 14–17 year olds self-reported smoking included in monthly
door-to-door cross-sectional surveys.
It is interesting to note here that Philip Morris has purchased data
on youth smoking despite frequent public statements about its disin-
terest in the youth market. The report’s authors concluded that there
was no evidence of any impact on youth smoking prevalence for the 12
months from December 2012.
However, despite enthusing that their data were ‘reliable cigarette
market data’, they also noted about the youth data that:
Since the monthly sample sizes are rather small, ranging mostly be-
tween 200 and 350, and since the minors included in the sample
change from month to month, it is expected that the monthly ob-
served prevalence is rather unstable over time. This is indeed the
case.
Again, Cancer Council Victoria quickly threw withering sunlight on
this tobacco industry-commissioned report’s many problems (366),
commencing by noting:
The report is seriously flawed conceptually. It is based on the straw
man principle that plain packaging could be expected to immediately
lead to a detectable reduction in adolescent smoking prevalence. No
other tobacco control intervention has achieved that and neither is
this the expectation of governments or credible researchers.
Many other problems were identified in the report.
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The survey of adolescents was completed at home, when many par-
ents would be present. This could lead to under-reporting of smok-
ing.
and
The small monthly sample size prohibits any credible analysis of
change over a short period of time. The authors describe the sample
as being between 200 to 350 adolescents per month, (although they
neglect to point out the sample size in the last several years has been
reduced to closer to 200 per month). The authors’ entire analysis is
based on the fact that they have been able to fit a trend line to the
measure of smoking over the 13-year period examined. This is not
a test of plain packaging but a simple description of how much on
average smoking prevalence has declined over the 13-year period. It
would be truly concerning if any ongoing survey in Australia could
not yield this basic descriptive parameter, since there has been such
a large gradual decline smoking over this 13 year period due to the
aforementioned ongoing tobacco control policies and program ef-
forts. (366)
The day of reckoning
17 July 2014 is unlikely to be a date that the global tobacco industry
will ever forget. At 1am Canberra time an embargo was lifted on a set
of numbers that drove a stake deep into the heart of Big Tobacco’s con-
tinuing best efforts to deny that plain tobacco packaging had made any
impact on Australians’ smoking.
The AIHW released the results of its latest national survey of drug,
alcohol and tobacco use, involving 23,855 people. (194) These surveys
have been conducted every three years since 1991, when 24.3% of Aus-
tralians aged 14 and over smoked on a daily basis. In November 2013,
this figure had almost halved to 12.8%. With another 3% smoking less
than daily, Australia’s 15.8% was now the lowest daily rate in the world,
with Canada in second place with 16.2%. (367) Sweden is in world’s first
place on daily smoking (11%) but with another 10% smoking less than
daily, its 21% total smoking rate (368) places it well behind Australia,
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Canada, the USA and England (see Figure 7.1). Moreover, the percent-
age fall in Australia between 2010 and 2013 was a record 15.2%. The
average percentage decline across the nine triennial surveys since 1991
had been 6.5%, with the previous biggest fall being 11%. (Figure 7.2)
Figure 7.1 Smoking prevalence in Australia, Canada, USA, Eng-
land and Sweden, latest available data
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Figure 7.2 Daily smoking, adults 14+, Australia 1991–2013
Interest naturally centred on whether the fall could be attributed to the
introduction of plain packaging. Other than the routine twice-yearly
consumer price index (CPI) tax increases in each of 2011, 2012 and
2013, bans on point of sales retail displays, a continuation of anti-smok-
ing campaigning throughout the period in question, and measures like
smokefree restaurants and pubs that have been in place for many years,
the elephant-in-the-room explanatory variable was the implementation
of plain packaging in December 2012. Together with almost continu-
ous national news diet of debate about the policy throughout much of
the three years in question, no other policy or program presented as a
plausible candidate.
In the weeks before this data bombshell exploded, the Murdoch-
owned newspaper The Australian had run a major campaign involving
three front page stories and whole pages led by IPA-affiliated journalists
and contributors (369). They drew on internal tobacco industry data
that was never made available for public scrutiny. This mystery data
purported to claim a 0.3% increase in consumption following the intro-
duction of plain packs. The treasury quietly released tobacco customs
and excise data showing a fall of 3.4% in 2013 relative to 2012 when
tobacco plain packaging was introduced. There had been a larger fall
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between 2010–2011, but that was an exceptional year which saw an un-
precedented 25% increase in tobacco tax introduced at the beginning
of May 2010. (66) The Australian Bureau of Statistics also released data
on expenditure on tobacco for the December 2012 ($3.508b) and the
March 2013 ($3.405b) quarters, showing that the introduction of plain
packaging was followed by a 2.9% fall in consumption.
The timing of The Australian’s campaign coincided with a final
consultation period in England preceding a final decision on a stated
intention to introduce plain packs in that country.
17 July unleashed some of the most desperate straw-clutching from
the industry and its blogosphere errand boys I have ever seen. Imperial
Tobacco and Philip Morris opened the batting, claiming there was no
change in the long-term downward trend. BAT issued a press release
containing at least two lies. Like Imperial, they said the fall was ‘in line
with historical trends’. (370) It wasn’t. It was the biggest percentage fall
ever recorded since the surveys commenced. Next, they highlighted the
impact of the 2010 tax rise. There had been a 25% tobacco tax increase
in early May 2010, but the first five months impact of that rise coincided
with the data collection period (29 April – 14 September 2010) for the
previous AIHW survey, published in 2011.
Then they referred to the December 2013 12.5% tax rise as an in-
fluence. But data collection for the 2011–2013 AIHW report occurred
between 31 July 2013 and 1 December 2013, the day an extra 12.5%
tobacco tax was introduced. It could therefore have not influenced the
data showing the fall.
They also explained that the 12.8% prevalence figure was a fudge
because it was only daily smokers. It didn’t include ‘casual’ smokers,
whom we were told would lift the true ‘incidence figure’ to 16.4%. (And
note here that BAT apparently didn’t know the basic difference be-
tween incidence and prevalence.) But they couldn’t even get that right.
The AIHW data showed 12.8% daily, 1.4% weekly, and 1.6% less than
weekly, making 15.8%. Pathetically, here was BAT desperate to claim
as their own those who admit to smoking a cigarette once in a blue
moon. Note that the prevalence of those who smoked at any frequency
(daily, weekly and less than weekly) fell by 12.2% between 2010 and
2013, another record fall, while the average three-yearly declines over
the previous 20 years was just 6.8%.
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Then they whined that because the data included the 12–17 year
age group (where only 3.4% smoked daily), this would have artificially
deflated the ‘true’ figure. This ignores that the 14 years and over figure
had been standard in every year since the surveys commenced in 1991,
and that between the 2010 and 2013 surveys, smoking fell in every age
group above 18 years.
However, a tiny ray of hope remained. A tobacco-loving English
blogger noticed that in the 12–17 year age group (the principal target
of plain packaging legislation) the percentage of daily smokers actually
rose from 2.5% to 3.4%. The jubilant blogger took the trouble to con-
struct a bold graph that emphasised this massive uplift. But he failed to
tell his readers that for five of 10 data cells which made up the figures,
the standard error was more than 50% (‘too unreliable for general use’)
and another two cells with lower standard errors ‘should be used with
caution’).
Citi, the global market investment advisors, were in no doubt about
the meaning of the data, saying it provided ‘the best data’ to support
the British government’s imminent decision to legislate plain packs and
that the data would ‘substantially undermine’ the tobacco industry’s ar-
gument that there was no good evidence that plain packaging would
achieve its stated aims. (371)
This is not likely to be the last round of denials from Big Tobacco.
But their hollow denials of impact have now become little more than
laugh-a-minute spectator sport.
‘My cigarettes now taste lousy’
One night I had friends over to dinner and decanted a bottle of $15
Australian shiraz into an empty bottle of very expensive French
Chateau Margaux that I’d been given as a gift. As I brought it to the
table, I spoke about our friendship and how I wanted them to share this
special wine. As people took their first careful sips, no one was raptur-
ous, but all said the wine was truly wonderful and commented about
its mouth feel, how easily it slid down the throat and how you could
‘taste the French soil’ in French wines. When I quickly revealed the
hoax there was long conversation about many experiences with expec-
tations priming experience.
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Those studying placebo and nocebo effects in medicine are very fa-
miliar with this phenomenon, as is the marketing industry. A study of
the influence of pricing on perceptions of the taste of wine shows that
my dinner experience was not a one-off example. (372) Those studied
reported that a bottle of wine selling at $90 was experienced as more
satisfying than exactly the same bottle where the subjects were told the
price was $10.
But brain scans showed this phenomenon was not just people say-
ing the $90 wine tasted better, their brain activity showed they really
experienced it. Adam Ferrier, a psychologist working in advertising de-
scribed it this way:
The subjects’ medial orbitofrontal cortex, an area of the brain
strongly associated with experiencing pleasure, lit up like a Christ-
mas tree when the subjects tasted the $90 bottle. This is despite, and
this is the really interesting bit, the areas of the brain responsible for
experiencing taste (the insula cortex, the ventroposterior medial nu-
cleus of the thalamus, or the parabrachial nucleus of the pons) did
not light up any differently between the tastes tests of the $10 v $90
bottle. Therefore, even though the taste part of the brain recorded
no difference between the bottles, the pleasure part of the brain did.
(373)
From 1 October 2012 it was illegal for old ‘branded’ packs to be man-
ufactured in Australia, and for such branded packs to be imported.
From this date until 1 December 2012, tobacco retailers could sell both
branded and plain packs. Compliant plain packs began appearing in
shops from early September and immediately reports began coming in.
Shortly afterwards, a colleague dropped by my office and said she’d been
to her hairdresser on the weekend and the woman in her 20s who had
cut her hair, knowing she worked in health, had told her that she had
finally decided to quit: she couldn’t bear the thought of being seen with
one of those ugly new packs.
Mike Daube similarly told us:
So I stopped off at the local supermarket to buy a few plain packs
and a young woman – she would have been about 20 – who didn’t
know me from a hole in the ground, behind the counter, opened the
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shelves behind her, gave me some packs, pointed to them and said:
‘That made me give up’. That was within days and I thought that’s nice
– we do the research, but it’s actually nice to get that personal story.
Anecdotes like this may not be worth much in isolation, but when they
move from a trickle to a stream, it’s often a sign of things that will be
validated in formal population-wide surveys down the track.
Soon after plain packs came on the market, I took three calls in
the space of a week where the callers asked if there had been some sort
of tobacco formula change that had accompanied the switch to plain
packs. ‘My usual brand tastes really different – far worse’ was the drift of
the comments. Other colleagues were getting these calls too, and they
were also going to the office of the new health minister, Tanya Plibersek.
She told the New York Times:
Of course there was no reformulation of the product. It was just that
people being confronted with the ugly packaging made the psycho-
logical leap to disgusting taste . . . the best short-term indication I
have that it’s working is the flood of calls we had in the days after the
introduction of plain packaging accusing the government of chang-
ing the taste of cigarettes. (374)
This phenomenon was entirely expected. People in marketing have long
understood that packaging can prime expectations. In first days after
implementation of the legislation, Adam Ferrier wrote:
This experience has been found to relate to packaging and its con-
tribution to taste in numerous studies, across numerous categories.
Packaging strongly influences the taste of something as the brain is
looking for cues to help create its story of tastiness (or not).
When tasting a cigarette, all advertising contributes to the taste
of that cigarette. People used to see ‘advertising’ as the stuff that be-
longed on TV. However, marketers today know that every little thing
they do is a form of promotion for the brand. Packaging, shelf wob-
blers, websites, the cars the sales team drive, the sales team – they
are all marketing, and they are all forms of advertising. And of all of
them, packaging is arguably the most important contributor to the
brand for three reasons; (a) it’s on 24-hours a day, (b) it’s experienced
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at point of purchase, (c) it was completely under the marketers con-
trol. This was especially true for cigarette manufacturers who had
other advertising levers pulled from them years ago.
Cigarette packaging – with its bright colours and symbols of
freedom and power – was a cue that this product tasted nice. It made
the cigarette more enjoyable. Now these images have been replaced
with images of disease and an unpleasant olive green (itself a colour
associated with sour taste). There are few cues left that suggest the
product will ‘taste’ nice. Consumers will begin to taste, you guessed
it, smoke!
If this is the hallmark of a nanny state, then as the son of a
smoker who died of cancer way too young I happily say ‘Goo goo ga
ga. Keep looking after us.’ (373)
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The future
The global history of tobacco control is a history of vanguard nations
taking what, at the time, seemed like bold, sometimes radical steps.
These always attracted derision at the time from the tobacco industry,
but sometimes also from the public, the media and politicians.
But there are many examples of pioneering initiatives first intro-
duced by single nations or states then being adopted by large numbers
of other nations in subsequent years. The most obvious examples are
restrictions and bans on tobacco advertising, smokefree workplaces
and public places like restaurants and bars, and most recently, graphic
health warnings on packs. In the face of huge opposition from the to-
bacco industry, Canada was the first nation to introduce graphic health
warnings in 2001. By October 2012, this had increased to 63 nations.
(205)
Plain packaging is also a good candidate for the continuing history
of domino effects because, as a regulatory measure, it is relatively inex-
pensive for governments to implement, as all packaging costs are borne
by the tobacco industry. Government costs consist of any that may be
involved in defending their plain packaging legislation and its imple-
mentation, and any surveillance costs post-implementation. Note that
the High Court of Australia ordered that the tobacco companies bring-
ing the case against plain packaging should pay all costs involved in the
action.
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Brand names – the last bastion
Plain packaging eviscerates, but does not drive a fatal stake through,
the still-beating heart of tobacco industry marketing. The one big op-
portunity remaining for the industry to brand its deadly products with
associations designed to distract its customers from their concerns
about health remains with opportunities to name brands in beguiling
new ways.
The Australian legislation is silent on any limitations on what com-
panies can call their brands. Variant names are limited in being re-
quired to refer to (72):
. . . the name used to distinguish that kind of tobacco product from
other tobacco products that are supplied under the same brand, busi-
ness or company name, by reference to one or more of the following:
(a) containing or not containing menthol;
(b) being otherwise differently flavoured;
(c) purporting to differ in strength;
(d) having or not having filter tips or imitation cork tips;
(e) being of different length or mass.
Here, the industry has considerable latitude to make claims about par-
ticular words like ‘smooth’ as referring to flavour, rather than to the
characteristics of users. But when it comes to words used to name
brands, the Act is an open door for introducing creative brand names.
Already one company, Imperial Tobacco, introduced a new brand name
to its Peter Stuyvesant brand. ‘Peter Stuyvesant + Loosie’ (see Figure 8.1)
was a gimmick innovation that provided one extra cigarette in a pack
of 20s and thereby allowed the company to introduce a brand name
change while flagging an apparent premium offer of an extra cigarette.
There would be nothing in the Act stopping the company introduc-
ing new variations on the core brand name by for example introducing
variations like ‘Peter Stuyvesant – Post Sex’ or ‘Peter Stuyvesant – Fore-
play’, using words from teenage argot (‘Peter Stuyvesant – Totally Sick’),
or in ways that would attract particular subcultures ‘Peter Stuyvesant –
Goths’, political orientations ‘Peter Stuyvesant – Liberals’, sporting allu-
sions ‘Peter Stuyvesant – Gold Medals’ and so on.
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Figure 8.1 Imperial Tobacco’s newly named brand ‘Peter Stuyver-
sant + Loosie’.
Plain packaging beyond Australia
There has been great international interest in what Australia has done.
Nicola Roxon told us:
DFAT [the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade], that often
sticks very much to its foreign affairs diplomacy, . . . was a bit taken
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aback how many requests in different countries they were getting for
packets and information and advice on how it had happened, and
most of that started post the High Court decision.
As we finish this book, some 20 months after Australia made it illegal
to sell tobacco products in fully branded packs, three nations – New
Zealand, Ireland and the United Kingdom – are well advanced in their
parliamentary processes to introduce plain packaging. Another seven
nations (Finland, Turkey, South Africa, Chile, Brazil, France and India)
have made statements or have seen developments which portend im-
plementation.
New Zealand
In April 2012 the New Zealand government agreed in principle to
introduce plain packaging reforms that were in alignment with Aus-
tralia’s, pending the outcome of a public consultation process. The pub-
lic consultation closed in October 2012 and Cabinet considered a re-
port on the consultation in February 2013. The government decided to
proceed with plain packaging legislation and a bill was lodged in the
New Zealand parliament in December 2013.
The Smoke-free Environments (Tobacco Products and Packaging)
Amendment Bill (375) had its first reading in the New Zealand parlia-
ment in February 2014. New Zealand associate health minister, Tariana
Turia, introduced the bill by stating that ‘when tobacco manufacturers
push tobacco, they are not simply selling a stick of nicotine; they are
selling status, social acceptance and adventure.’ (376) The bill received
overwhelming support with the exception of one dissenting MP from a
minor conservative party.
Following the positive first reading results, the bill was referred to
the Health Select Committee for public consultation. The committee re-
ceived more than 17,000 written submissions, the bulk of which were
made up of form letters and postcards solicited through a campaign
organised by the three major tobacco companies operating in New
Zealand. The committee held public hearings in April 2014 and is ex-
pected to provide a final report in August 2014. (377)
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New Zealand prime minister John Key has repeatedly stated that
the bill will not be sent to the governor general for royal assent until the
WTO challenges against the Australian plain pack laws are settled.
United Kingdom
In April 2014, the Chantler report on plain packaging concluded that
plain packaging would assist in reducing smoking by young people
in particular. The British minister for public health, Jane Ellison com-
mended the report in the House of Commons, saying:
In light of this report and the responses to the previous consultation
in 2012, I am therefore currently minded to proceed with introduc-
ing regulations to provide for standardised packaging. I intend to
publish the draft regulations, so that it is crystal clear what is in-
tended, alongside a final, short consultation, in which I will ask, in
particular, for views on anything new since the last full public con-
sultation that is relevant to a final decision on this policy. I will an-
nounce the details about the content and timing of that very shortly,
but would invite those with an interest to start considering any re-
sponses they might wish to make now. The House will understand
that I want to move forward as swiftly as possible. (378)
The UK has seen intense advocacy for plain packs since 2008. We are
grateful to ASH UK for providing the timeline below on how the UK
arrived at the ministerial statement of intent cited above. We set it out
in detail below to give readers a sense of the time and various stages
that are involved from an initial proposal through to the time when leg-
islation is introduced. Throughout this protracted process the tobacco
industry seeks to delay and defeat every step.
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Table 8.1: Plain packs in the United Kingdom
31 May 2008 The UK Labour government (Labour) consults on
a new strategy for tobacco control, including plain
packaging. (379)
30 October 2008 ASH (UK) publishes Beyond smoking kills to mark
the 10th anniversary of the white paper Smoking
kills and set an agenda for action for the decade to
come. (380) The report recommends plain pack-
aging and is endorsed by 100 health organisations
including Cancer Research UK and the British
Heart Foundation.
25 June 2009 An amendment on standard packaging is tabled to
the Health Bill by backbenchers in the Lords and
the Commons.
1 February 2010 UK government launches a new tobacco strategy,
A smokefree future: a tobacco control plan for Eng-
land, which includes the possible introduction of
standardised packaging. (381) There is opposition
within government so a commitment to proceed
is not possible, but says ‘The government believes
that the evidence base regarding “plain packaging”
needs to be carefully examined. Therefore, the
government will encourage research to further our
understanding of the links between packaging and
consumption, especially by young people. The
government will also seek views on, and give
weight to, the legal implications of restrictions on
packaging for intellectual property rights and free-
dom of trade.’ BAT says that the government will
face a ‘huge fight’ from the tobacco industry if it
moves ahead with the plans. Imperial Tobacco
calls the proposal a ‘counterfeiter’s charter’.
6 May 2010 New coalition government (led by Conservative
Party) formed following UK general election.
24 September 2010 The European Commission launches a public con-
sultation;on a proposal to revise Directive 2001/
37/EC which covers health warnings, limits on
toxic constituents, etc., for tobacco products. The
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consultation includes a proposal for plain packag-
ing.
20 November 2010 Following meeting with Australian health minister
Nicola Roxon at an international health ministers
event, UK health secretary, Andrew Lansley, an-
nounces he is investigating the viability of
introducing standardised packaging, saying: ‘It’s
wrong that children are being attracted to smoke
by glitzy designs on packets.’ (382)
30 November 2010 Publication of Healthy lives, healthy people, a pub-
lic health white paper stating that the government
will consider forcing tobacco companies to adopt
plain packaging to reduce the attraction of smok-
ing and the number of young people taking up
smoking.
1 December 2010 European Union launches a public consultation
on the introduction of plain packaging in its re-
vised tobacco products directive.
9 March 2011 UK government publishes Healthy lives, healthy
people: a tobacco control plan for England in which
it commits itself to consult within the year on
putting tobacco products in plain packaging.
17 January 2012 Plain packs protect campaign, spearheaded by
Smokefree SouthWest, is launched.
13 April 2012 The UK government launches a public consulta-
tion which seeks people’s views on whether or not
standardised packaging should be adopted, or
whether a different option should be considered.
17 April 2012 Northern Ireland health minister gives his support
to standard packs.
15 May 2012 The Tobacco Retailers’ Alliance launches anti-
plain packaging postcard campaign.
1 June 2012 Pro-smoking activists threaten and harass health
campaigners, reports The Guardian. (383)
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15 June 2012 Packaging companies form a group to fight the
UK government’s proposals for plain packaging of
tobacco products. The nameless group includes
Weidenhammer Packaging Group, Payne, Park-
side Flexibles Group, Chesapeake and the API
Group.
18 June 2012 Following lobbying from the Tobacco Retailers’
Alliance, the consultation documents are made
available in Urdu, Gujarati and Tamil and the clos-
ing date for the consultation is extended.
20 June 2012 Philip Morris releases reports alleging the system-
atic review of the evidence is flawed and plain
packaging will make counterfeiting easier.
3 July 2012 The Tobacco Retailers Alliance delivers 2,500 No
to plain packs postcards signed by staff in inde-
pendent shops across the UK to the department of
health.
6 July 2012 JTI launches £2m advertising campaign against
standardised packaging.
19 July 2012 Unite The Union claims plain packaging would
‘inevitably’ lead to 25% job losses in the print in-
dustry.
4 August 2012 The National Federation of Retail Newsagents asks
its 16,000 members to sign a petition against stan-
dard packs.
8 August 2012 FOREST presents a 235,000-strong petition in op-
position to plain packaging to the government.
10 August 2012 End of UK consultation.
20 September 2012 Department of health director of promotion an-
nounces that South Africa is exploring cigarette
plain packaging and will issue a report on its feasi-
bility by the end of this year.
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28 September 2012 JTI launches second phase of campaign against
plain packaging in the UK.
23 November 2012 A report by Luk Joossens, commissioned by Can-
cer Research UK, finds that, contrary to industry
claims, standardised packs are unlikely to cause
extra counterfeiting.
7 February 2013 Ian Paisley Jr MP delivers an open letter signed by
73 fellow MPs who oppose standardised packag-
ing to health secretary Jeremy Hunt.
14 February 2013 Launch of the Smokefree Action Coalition’s The
clock is ticking campaign to lobby MPs, and mark-
ing six months since the end of the consultation.
5 March 2013 The Guardian reports that the government is plan-
ning to legislate for plain cigarette packaging
within the year. The next day, a spokesman for the
prime minister denies the news, stating that ‘no
decisions have yet been taken’.
13 March 2013 The Advertising Standards Authority rules that
adverts against standard packs run by Japan To-
bacco’s Gallaher last year were ‘misleading’.
15 March 2013 The Scottish Liberal Democrats give full support
to standardised packaging after passing a motion
of confidence in support of legislation at their
conference.
27 March 2013 Scottish public health minister announces the
Scottish government’s support for standard pack-
aging.
8 April 2013 JTI rolls out phase three of its anti-plain packag-
ing campaign.
17 April 2013 Responding to a question in parliament on stan-
dardised packaging, health minister says that the
government is currently taking a ‘careful look’ at
all the evidence submitted as part of the depart-
ment of health’s public consultation.
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19 April 2013 Public health minister Anna Soubry says she is
‘persuaded’ by the evidence on standardised pack-
aging.
3 May 2013 News that UK government is to abandon standard
packaging plans surfaces among accusations that
the chief Tory strategist, Australian Lynton
Crosby, is behind the move due to his links with
the tobacco industry. (384) It subsequently
emerges that his firm, Crosby Textor, is in the pay
of Philip Morris.
8 May 2013 On the morning of the Queen’s Speech, which sets
out the government’s legislative agenda, the health
secretary says that no decision has been made re-
garding standard packs, adding that ‘just because
something is not in the Queen’s Speech, doesn’t
mean the government cannot bring it forward as
law.’
28 May 2013 The Irish government announces its intention to
ban cigarette pack branding.
21 July 2013 A summary report on the consultation is pub-
lished, together with a written ministerial
statement, in which the secretary of state for
health says that the government ‘has decided to
wait until the emerging impact of the decision in
Australia can be measured before we make a final
decision on this policy in England’. (385)
18 November 2013 A cross-party group of peers tables an amendment
to the Children and Families Bill to introduce
standardised tobacco packaging at report stage.
This is a crucial step, as the government knew that
the amendment was likely to pass in the Lords and
may well pass in the Commons.
28 November 2013 Facing possible defeat in the House of Lords over
the amendment, the government announces it will
introduce its own amendment to the Children and
Families Bill to give the secretary of state for
health the power to introduce standardised pack-
aging through regulations, while at the same time
launching a review of the public health evidence
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headed up by eminent paediatrician, Sir Cyril
Chantler. The amendment passed without dissent
in the Lords.
10 February 2014 Amendments to the Children and Families Bill are
passed in the Commons 453 for and 24 against –
this is a whipped vote but this is a government
which has faced significant rebellions and only a
tiny minority voted against. (386) The opponents,
in forcing a vote, have been very helpful in clarify-
ing the level of support. Standardised packaging
covers the whole of the UK.
13 March 2014 The Children and Families Bill becomes law after
receiving royal assent.
3 April 2014 Paediatrician Sir Cyril Chantler publishes his re-
port in which he concludes that standardised
packaging would have a positive impact on public
health.
27 June 2014 Draft regulations on standardised packaging pub-
lished for public consulation.
7 August 2014 Closing date for submissions.
Ireland
In May 2013 the Irish government, under the leadership of health min-
ister Dr James Reilly, announced it was planning new regulations on
tobacco plain packaging, with a planned implementation date in 2014.
Reilly is an unwavering advocate of plain packaging of tobacco prod-
ucts, and has stated he his prepared for a legal challenge from the
tobacco industry. (387) The tobacco industry and its allies have perpet-
uated the same myths as they did in Australia that the reforms violate
intellectual property law, will lead to increased smuggling and won’t re-
duce smoking.
In April 2014, the Irish Health Committee presented its report on
plain packaging. The recommendations cover almost identical ground
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to that covered by the Australian legislation. (388) Specific to plain
packaging reforms, the report also recommends: (389)
• the standardisation of the size of tobacco packaging
• the inner packaging of tobacco products to be the same colour as the
outside surface
• a separate and distinct definition for brand, company and business
name so as to prevent tobacco manufacturers from promoting brand
variants to the status of brands
• the maximum length/number of characters in brand and variant
names.
The bill passed the second stage of its passage through the Irish Senate
(Seanad) in June 2014 (390). It seems possible that Ireland may be the
second nation after Australia to implement plain packaging.
Early developments in other nations
Since the Australian plain packaging bill passed into law, I have un-
dertaken three WHO multi-country consultancies focused exclusively
on plain packaging. One was held in Brunei Durassalam in January
2012, where representatives from 11 nations were present, including
several nations not from the south-east Asian region. Another was in
Ankara, Turkey, in September 2012, where some 42 nations from the
European and Eastern Mediterranean region were present. A third was
held in Noumea, New Caledonia, in March 2013, where government
representatives from all Pacific island nations attended a South Pacific
Commission meeting. A pan-African meeting has also been held in
Capetown, South Africa.
Brunei Darussalam, which has very strong tobacco control, is
known to have plain packaging under active consideration and has
a leader with extreme wealth who would not be disturbed by legal
threats.
There is intense interest in India about plain packaging. (295) A na-
tional meeting was held on the issue in 2012, with a report published
in June 2012. In September 2013, a special session on the issue was in-
cluded in the Tobacco Endgame Conference in New Delhi, and Indian
legal scholars have begun publishing papers on the concept. (391) In-
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dian MP Baijayant ‘Jay’ Panda introduced a private member’s bill on
plain packaging in December 2012, but it did not progress.
In July 2014 the High Court of Uttar Pradesh, after being peti-
tioned by an NGO, recommended that the government of India intro-
duce plain packaging. (392)
There is some momentum in France toward plain packing with a
report, in May 2014, that the health minister Marisol Touraine would
introduce a bill in June for plain packaging. In late September Touraine
announced that the policy would be implemented from the beginning
of 2016. (393)
South Africa’s health minister Aaron Motsoaledi announced in July
2014 that his nation planned to introduce plain packs from 2015 and
was unlikely to wait for the decision of the WTO case with Australia.
(394) Turkey also announced at the same time that it would rapidly
progress the introduction of the measure from the start of 2015. (395)
Chile’s Senate Health Committee endorsed a comprehensive set of to-
bacco control proposals in July 2014, which included plain packaging.
Finland’s action plan for tobacco control includes a plain packaging
proposal. (396) Brazil’s Anvisa, the country’s equivalent of the US Food
and Drug Administration, announced in June 2014 that it would be
recommending plain packaging. Anvisa was the agency responsible for
Brazil’s globally historic ban on all tobacco flavourings, so it has a track
record of getting tobacco legislation implemented.
So as of August 2014, nine nations besides Australia have either
introduced legislation, are on the cusp of it or have announced their in-
tentions to do so. The global plain pack domino spectacle looks to have
commenced.
As we have seen, the tobacco industry has already shown its in-
terest in using international trade treaties to attempt to stop domestic
tobacco control policies and legislation that threaten its interests. Fooks
and Gilmore (397) have recently reviewed efforts by Philip Morris In-
ternational to influence the United States Trade Representative to use
the multinational TPP for such a purpose. There is virtually no trans-
parency about how the TPP is being negotiated, and other than leaked
drafts, no formal access to what has been already decided. Their paper
concludes:
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[Philip Morris International’s] formal request to the [United States
Trade Representative] that the TPP be used to extend IP rights, har-
monise the process of regulatory formation, and provide a compre-
hensive system of ISDS [Investor-State Dispute Settlement] reflects
the contents of leaked drafts of the TPP agreement. These suggest the
TPP will extend IP protection to trademark use, strengthen corpo-
rate influence in regulatory formation and provide tobacco compa-
nies with extensive powers to litigate against governments directly.
Although the extension of IP protection is subject to exceptions
for measures aimed at promoting public health, the precise scope
of these exceptions is unclear. Consequently, all three measures are
likely to increase the tobacco industry’s policy influence and to de-
ter governments from introducing plain packaging, albeit in different
ways.
First, by increasing litigation risk for legislating states, the extension of
IP protection to trademark use will increase tobacco companies’ power
to present the costs associated with plain packaging and other policies
affecting pack design as prohibitively expensive.
Likewise, proposals such as regulatory review, stakeholder consul-
tation and the use of impact assessments provide the industry with a
range of tools to access and feed information into health policymaking.
Combined with the TPP’s proposal for states to provide access to ‘sup-
porting documentation’ relating to regulatory measures, analyses and
data, which may exacerbate existing information asymmetries between
states and multinational corporations, these reforms are likely to fa-
cilitate challenges to regulatory innovation under international law. By
underpinning these measures with ISDS, which increases the economic
costs associated with litigation and institutionally embeds uncertainty
in treaty interpretation, the TPP provides a powerful new toolbox for
the industry in preventing the introduction of plain packaging and
other innovative health measures.
Finally, the lack of transparency in the TPP negotiations illustrates
the limitations inherent in the state-centric nature of article 5.3 of
the WHO FCTC. Article 5.3 aims to limit tobacco industry involve-
ment in health policy by, among other things, requiring parties to the
convention to make interactions between the tobacco industry and
public officials as transparent as possible. The USA is a non-party to
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the convention and is, therefore, under no obligation to make public
any involvement of tobacco companies, either directly or through third
parties, in TPP policymaking. This enables the tobacco industry to un-
dermine APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] states’ efforts to
implement article 5.3 and influence health policy remotely through
TPP negotiations.
There has been considerable expression of concern about whether
the TPP could be used to thwart other nations covered by the TPP from
doing what Australia has on plain packaging, and even whether the cur-
rent government might be persuaded to sacrifice Australia’s plain pack-
aging laws on the altar of its wider concerns to see the TPP adopted.
Encouragingly here, Australia’s trade minister Andrew Robb has
twice gone out of his way to emphasise that the Australian government’s
negotiations in the TPP would not see plain packaging somehow sac-
rificed to the wider terms of the treaty being developed. In a strongly
worded letter to The Age newspaper he wrote:
Australia is a world leader in tobacco control. It is incorrect for an
‘observer’ at the recent Trans-Pacific Partnership talks in Singapore
to suggest Australia is blocking the right of other TPP parties to
follow Australia’s lead. My primary focus in the TPP is to advance
Australia’s national interest, not compromise it. The Australian gov-
ernment has made it clear it will not accept an outcome that under-
mines our right to regulate for public health, including on tobacco
control. Under existing international trade obligations, Australia has
the right to implement tobacco control measures, such as plain pack-
aging for tobacco products, in the interests of public health. Australia
is very happy to consider any proposal in the TPP that confirms this
right. Ultimately, Australia will only sign up to a TPP deal that in-
cludes appropriate safeguards for public health. (398)
And again later he was reported in the Financial Review, saying: ‘The
plain packaging measure was introduced by the previous government
from a legitimate public health standpoint.’ (399)
In January 2014, the British retail trade publication The Grocer
reported that Imperial Tobacco’s chief in Australia, Melvin Ruigrok,
was moving to the UK to help his company ‘gear up for an escalation
in the fight against plain packaging’. The article reported an Imperial
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spokesman explaining that: ‘Melvin brings with him first-hand experi-
ence, having successfully led Australia through display bans and plain
pack legislation, experience that will be essential as the UK market
works through these very same regulatory pressure.’ (400)
‘Successfully led Australia through . . . plain pack legislation’ . . . In
the film Monty Python and the Holy Grail, there’s a famous scene where
King Arthur fights the Black Knight (see https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ikssfUhAlgg). Quickly losing two arms, the Black Knight con-
siders the loss ‘only a flesh wound’. Down two arms and a leg, he
declares he’s invincible. When King Arthur lops off his other leg, the
Knight says ‘right, we’ll call it a draw’. Stan Shatenstein, a long-time an-
alyst of tobacco control argues that, like the Black Knight, the industry’s
complete Australian humiliation is already being spun as a ‘success’ be-
cause so far, no other country has yet implemented plain packaging.
The history of tobacco control is a history of global dominoes tum-
bling first slowly, but then very, very quickly. As this book goes to press,
there is keen interest to see whether Ireland or the United Kingdom
becomes the second nation to legislate on plain packaging. Australia,
in being the first nation has hopefully unleashed a virulent, high con-
tagious and deadly agent that should cause immense damage to the
tobacco industry over the next decades. In 1985 Hugh Cullman, vice
chairman of Philip Morris Companies Inc told an international tobacco
industry meeting in Denmark: ‘As one of our Australian colleagues puts
it, a sneeze in one country today cause international pneumonia tomor-
row!’ (401)
Let us hope that plain packaging becomes as highly contagious as
all other platforms of comprehensive tobacco control have over the past
three to four decades, and that it proves to be highly resistant to any
‘treatments’ with which the global tobacco industry tries to dowse it.
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